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ABSTRACT
I present an ethnographic account of surgical operations, via which I have 
investigated two principal issues. Firstly, people’s uses of representations 
(verbal, visual, two-dimensional, three-dimensional), in performing complex 
tasks, and solving complex problems, and secondly, the ways in which these 
uses change as they gain in experience. Using a reflexive, interdisciplinary 
approach, I have shown strategies by which actual bodies become ‘merged’ 
with anatomical pictures and other representations of them (Hirschauer 1991), 
enabling surgeons to map the internal body during operations.
Initial evidence from sculptors showed that 2D pictures are frequently used as 
sources of ideas, for problem solving, or as rhetorical devices in the making of 
3D art. Their use as ‘blueprints’ or plans, or as models to copy directly, is 
however problematic. Numbers o f pictures were preferred to individual ones, 
and these tended to be combined and superimposed together in various ways. 
These uses o f pictures were also shown in observations o f surgeons.
I have identified ‘primary enhancement’ and ‘reduction’ procedures (ie, the 
pre-operative preparations that surgical patients undergo), and ‘fiirther 
enhancement’ procedures (which may include physical interventions, the use of 
anatomical pictures and other images, and language - literally verbal 
‘bodymapping’), which allow the body to be mapped, and become known.
Thus the body is subjected to alternating processes of enhancement and 
reduction which make successful surgical intervention possible.
These procedures may be differentially applied by individual surgeons with 
differing amounts of experience of a particular operation Further enhancement 
procedures may also be differentially used by groups o f surgeons performing 
‘actual’ and ‘virtual’ operations; that is, involved in the practical performance 
of a surgical procedure, or alternatively in the active observation of it, 
peripheral to it, but still very much involved. Surgeons thus become skilled 
‘operators’ via the performance o f actual and virtual operations
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1CHAPTER 1: BEGINNINGS...




What follows is above all about knowing, seeing, and how we come to know 
and see. It is intended as a contribution to the study of work and of skill, and 
stems from a long-term interest in the ‘thinking and doing’ processes of 
people who do skilled work with their hands and heads. Using examples 
(mainly) from veterinary surgery, my principal aim is to examine both the 
ways in which we accrue and apply knowledge, and to consider also the role 
of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ visual imagery in skilled task performance. I adopt 
the terms ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ in an attempt to differentiate between our 
internal, mental images, and their physical counterparts such as diagrams, 
photographs or the images that result from the application of technologies 
such as radiology. I am aware that this mental / physical dichotomy is in itself 
problematic; it may be for example that we do not in fact discriminate 
between them when we come to actually use imagery, to nearly the extent that 
we do when we discuss it.
I apply these terms here in preference however to those related ones of 
‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’. This terminology is particularly problematic since 
all images could be thought about as abstractions from things in the world. 
Amheim (1969) described the unitary nature of perceiving and thinking, 
stressing that at every level, this single cognitive process involves abstraction. 
Whilst I endorse this view, I nevertheless make use of related terms here, 
(unwillingly, and in the absence of any better), in an attempt to communicate 
what I wish to do. Difficulty in ‘finding the right words’ to express complex 
ideas and processes forms an important theme running throughout this thesis; 
one that will be revisited again and again.
My research represents not only an attempt to investigate the ways in which 
skilled practitioners tackle the complex tasks that form part of their work 
routines, but an attempt also (on my own part) to render more visible this 
complexity. Some aspects of the ways in which people approach and perform
2such tasks have a tendency to become hidden by the very mechanisms by 
which they are described and communicated, and as a result remain essentially 
unacknowledged. This work represents an attempt to make more explicit 
some of these tacit processes, and provide some insights into the ways in 
which practitioners represent a domain in which they are trying to solve 
problems, using the example of one particular domain; that of the body.
Research of this type is usually considered to be purely cognitive in nature, 
and therefore confined within the boundaries of psychology. Numerous other 
studies concerned with visual cognition and problem solving have made use 
of psychological experiments, (eg, Pylyshyn 1973; Kosslyn 1980; Kosslyn, 
Brunn, Cave & Wallach 1984). More recently, research on mental imagery in 
particular has become increasingly ‘neuropsychological’; related to findings 
about brain structure and function, (eg, Tippett 1992; Kosslyn 1994). I have 
chosen however (after much thought and research) to avoid these routes, and 
instead to do ethnographic work in natural settings, and construct case studies 
of actual procedures based upon this fieldwork. In doing so, I hope that this 
work, rather than purely ‘psychological’ in nature, will be considered to be o f 
broader disciplinary relevance. Thagard (1999) identified ‘social’ and 
‘physical’ aspects or dimensions that exist, (alongside the ‘cognitive’ one) in 
his study of explanations in science. Explaining, like bodymapping is also an 
activity that could be entirely relegated to psychology. Like Thagard however, 
I attempt to demonstrate how fuller explication can result from a more wide 
ranging and inclusive approach.
Also, without wishing to discount the considerable importance of 
experimental psychology to this topic, (and indeed, I refer to such studies at 
various points within my text), I feel, following Wundt (1916), Bartlett 
(1958), Neisser (1976), Cole et al (1978), Lave (1997) and Scribner (1997), 
that everyday problem solving situations are very different from laboratory 
ones in a number of important ways. For example, although any work 
situation is much more complex than a laboratory experiment, certain types of 
problems tend to occur over and over again within them, (even if they are not 
exactly the same each time), rather than the problem being totally 
decontextualised from normal everyday working life and experience. Also, 
unlike psychology laboratories, work situations tend to be rich sources of the 
sorts of tools and information needed for solving work-specific types of 
problems. Finally, the problems that need to be solved in the course o f skilled
3practice are usually a means to an end, rather than an end in themselves, as 
laboratory based problems tend to be.
These differences have been particularly well documented by Lave (1997) 
who studied how unschooled tribal craftsmen solved arithmetical problems 
both within their familiar work context, and also in the laboratory. Scribner 
(1997) studied US factory workers solving similar types o f problems, again 
both inside and outside of the work context, and found similar results. Both 
researchers found that their subjects, although skilled at solving almost 
identical problems as part of their work, found it very difficult to do so when 
the problems were decontextualised as psychology laboratory experiments.
1.2 Of surgical practices Mtt
‘But this morning, as the surgeon parts the edge o f  the wound with his 
retractor, he feels uncertain, fo r in that place where he knows the duct to be, 
there is none...'
Robert Selzer 1981
Veterinary surgery is fascinating, and under-researched even in comparison 
with a ‘human’ counterpart that is itself not extensively researched. Pinch, 
Collins and Carbone (1996) used it as a context to examine some of the ways 
in which task uncertainty may be resolved in practice, and this interesting 
study represents in some ways a starting point for my own. They described 
this work as a ‘second order study of skill’ which, whist accepting that skills 
and their transmission are the properties of social groups, wished to examine 
in detail which aspects of skills can be explicated and which cannot. They 
identified a ‘quasi-quantitative measure of skill acquisition - hardness’ (ibid 
p .163)^’ wj1jc}1 may have value in contributing to a wider understanding of 
how task uncertainty is resolved in practice and how new skills are learned.
Another influential study is that o f Hirschauer (1991), who showed how the 
bodies of (human) surgical patients are ‘made operable’, and ‘anatomical 
visibility’ created by means of ‘highly skilled manipulations and optical 
technology’. Both Pinch and his co-workers and also Hirschauer have used an 
ethnographic approach similar to my own. Like Pinch, Collins and Carbone, I 
am interested in skills and their transmission within a culture, and in the same 
sort of way as Hirschauer, I wish to examine the ways in which the ‘language’
4of anatomy may be ‘read’ by practitioners who possess the appropriate skills. 
Both of these studies were concerned to some or other extent with surgeons’ 
‘bodymapping’ activities during operations. One of my intentions here is to 
carry this theme further by shedding some light upon the actual variations that 
occur in some of these processes when the ‘same’ operation is carried out by 
surgeons with differing amounts of practical experience.
Surgical operations, as well as being very interesting, have certain other 
advantages as a research topic over, for example, the sculptural procedures 
discussed in chapter 7. There, I report findings from a pilot study relating to 
art and craft practices which I have loosely termed ‘sculpture’. A surgical 
operation (unlike the processes involved in making a sculpture) necessarily 
takes place within a relatively short timespan (though obviously the precise 
duration varies according to the actual procedure, as well as other factors 
which will be discussed below). It also has a clearly defined beginning, 
middle and end. It is useful to think about a surgical procedure (any surgical 
procedure), as consisting o f four stages. Stage 1 involves the pre-operative 
preparation, including the induction o f anaesthesia, stage 2 the incision, stage 
3 is the actual procedure itself; this may consist for example of the excision 
of unwanted material, or the repair of broken bones. The fourth stage is the 
closure o f the incision. These stages will be further discussed, and illustrated 
further on, particularly in chapters 8 and 9.
The (1996) study carried out by Pinch, Collins and Carbone, whilst 
emphasising the social dimension ubiquitious in some areas of science 
studies, acknowledges also the importance o f a cognitive one which exists 
alongside it. Thagard’s (1999) inclusion o f a physical dimension in addition 
to these social and cognitive ones is also noteworthy because o f this 
dimension’s particular emphasis in more recent debates within the philosophy 
of science. For Thagard, this physical dimension includes within it such 
things as scientists’ uses of experimentation, and also the tools, equipment 
and external representations (such as books and diagrams) that they use. 
Gooding (1996a) in his consideration of experimentation, included thought 
experiments alongside actual, physical ones, thereby drawing a further link 
between the physical and the cognitive.
5Thought experiments, like mental representations, are undeniably ‘cognitive’ 
things, and ‘real’ experiments physical in nature. However, in the same sort 
of way as with mental representations and their physical counterparts, the 
ways in which we use them at times render it difficult to distinguish between 
them. Pinch, Collins and Carbone (1996) then, stressed cognitive aspects 
which exist alongside the social ones within their chosen context, and 
Gooding, (1996a) the physical alongside the cognitive ones within his. 
Thagard however has taken this further, choosing to give more or less equal 
weight to all three o f these ‘dimensions’. I shall attempt to do the same.
Katz (1981) and Hirschauer (1991) emphasised the importance of the sterility 
procedures which surround surgical operations (carried out upon human 
patients). Rather than being seen merely as infection prevention measures, 
these are better understood as ritual practices designed to deal with the taboos 
which surround the human body, (which is not an issue here), or to increase 
efficiency by allowing autonomy of action, thus enabling workers to function 
in situations o f ambiguity. This last point is relevant, and interesting, since 
these procedures are important within veterinary surgery also, and not merely 
from the obvious standpoint of asepsis.
1.3 M apping surgeons’ mapping of the body...
Of major concern to all surgeons is the body; its cartographies, both internal 
and external, its functions and form, the ways in which we apply our 
knowledge about it, and how it is represented. As a practice, surgery has its 
own special knowledge (quite apart from more ‘general’ knowledge that we 
all share) about the body. Recent work suggesting the importance of visual 
imagery (both the internal, mental kind and also external, physical 
representations), to the natural sciences, has prompted me to consider its use 
in the context of my own work, concerned as it is with the applied scientific 
discipline of surgery. I refer specifically to the ways in which surgeons map 
the body during operations. Not only from the point of view of my research 
subjects’ own use o f such devices (although this is obviously of great 
relevance), but also ways in which I might myself use them to help explicate a 
complex, dynamic process that seems difficult to express adequately in words 
alone. As the art historian Barbara Stafford (1991 p.2) has stated, some things 
(even quite fundamental ones) are, and remain very hard to express verbally.
6Some examples of what she terms these inarticulable relationships are those 
important ones (to me) of interior / exterior, and idea and form.
I will argue that, when preparing to perform operations, surgeons need in 
some way to ‘map’ or visualize the internal body. Since it is to be expected 
that individual variations exist in the interior (as well as the exterior) 
appearance of bodies, it cannot be assumed, even if a surgeon has carried out a 
particular procedure on one or more previous occasions (or watched someone 
else doing it, or looked at pictures in a textbook), that the organs in this case 
will be exactly the same in appearance (and even their position may vary to 
some extent), or for that matter that the procedure’s trajectory will be exactly 
similar this time. The quote from Selzer at the head o f the previous section is 
illustrative of this. Hirschauer (1991, p.310) explicitly described a need for 
specialism in surgery; he asserted that the visual complexity of the body 
forces every student surgeon into the disciplinary differentiation of the field.
Veterinary surgeons are therefore particularly interesting to study in this 
respect because, not only do they not specialise in the same way as surgeons 
in ‘human’ medicine (even ‘specialists’ do more ‘general’ work as well, in 
most circumstances), but they may work also with the fu ll range o f  animal 
species. In addition to having to contend with the whole of anatomy in a way 
not encountered by their ‘human’ counterparts, encompassing individual 
anatomical differences that may occur in any part of the body, vets have also 
to contend with species differences, and for that matter, even differences 
between the different classes o f animals, such as mammals, birds and reptiles.
It must be borne in mind that at the outset, before any incision is made, the 
body’s (any body’s) bones and internal organs are in most cases invisible. An 
operation may be carried out with or without the aid o f pictures in textbooks, 
or those produced by means of technological interventions such as 
radiography. Such devices could be said to expand the senses, providing if  
you like extra sensory perceptions, which allow the interior of the body to be 
viewed or visualized from the exterior. In addition to these sensory expansion 
devices, certain reduction processes may also be of importance to the 
visualisation process. For example the anaesthetised animal is carefully 
positioned. It may be placed in a device to hold it steady in the desired 
position, and /or one or more of its limbs tied to the legs o f the operating table
7to hold them out of the way. The entire body will usually be covered with 
drapes, with the exception of the immediate area where the incision is to be 
made. Additionally, in animal patients the incision site is shaved, which has 
the effect of further demarcating it from the remainder of the body. The site 
may be further marked by painting it with antiseptic, or even drawing the line 
of the intended incision.
After the initial incision has been made, the internal body must be 
(re)constructed in the sense of identifying individual organs and their relations 
to each other. This (reconstruction process may be made more difficult by 
the obscuring presence o f blood, muscle, fat, mesentery and other bodily 
substances, and the facts that both individual variations exist in the relative 
size, position and so forth o f even normal organs (diseased organs and broken 
bones may obviously vary even more in appearance); also, that the body is 
made up of a number o f layers, the organs overlying each other. Xray images, 
or pictures in anatomical atlases or surgical manuals may be consulted again 
at this point. However, it is important to recognise that the content of some of 
these representations is itself problematic; a measure of expert interpretation 
is required in order that they be of any use at all.
The question of dimensionality too, is an interesting one. Most pictures are 
two dimensional, and practical ‘reality’ usually occurs in three dimensions. I 
discount here the use of such medical imaging technologies as magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) and computer aided tomography (CT), which do 
give images more approaching three dimensions, simply for the reason that 
these are not used in general veterinary practice at the time of writing, (and are 
therefore unavailable to me as data sources in this investigation). Beaulieu 
(2000) however has studied these developing practices in real time, and this 
research adds interesting insights to previous studies of developing optical or 
visualization technologies, the interpretation o f images produced by them, and 
their integration into mainstream discourses.
My own respondents needed in some way to accommodate a switch between 
dimensions that occurs when they use pictures to aid with the visualisation of 
three dimensional tasks. Gooding (1996a p.94) described a  process in the 
early stages of scientific innovation, which he termed ‘dimensional reduction 
and enhancement’, in which dimensions are first subtracted, then added to
8existing images (which may be either mental images or tangible images in the 
real world, such as pictures) to create new images to aid inference. I will later 
argue that a variation of this posited process could be put forward as an 
explanation for the method by which surgeons map the body in complex 
operations.
1.4 ... And *sculpturaP practices...
Hirschauer (1991) described surgery as a ‘sculptural practice’ which relates 
‘experience and representation’ in explaining how patients’ bodies come to 
‘embody the properties of anatomical pictures’. Surgery, like sculpture, he 
argued, is ‘a sequence of looking and cutting’ (p.299). The use of this 
intriguing metaphor has prompted me to consider also the ‘practice’ of 
sculpture itself. How is it similar for example, and how does it appear to 
differ from surgery? If surgery can be described thus as a ‘sculptural 
practice’, then perhaps the practice of sculpture (or at least, sculptors) can help 
shed some additional light upon the research questions, particularly since 
veterinary surgeons, like Hirschauer’s subjects, are often very bad informants 
during operations.
The two practices seem, at least on the surface, to be very different in nature. 
Surgery can be termed broadly ‘scientific’, or at least ‘applied-scientific’, 
(Hirschauer (1996 p 279 / 314) referred to it as an ‘applied science’); 
sculpture belongs unquestionably to the realm of ‘the arts’. I have chosen 
these examples advisedly; partly pragmatically (ie, access was possible, 
although as I will relate later, not always easy), but also because of these 
perceived differences. Our society tends rightly or wrongly to segregate rather 
strictly ‘artistic’ from ‘scientific’ pursuits, assigning to them not only different 
modes of education and areas of concern, but in some senses differential 
status also. Historically this has not always been the case. It is the case 
though, somewhat paradoxically, that, although it seems to be accepted that 
science and art are ‘different’ from one another in various ways, precisely 
what these differences are is hard to pin down. Also, their actual content is 
frequently subject to debate; for example, what exactly constitutes a valid 
work of art? Painting and sculpture (or at least, realist paintings and 
sculptures) are rarely criticised as not being ‘real’ art, most especially when 
they are produced by ‘real’ artists. But how about more abstract pieces,
9particularly those in which use is made of non-traditional media or materials? 
Science too, is subject to its own questions and debates. What characterises 
‘hard’ science? Can biology and psychology for example be termed ‘real’ 
sciences in the same sense as physics or mathematics? And how about the 
‘quasi-sciences’ o f the paranormal? This thesis bears upon, and contributes to 
debates about these important issues.
Quite apart from this conventional art / science dichotomy (whose apparent 
denial, or refutation will inevitably characterise my work as ‘interdisciplinary’ 
- or ‘undisciplined’ perhaps?), there exist others. Neither is it merely the 
empirical subject matter that spans disciplinary areas. My literary sources also 
originate from a range of disciplines; art and art history, history of science, 
sociology, psychology, artificial intelligence and others are represented in my 
bibliography, and despite the fact that I carry out real-time research, the 
conferences to which I have been invited to contribute, have been history 
ones.
Another of the ways in which my chosen practices could be categorised is that 
o f their attributed relative status. Veterinary medicine is unquestionably a 
‘profession’ in a society in which professional occupations are rather highly 
valued and rewarded. The position of sculpture is rather more ambiguous. 
Could sculpture be termed a ‘profession’ and sculptors ‘professionals’ in the 
same sort of way as veterinary surgeons? The term ‘profession’ itself, and 
exactly what contributes to a particular occupational group being considered 
‘professionals’ are subject to debate. Also, the process of 
‘professionalisation’ (that is, the process by which an occupational group 
gains professional status), is a focus for discussion. Eraut (1994 p.l) 
described the boundaries of ‘professionalism’ as ill defined, and discussed the 
many attempts that have been made to provide an adequate definition. Etzioni 
(1969) for example, termed nursing and teaching as ‘semi-professions’ due to 
the relative lack of autonomy and the large numbers of people who follow 
these occupations. Millerson (1964) attempted to define the term by 
compiling a list of ‘professional traits’, although this was itself criticised by 
Eraut as being based solely upon the author’s view of the characteristics of 
high status professions such as medicine and law. Johnson (1972,1984) 
approached the concept of professionalism as an ideology, and 
professionalisation as the process whereby occupational groups seek to gain 
status and advantage in terms of this ideology.
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Training in veterinaiy medicine is highly regulated both by the university 
system and also by professional associations (the Royal College of Veterinary 
Surgeons, or RCVS, and the British Veterinaiy Association, or BVA). 
Research in the (human) medical sociology field has emphasised the role of 
aspects of such training and regulation in socialising young doctors into the 
culture of medicine, so maintaining the status quo in relation to a powerful 
profession’s exclusive right to practise, (see for example, Atkinson and Heath 
1981). In contrast however, the training for sculpture, as is the case with 
many other artistic pursuits, is far less rigidly structured and regulated. Whilst 
it may last as long and be as structured as that undertaken by veterinary 
surgeons, this is not necessarily the case. On the contrary, given the lack of 
formal regulation, it may follow any number of alternative patterns. Indeed, 
some practitioners claim never to have undergone any formal training 
whatsoever. My own respondents varied according to the type / length / form 
of training they had received, from art school degree to some sort of formal or 
informal ‘apprenticeship’ in which they learned by working alongside 
experienced people in some similar or related field.
There are doubtless many other criteria by which these practices could be 
categorised; these merely serve as examples. However, instead of 
consigning them separately into (roughly) arts and science, or ‘professional’ 
and ‘non-professional’ (or for that matter, any other) categories in a 
classificatoiy (dualistic?) sort of way, I wish to concentrate instead rather 
upon the things that they have in common.
LS-wt And narrative order,™
I began this chapter with a quote from Fodor, with which he incidentally also 
began his work Representations. As I recollect, he then followed this 
comment with a very long introduction to his book. I do not entirely recollect 
to what extent he managed to avoid either superfluity or prematurity in doing 
so. However, in making this statement Fodor identified a problem which is 
very relevant to the present work; how very difficult it is to ‘begin’ writing a 
project of this nature. It could be assumed that one might start at ‘the 
beginning’, for example by stating what is to be covered, and work forward 
from this in a step-by-step sort of fashion to the conclusion. It is by no means 
clear though, where ‘the beginning’ lies when considering in more depth the
11
matters that form the focus for a complex study such as this (or for that 
matter, that of Fodor). Any starting point is in a sense arbitrary. Also, 
although it is fairly straightforward to identify what they are, it is not at all 
obvious precisely in which order should fall the various ‘steps’ which 
logically follow it. In fact, it is most difficult to position them in such a tidy, 
serial order, simply because life as it is lived (as opposed to life as it is 
(re)constructed) does not usually consist of, and neither does it result in, such 
order.
In reality (as opposed to situations which occur in the narratives, or ‘stories’ 
that we tell about it), several things may (indeed usually) happen all at once, 
so that it is difficult to tease them apart in order to recount them. Moreover, 
events do not necessarily follow a progressive pattern, but may regress. For 
these sorts of reasons, we cannot ‘tell it like it is’ in any real sense. There are 
always many alternative stories that could be told (Bennett and Royle 1999). 
We are faced with a task not of straight reporting (since this is not possible), 
but of construction, (or reconstruction) of events into a narrative sequence.
1.6 Narratmty tttf
‘We are made real by stories *
Curt 1994, p.55).
Already, ‘words have failed me’ in several respects as far as the things that I 
am trying to communicate are concerned. The main reason for this I think, is 
inherent in the narrative form itself, which I am compelled to use, both for 
reasons of convention and also because of the lack of any realistic alternative. 
(I refer here to Curt’s quote, cited above). Narrative is useful (even essential) 
to us because it helps us to order, communicate and make sense of our 
experiences (Johnson 1987, p. 171). Narrative enables our readers (or hearers) 
to imagine a situation - that is, to create a mental image of what is happening 
to us, or what we are doing. However, like all representational forms, it also 
has its limitations, and these lie within these very processes of ordering, 
communication and sense-making.
A narrative is in an important sense, a (re)construction of our lived 
experiences, which requires additional reconstruction (or interpretation) by 
our readers or hearers (Atkinson 1990). Paul Atkinson referred here to
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ethnographic narratives (such as those featured within this thesis). He called 
these ‘highly contrived products’. This was not intended as a particular slur 
on the methods of ethnography (which is after all Atkinson’s preferred 
method of enquiry, as well as my own), but rather to emphasise some general 
limitations; principally in so far as ethnographic writing, in common with any 
other type of account or representation, cannot possibly be neutral or 
‘objective’ in any accepted sense. Atkinson described in detail how narrative 
order is ‘a« accomplishment o f  tellers, hearers, writers and readers ’ (ibid 
p. 105); for example in the ‘writing down’ and the subsequent ‘writing up’ 
stages that one goes through in order to produce an ethnographic monograph. 
One initially ‘writes down’ one’s field notes (which are themselves 
reconstructions or interpretations of what the observer has seen), and 
eventually ‘writes them up’, in a process which again reconstructs and 
reorders these into a coherent narrative.
Atkinson described strategies within these narratives by which ethnographers 
‘place’ the reader at the scene, and additional rhetorical devices such as the 
use o f paired clauses in titles to link a specific topic to a more general theme 
or theory. This denotes that the piece of writing under consideration is about 
‘something more than’ the author’s own study (ibid pp.76-80), and is common 
within the genre; narrative possesses also then, a persuasive, or rhetorical 
function. I have used the latter convention myself - ‘Mapping surgeons ’ 
mapping the body.....' These aspects are discussed in more detail in Section 2 
of Chapter 6, which relates more specifically to methodology. Narrative 
sequence has failed me again - or (veiy possibly) vice versa.
Gooding (1990,1996a, 1996b) highlighted another drawback inherent in 
narrative recounting. He showed how many of the things which are for one 
reason or another difficult to articulate, tend to get ‘lost’ within narratives. 
Whilst recognising that reconstructive processes such as those involved in 
narrating (as we could term the production of narrative accounts), have great 
value in that they are ordered enough to enable further action, provide clarity 
o f communication, and allow the redefinition of problems, it is important to 
take on board the fact that they also have important constraints, as narrative 
accounts of scientific experiments have shown. These constraints are often to 
do with ways in which skills are rendered invisible because aspects of them 
cannot be verbalised (Gooding 1990, p.27). Even those aspects which can be
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explicated tend to lose this visibility as observers or experimenters gain in 
expertise, and the skills themselves move into the realms of the tacit.
Gooding (1990) criticised philosophers’ neglect of the epistemic significance 
of the way in which ‘actions’ are subsumed as ‘statements’ in scientists’ 
published accounts of their work. Although the reflexive nature of 
experiments enables understanding, their reporting often involves translating 
actions into statements, which are prepositional in nature. Action can be 
expressed in prepositional (and many other) forms though, only in hindsight, 
and this does not reflect the inherent ‘messiness’ and immediacy of 
experimental reality. Gooding went on to show how this correspondence of 
words and images to things and processes is a made relationship (ibid, p. 160). 
As we will discuss later, much research in psychology, science studies and 
artificial intelligence has shown that it is misleading to identify knowledge 
only with what can be expressed in words.
The narrative form then, imposes a serial order, a sequencing of events quite 
unlike what actually happens in reality (Gooding 1996a, p.82). Thomas 
Nickles (1988, p.34) has also criticised many philosophies of science for their 
unquestioning acceptance of what he termed this ‘one pass fallacy’. By this 
he meant the way in which scientists’ written accounts o f their work give the 
impression of a single, linear ‘pass’ or string of operations, thereby obscuring 
and ignoring to a great extent both the problems and uncertainties encountered 
along the way, and the creativity necessary to solve (or at least work with) 
them. One reason for this may lie in the fact that creativity is difficult (indeed 
almost impossible) to recognise as such after the creative process has ended 
(Gooding 1996b, p. 191). Gooding described how creative insight can elude 
introspection, since before its completion, it does not necessarily appear to be 
creative. Often it seems to be going nowhere, or alternatively in too many 
directions all at once. The linear, unidirectional nature of narrative conceals 
the reality of human creative (and recreative) processes (Gooding 1996b). 
While his arguments were situated in terms of discovery in innovative science, 
my own belong within more commonplace discovery. Although situated in 
far less exalted spheres, such small ‘discoveries’ are interesting in that they 
are common to skilled practice and to all of us.
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In order to aid with their communication, I produce my own images {Graphic 
renderings) which I use alongside the text. Like the images and text in the 
surgical manuals and anatomical atlases that my respondents use, both images 
and text are intended to be used together, each to compliment the other. As 
well as these works that are the stock in trade of my research respondents, I 
am influenced by the diagrammatic notation that dancers and choreographers 
use to communicate movement.
The question that this research attempts to address is that of: ‘How do 
surgeons map the body during operations?’ I state below some broad 
objectives in relation to this.
• to consider the ways in which we apply knowledge in our approach to, and 
performance of skilled tasks
• to consider alongside this the role of physical images such as pictures, and 
our own mental visual images in skilled task performance
• to examine the ways in which people use two dimensional representations 
to help them carry out three-dimensional tasks, or solve three-dimensional 
problems
• to experiment with the use of text alongside alternative representational 
forms in the communication of process.
1.7 Thesis Plan and Layout
Before presenting my field work case studies, I conduct an interdisciplinary 
(though necessarily selective) review of the literature pertaining to knowing 
and seeing, in order to provide for my studies an appropriate theoretical, 
historical and practical context. This review is necessarily wide-ranging, since 
there exists no discrete ‘body of literature’ that pertains to the particular topics 
to which I refer. This is a ‘science studies’- based thesis. I place myself 
philosophically (as well as geographically) within the science studies 
form-of-life. However, as well as traditional science studies sources, art and 
art history, history of science, sociology, philosophy, psychology, cognitive 
science and others are represented in my bibliography. The structure of the 
remainder of this thesis is as follows:
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Chapter 2 ‘Knowing’ discusses ways in which ‘knowledge’ has been defined 
and categorised, and compares two contrasting models of ‘knowledge’; that 
implicit in knowledge acquisition methods used in Artificial Intelligence and 
Expert Systems, and an alternative, enculturational model based upon 
arguments put forward by a body of work in SSK (the sociology of scientific 
knowledge). I examine the role of knowledge within skilled practice, and 
review the ways in which novice practitioners differ from experts. Following 
on from this, I discuss the significance o f plans for skilled practice, I conclude 
with a consideration of mapping as a way of knowing.
Chapter 3 ‘Seeing’ begins by exploring the necessity for, and problems that 
exist with dividing these topics into discrete chapters and sections. I justify 
separation of the material in this chapter from that in the next with reference 
to Kantian distinctions between ‘seeing as’ and ‘seeing that’ (Miller 1996). 
Thus I discuss visual representations of the body here; in anatomical pictures, 
three dimensional models, and also what I have termed ‘extra-sensory 
perceptions’. By this term, I refer to bodily images obtained by means of 
technologies such as radiography, and also to ‘non-pictorial’ representations 
such as the printouts provided by machines that quantify substances within the 
body (such as blood biochemistry analysers), or which enable the visualisation 
of minute bodily movements, such as the kymograph and its descendents. The 
latter two do not visualise the appearance of the body, but provide information 
relating to its function. Particularly interesting are instances in which 
numbers of these representations, often from different modalities, are 
superimposed, or juxtaposed together. I conclude by examining debates about 
our uses of mental imagery, and ponder the ways in which this impinges upon 
the uses that we make of its physical counterparts of the types already 
mentioned.
Chapter 4 ‘Knowing and seeing’ follows on from this in its consideration of 
occasions when we move beyond our actual perceptions to make inferences 
about things in the world. I discuss the emergence of visual languages, not 
only as a tool for communicating ideas, but for thinking about them also. I 
consider in addition the different ‘models’ that exist of ‘mental models’. I 
conclude with a discussion of modes of inference. I argue for the abductive 
model to account for the creative thinking of skilled practitioners in solving
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problems in their everyday work, and in dealing with novel or uncertain 
situations.
Chapter 5 ‘Putting the language into visual languages’ discusses some of 
the ways in which the visual interfaces with verbal language.
Notwithstanding the difficulties so far encountered with matters pertaining to 
language, particularly narrative sequencing, the importance o f language to the 
topics under consideration cannot be denied. I discuss in particular the roles 
played by talk and text in the workplace, and the cruciality o f metaphor and 
analogy to science and to art. I suggest that we use visual representations 
alongside verbal ones, sometimes together and sometimes separately, and 
interchangeably, and for the same purposes. I argue thus for the possibility of 
the ‘visual metaphor’.
Chapter 6, ‘How we got here’ is divided into two sections. In section 1,1 
summarise the main points that have been raised by the literature review, and 
reflect upon the nature of the research question. Section 2 is concerned with 
methodology, with an emphasis upon the method(s) of ethnography.
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 will consist of empirical material derived from my 
ethnographic work, to include case studies o f actual procedures. I experiment 
with alternative forms of recording and communicating process (alternative, 
that is to the use of narrative alone).
Chapter 7 ‘Building bodies...’ is an account of a small pilot study which 
involved interviews with (and observations of) four artists / craftspersons 
whom I have termed ‘sculptors’. The purpose of this study was primarily to 
develop methodology. However, I justify its inclusion because it offers some 
interesting insights, particularly in respect of the uses of 2D pictures in the 
performance of 3D tasks (mirroring in some respects the uses that surgeons 
make of anatomical pictures).
Chapter 8 ‘Taking things apart’ explores a common surgical procedure 
undertaken by vets, that o f the ‘spaying’, or sterilisation of female domestic 
animals. I discuss ways in which surgeons categorise the operations that they 
perform, which may give clues as to how they think about them, and approach 
them. I describe the preparatory procedures that both surgeons and their
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patients undergo. In the case of these routine operations, it would appear that 
these are not always performed strictly in line with textbook guidelines, but 
tend to vary along with the experience o f the surgeon. I identify ‘primary 
enhancement’, ‘reduction, and ‘further enhancement’ procedures which are 
applied to the patient-body, in operations that proceed in a routine way, and 
also in an instance where a skilled surgeon experienced uncertainty in relation 
to an anatomical abnormality / variation that he had not previously 
encountered. I argue for the abductive model of inference as the best 
explanation available to account for his actions in this situation.
Chapter 9 ‘Putting things (back) together’ examines some less routine 
surgical procedures, in the form of orthopaedic operations. Main concerns 
raised include expanded discussion of ‘further enhancement procedures’ and 
their use by different groups of surgeons in performing ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’ 
operations. The differences that exist in novices’ and experts’ approaches to a 
task, and between textbook accounts and actual practice are further 
highlighted. I discuss in more detail, and speculate further upon the roles of 
pre-operative procedures, both in relation to their uses as ‘enhancement and 
reduction’ tools, and also to Goffinan’s (1961) role theory.
Chapter 10 presents the discussion and conclusions to my study. It will 
discuss the findings o f the case studies in relation to the research question, and 
consider their broader applicability. It will discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of this research, identify other issues of interest that arose from 
the data, and make suggestions for further research.
NOTES
‘Hardness’ as in ’difficulty’.





4Speaking o f the vexatious problem o f  whether these elaborate electronic 
brains could really ‘think Sir Ben (Lockspeiser) said that it was necessary to 
distinguish between routine thought - which a machine could often perform 
much more quickly and more reliably than the human brain - and creative 
thought, which lay outside o f  the province o f  the machine ’
‘Electronic Brains’. Scientific Correspondent, The Manchester Guardian, 7 
May. 1954.
When we are asked the question ‘How do you know that?’, it is usually in 
response to some assertion or statement that we have made. What we are 
actually being asked for is some form of evidence or justification to back up 
our assertion. In asking a similar question here though, what I am after is not 
how we know one particular thing, but how we ‘know’ in general. I could 
phrase this question differently: ‘How do we come to know anything? or 
alternatively ‘How do we know what we know? ’.
In this chapter I will explore some of the (alternative) answers that could be 
put forward to such questions. I begin by discussing a range of definitions and 
classifications pertaining to ‘knowledge’. I continue with a comparison of 
two broad traditions that have been put forward as to its nature; that (arguably 
more ‘traditional’ one) implicit in knowledge elicitation for Artificial 
Intelligence and Expert Systems research, and an alternative model based 
upon arguments put forward by a body of work in SSK (the sociology of 
scientific knowledge). These traditions need to be bome in mind in relation to 
ideas discussed further on in this chapter, and elsewhere.
Although I discuss visualisation more fully in ensuing chapters, I briefly 
mention here also concepts of ‘seeing’, perception or observation which are 
associated with these models o f knowing. I include this here in my anxiety to 
avoid inferring (by separating them totally in a physical sense) any separation 
(in a more philosophical sense) between knowing and seeing. After 
Wittgenstein (1953) and Hanson (1965) I argue against the conventional
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hierarchy which places cognition above perception (eg see Fodor 1983), and 
for  the inseparability o f knowing from seeing. As Barnes et al (1996, p.4), 
writing from a science studies perspective put it, for m e ,4observation... is 
shot through with interpretation However, I am restricted by the narrative 
form that I am trying (somewhat unsuccessfully) to escape, and the associated 
necessity to ‘sequence’ this thesis by dividing it into discrete chapters.
I continue by examining the notion of ‘skill’ as distinct from that of 
‘knowledge’, and considering the role of knowledge within skilled practice. I 
review also ‘stage models’ of skill acquisition, particularly in relation to the 
ways in which ‘novice’ practitioners differ from ‘experts’ in task performance. 
Following on from this, I discuss the significance of plans for skilled practice. 
It is accepted in a common-sense sort of way (in our society at least - there are 
other interpretations possible), that people plan their work, either 
meticulously, or in a rough and ready sort of way, perhaps depending upon 
individual factors such as ‘personality’, or alternatively upon the kind of task 
being undertaken. One could assume that herein might lie a verifiable 
difference between the sciences (however applied) and the arts. My chosen 
example of surgery would seem to be one in which meticulous and careful 
planning is essential. It might after all be a matter of life and death literally 
that things go strictly according to plan; if  plans go wrong, or have to be 
changed due to unforeseen circumstances, the consequences might be grave 
indeed. It is contended however, following Suchman (1987) that although 
people’s attitudes towards planning are largely dependent upon cultural 
factors, we in fact all use (and do not use) plans in a similar sort of way. I 
conclude by considering ‘mapping’ as a ‘way of knowing’. This theme is 
revisited in the following two chapters in connection with various related 
topics.
This chapter has obvious (and explicit) cognitive and social dimensions.
What is not necessarily obvious, is that knowledge also has physical 
dimensions. Some examples might include the various means by which 
knowledge is encoded and communicated, in books, papers, instruction 
leaflets, recipes, diagrams, plans, computer programs and so forth, and also 
ways in which these are applied or used in practical activities. The physical 
dimensions of knowledge are therefore equally as important to this study as 
those others mentioned above. As we later see however, any or all of these
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dimensions may be obscured in certain ways, due to the difficulties that lie in 
specifying some of the contents of knowledge.
These are huge topics, and I have necessarily been selective in so far as I 
review only some of the sources which would seem to bear direct relevance.
2.2 W hat is knowledge?
This is a question which has caused great concern to psychologists, 
philosophers and others over many years. Different, and contested models of 
‘knowledge’ exist, but as yet there is no consensus as to which (if any) is the 
‘right’ one, which may go some way towards explaining why teaching is so 
very difficult, and learning still so poorly understood (and incidentally 
perhaps, why education remains such a hotly contested topic in academic, 
political and other arenas).
‘Knowledge’ (although a familiar concept, and one which everyone knows 
about in a common sense sort of way), lacks a single, uncontested and 
overarching definition. Regoczei and Hirst (1992, p. 14-15) summarised some 
of the alternatives that exist, and also some of the problems that these 
definitions entail, in relation to their own field of Expert Systems research. 
They defined it firstly as ‘a concept consisting of a cluster of associated 
metaphors’, and went on to describe some of these metaphors, the ways in 
which they can be useful, and the ways in which they are sometimes 
misleading; for example, knowledge as a (metaphorical) substance that 
people possess, and which can be (however problematically) transferred from 
one person to another, or stored in a database (after Reddy 1979), and 
knowledge as a sort of organic being, (think about the way people talk about 
the ‘creation’ and ‘growth’ of knowledge). Aside from these ‘metaphorical’ 
definitions (metaphor will be revisited in ensuing chapters, particularly 
chapter 5), Regoczei and Hirst also cited the common sense idea of 
knowledge as ‘justified true belief. However, there are snags related to this, 
not only for their own field but also more generally; the practical difficulties 
of operationalising or eliciting ‘beliefs’ for example, and (perhaps more 
philosophically) the contrasting and conflicting ideas that exist regarding the 
terms ‘justify’ and ‘true’. Whose justification, and whose truth? Who 
decides?
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Newell (1982) identified knowledge with goals, aims, objectives, plans and 
purposeful behaviour. This seems useful, and to a certain extent, I make use 
of this definition here. However, as Regoczei and Hirst (1992) pointed out, 
there are other ‘knowledges’ possible, that may not be consistent with goals 
and aims; ethical, holistic or aesthetic knowledge for example, which may not 
be valued so highly in our society as more analytical, ‘scientific’ kinds of 
knowledge, but are nonetheless undeniably very important in some domains of 
expertise. Therefore, as a single, overarching definition it might still not 
work. Newell and Simon (1972) saw knowledge as a form of writing-like 
representation inscribed in the mind of a cogniting agent (which might be a 
human, or a computer). This definition o f knowledge, as a representation o f 
something in the world, is also one that is useful to my arguments, and one 
also I feel, that can include the ‘alternative’ kinds of knowledge alluded to 
above. I remain unsure however why it should be encoded in writing-like 
form; why not as images for example? *
So much for definitions; various attempts have been made also to classify 
knowledge into different types, or categories. Regoczei and Hirst (1992) 
summarised some of these as follows:
• Personal knowledge; that possessed by the individual. This is made up, 
partly of the general body of public knowledge of the culture to which the 
individual belongs (for example, knowledge about surgery), and partly of 
that individual’s own store of experiential, contextually applied knowledge 
which has been built up over time.
• Public knowledge, consisting of rules and techniques (such as that 
published in anatomical atlases and surgical textbooks), pertaining to a 
particular culture or form-of -life. This socially constructed knowledge 
may not be public in so far as everyone knows it, but it is in the public 
domain of the particular culture to which it belongs.
• Objective knowledge; this could be construed as ‘factual’ knowledge, ‘the 
truth’, or ‘independent knowledge . This type of knowledge is regarded 
very highly in our society, and forms a basis for the ‘hard’ sciences such as 
mathematics and physics.
All three of these types (or dimensions) of knowledge are of obvious 
importance in my research context. Another, related distinction is that
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between ‘book knowledge’ and the ‘experience knowledge’ that has been 
‘field tested’ (ibid, p. 17); refined, selected and improved in actual contexts. 
These classifications have been linked to the distinctions between task 
knowledge, or ‘knowing how’ and domain knowledge, or ‘knowing that’, (see 
Ryle 1949; Polanyi 1958; Buchanan and Smith 1989 for further discussion o f 
these terms). At various times, this distinction has been referred to as 
procedural versus declarative, or prepositional or formal knowledge versus 
experiential, (eg Anderson 1983; Cooke 1992). Anderson’s (1983) theory of 
skill acquisition (described in more detail below) is largely based upon 
proposed changes in declarative and procedural knowledge systems which 
occur as expertise is gained.
Regoczei (1992) questioned the usefulness of this procedural - declarative 
dichotomy, arguing that these two knowledge ‘types’ cannot be so easily 
separated. Task knowledge for example can be represented in both 
declarative and procedural ways. For example, declarative knowledge can 
include knowledge about procedures (as in knowledge about the steps 
required to successfully carry out some task). This argument too has obvious 
relevance here. However, this (verbalizable) ‘knowing’ knowledge versus 
(non-verbalizable) ‘doing’ knowledge distinction is nevertheless a useful one 
in terms of my arguments, although as Regoczei intimated, it may not be 
particularly useful to think of them in terms of a strict dichotomy. Collins 
(1990), argued against the very existence of different categories of knowledge. 
For Collins just one sort exists, and any apparent distinctions or differences 
are to do rather with the different ways in which we deal with it. He stressed 
that ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ (like knowing and seeing) are not so easily 
separable, and that we demonstrate those parts of what we know that cannot 
be stated through the ways in which we act. He also pointed to the fact that 
what is or is not verbalizable does not remain constant, but shifts across time 
and social circumstances. As he put it, the non-verbalizable becomes 
verbalizable at such times as ‘craft is made explicit by scientific research’ 
(p.112).
Hatt (1995) studied contradictions that exist between formal and experiential 
parts of knowledge in a clinical setting not entirely dissimilar to that which 
forms the main context for this study. She attempted to address how 
physicians relate their formal, clinical training to the reality of specific clinical
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contexts, and found that they continually experienced (and had somehow to 
come to terms with) uncertainty. Formal, ‘textbook’ knowledge was 
frequently contradicted by actual experience. According to Hatt, this 
highlighted the incompleteness and inadequacy of the rule-specified part of 
medical knowledge. As my own data show, clinical uncertainty forms part of 
the everyday experience of surgeons. Far from being wholly negative 
however, it allows the emergence of the potential for creativity (and evokes 
behaviours) similar to that shown by scientists working at the forefront of 
what is known within their disciplines (see Gooding 1990; Nersessian 1992).
Knowledges may also be ‘classified’ according to their particular function 
(strategic knowledge, planning knowledge). Such classifications address the 
question ‘Flow are they used?’ rather than that of ‘What are they?’ (Regoczei 
and Hirst 1992, p. 17). One type of knowledge that every human being (but 
conversely, no machine) is supposed to possess to some or other degree is the 
tacit, contextual and embodied sort of knowledge that is required for temporal 
and spatial reasoning (Johnson 1987). This knowledge is implicit in being 
human, (and as such part of society), and possessing a body that can 
experience things. Clark (1997 p.Xl 1) expressed a similar viewpoint (though 
from a rather different disciplinary stance). He argued that the brain and the 
mind are ‘embodied and embedded’, and that rather than being studied in 
isolation, as is common in some schools within psychology and AI, it should 
be studied in conjunction with the rest of the body and its local environment. 
Such arguments have obvious implications for the matters discussed here.
I next turn my attention to two broad traditions of thinking about knowledge, 
an ‘enculturational’ model (Collins 1990) put forward by a body of work in 
SSK, and the ‘individual psychological’ or ‘algorithmic’ (ibid) one implicit in 
knowledge acquisition methods for AI and Expert Systems. These traditions 
are themselves underpinned by different conceptions of the nature of ‘seeing’, 
and also learning.
25
2.3 The ‘enciilturational (or apprenticeship) model* of knowledge
I consider first of all the tradition which centres upon arguments put forward 
by a body of work in SSK, in which skills and their transmission are seen as 
social phenomena. These arguments, broadly, see scientific knowledge as 
socially constructed, and as the collective property of a culture or 
‘form-of-life’ (after Wittgenstein 1953; Winch 1958), rather than as residing 
in individuals. Collins (1974,1975,1985,1990) showed how the ability of a 
group of scientists to build a laser of a certain type depended upon their being 
part of a skilled community of laser builders, and having extensive personal 
contact with them. Spoken or printed instructions alone could not enable 
them to solve the problem of making this laser work.
Collins explained this in terms of the possession by this particular scientific 
community of traditional knowledge which could not be explicated (at that 
time) because they neither knew they had it, nor understood its significance. 
Collins termed this the ‘enculturational or apprenticeship model’, and I 
borrow his terminology here. An example of this way of thinking about 
knowledge that would be familiar to almost all of us, is to consider the 
situation of a novice cook (one’s child for example). My younger daughter 
sometimes tries to follow the recipes in my cookery books. However, without 
extensive assistance and lengthy explanation she is often unable to do so with 
any degree of success, due to her relative inexperience of cookery. (What does 
‘fold’ mean? How brown does it have to be when it just says to ‘brown’ 
something?) This is despite the fact that, as a bright teenager she would seem 
to possess the required skills. She is for example a proficient reader of recipes 
and other written material, and adept at the sort of mathematical skills 
required for measuring ingredients and converting between imperial and 
metric weights and measures.
Barnes et al (1996 p.27) spoke of the importance of ‘local scientific cultures ’ 
for both the initial establishment and the subsequent transmission of scientific 
knowledge. They argued that the possession of similar interpretations of 
observed phenomena is a key factor in such a model of scientific knowledge 
and its acquisition. Following Hanson (1965), they denied that perception and 
interpretation can be separated; in effect therefore, to see (or observe) 
something is to interpret it, a single process. They argued further, after Kuhn
26
(1962), that interpretive traditions in science (as in other domains) are ‘largely 
inherited from others, shared with others, validated by others and sustained in 
the course o f  interacting with others ’ (ibid p.26). According to this tradition 
therefore, what you see (and therefore to a large degree what you ‘know’ 
about it) is mainly dependent upon what those around you see. For as Collins 
(1990 p.4) put it, ‘the same appearance can be seen as many things'.
MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995), argued that skills die out if they cease to be 
practised due to the disappearance of the cultures upon which they are based 
and within which they are transmitted. They predicted the demise of nuclear 
weapons because of international agreements in force at the time banning 
their testing. Testing is apparently so integral to the design process of atomic 
weapons that, should it remain impossible, the ability to design them would 
die out along with the culture of weapons makers that sustains it. ‘Testing’ 
has now moved into the realms o f simulation, which begs the question of 
whether cultures of weapons-testing simulators will work (or behave) in the 
same way . Such arguments are not limited to scientific contexts. On a rather 
more mundane level, Orr (1990) stressed the importance of what he termed 
‘community memories’ to a service (as opposed to a scientific) culture, in his 
study of office equipment repair technicians.
This tradition of thinking about skilled practice is underpinned by an 
‘apprenticeship’ model of learning. People become skilled cooks, carpenters, 
plumbers, motor mechanics and surgeons by watching, working and 
interacting with other people who already have these skills. We in effect 
become immersed in an occupational culture (and in doing so, gain 
occupational skills) over a period of time. Apprenticeships for skilled trades, 
and also (very relevantly) the ‘clinical experience’ undertaken by student 
medics (see Atkinson and Heath 1981), or ‘seeing practice’ as it is termed in 
the veterinary form-of-life, provide examples of training informed by this 
model of learning.
An important implication of this is that it is not possible to become a skilled 
practitioner simply by being told facts, although the gaining of factual 
knowledge by such means certainly allows us to access some components or 
aspects of the required skill. Pinch, Collins and Carbone (1996), whilst 
upholding the principle that skills and their transmission are social in nature,
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wished to address questions relating to how such knowledge is explicitly 
transmitted and acquired as part of learning a skill. Such questions are not 
fully addressed by the enculturational model. We know that this transfer of 
knowledge somehow occurs, and whilst it is certainly not the full story as far 
as becoming a skilled practitioner in some or other domain is concerned, 
whole educational systems are after all built around this concept (or at least 
the ideologies underpinning them are; I would argue that educational practice 
is somewhat different). We study textbooks, consult computer databases, visit 
websites and attend classes in order that we may gain such knowledge. 
Moreover, such activities are highly regarded in our society. This necessarily 
brings us to consider an alternative model.
2.4 The ‘individual cognitive*, ‘psychological’ or ‘algorithmic* model 
(Collins 1990)
The second tradition concerns arguably more traditional and taken-for-granted 
individual ‘cognitive’ or ‘psychological’, (as opposed to ‘social’) theories and 
explanations of knowledge and its acquisition. This ‘common-sense’ model is 
implicit in knowledge elicitation methods used in Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
and Expert Systems research (eg, see Hoffman 1992). Attempts are made by 
researchers in these fields to ‘collect’ the accumulated knowledge of experts 
in order that it may be encoded and transferred to a computer, thereby 
rendering this knowledge accessible for use by others who are not necessarily 
experts themselves. In the course of such attempts, (which it must be said, 
have varied in the degree of their success), it has been necessary for 
practitioners in these disciplines to think long and hard about what knowledge 
is and how it is used, quite apart from other, related questions such as methods 
by which it can best be captured or collected.
Knowledge capture is attempted by means of observations, interviews and 
‘verbal protocols’ in which experts in a given field are asked to ‘speak aloud’ 
about what they are doing as they perform a given task. This technique is 
derived from introspectionist methods once popular in psychology although 
more recently treated with a certain amount of caution, due among other 
reasons to perceived ‘subjectivity’. This is addressed more fully in chapter 6. 
However I will argue that all research methodology is ‘subjective’ to a greater 
or lesser extent, and that both researchers and their readers need always to
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keep this in mind. I reiterate; to observe something in some or other way is to 
interpret it, to relate it to one’s personal framework of representations, 
concepts and assimilations.
The main problem with this model (as far as knowledge elicitation for expert 
systems is concerned; my own objectives are considerably more modest) is 
the underlying assumption that an expert can explicate all of his/her 
knowledge ‘to order’ in such a fashion. It has on the contrary been repeatedly 
shown that only some of an expert’s knowledge becomes accessible by such 
means (see Dreyfus 1992 and Hoffman 1992 for discussions relating to this 
problem, albeit from rather different standpoints), and that this limits the 
usefulness (and ultimately the use) of the resulting programs. This is not to 
say of course that they are entirely without use. However, they are only of use 
up to a point, and far from being a tool which enables novices to utilise the 
knowledge of experts, they in fact require a good deal of (expert) human input 
and ‘repair’ (Hartland 1993) in order to be effective. Thus computer 
programs cannot totally replace either the diagnostic skills of physicians 
(Blois 1980) or the operating skills of surgeons (Rooke 1994), just as Collins’ 
embryonic laser scientists could.not by themselves build a working laser, 
because they all lacked certain critical elements within expert knowledge 
which are for various reasons difficult to explicate, and can be got only 
through protracted immersion in a human culture.
Collins (1990) has termed this model of knowledge and learning 
‘algorithmic’. Algorithms are exact rules and formulae that can be specified 
to a receiving system (which may be a human mind or the ‘mind’ of a 
computer). A good example of such a rule is the formula for a long 
multiplication problem; so long as it is followed absolutely correctly, with no 
mistakes or deviations, the correct solution will be obtained on every 
occasion. However, algorithms are now recognised to be for the most part a 
cumbersome tool which is relatively little used in skilled practice, since as we 
have already discussed, human problem solving (outside of the psychology 
laboratory) tends to involve problems which are far too complex. Instead, 
people rely more often upon the use of less precise heuristics, or rules of 
thumb. These are not proven formulae in the same way as could be said of 
algorithms, and therefore cannot be guaranteed to work on all occasions. 
However, they usually work in practice nevertheless. Heuristics, as well as
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algorithms are now specified to AI programs, so labelling this model 
‘algorithmic’ is perhaps a little misleading. Collins’ concept of algorithmic 
knowledge acquisition however provides a useful contrast to the 
enculturational model that he also described. The model of ‘seeing’ 
associated with the algorithmic tradition of knowledge stresses the objectivity 
of the natural world, and takes it for granted that we see what is somehow ‘out 
there’ in an unproblematic and unbiased way. It has been used (many would 
argue rather uncritically) to ‘explain’ science, and characterise it as different 
from various other human discourses such as art and religion.
Heuristics can be formulated as ‘production rules’. Sloboda (1986, p.23) 
drew attention to interest shown by cognitive psychologists in the possible 
role in skilled behaviour of ‘associative pattem-action pairs’. These take the 
form of If-Then rules that can be applied to particular situations, eg, ‘If 
condition X applies, Then carry out action Y’. Sloboda likened these rules in 
some respects to the S-R bonds used in behaviourist explanations of learning, 
although there are important differences. They are more flexible; X need not 
be a simple external stimulus for example, nor Y an overt behaviour. Such 
things as internal mental states and goals can also be included. Production 
rules can be incorporated into production systems; a set o f rules sufficient for 
carrying out some task.
Production systems can easily be simulated on computer, and in fact form the 
basis for many AI programs (see Anderson 1983; 1993). They have also been 
used to explain how the knowledge of skilled persons may be organised, even 
that knowledge that is seemingly inaccessible until particular circumstances 
demand its use. Chase (1983) demonstrated how some types of knowledge 
may be accessible only when a particular situation demands it, in a study of 
US taxi drivers whose ability to actually find  the best routes between two 
points in their city was shown to be greatly superior to their ability to verbally 
describe the routes in the laboratory. Learning can be explained in terms of 
the acquisition of new pattem-action pairs, and complex skilled behaviour 
postulated in terms of production rules used in conjunction with a goal stack 
stored in working memory (Baddeley and Hitch 1974; Hitch 1980). Other, 
related systems have been proposed for the organisation of knowledge (eg, 
schema theory (Rumelhart 1975; 1980), and scripts (Schank 1975; Schank 
and Abelson 1977; Baddeley 1990).
30
To label such theories as ‘psychological’ is not to say, of course that the 
discipline of psychology itself is devoid of cultural, or social explanations for 
knowledge and skills and their transmission. This is not the case. On the 
contrary there is a strong tradition within the discipline which places great 
importance on the role of culture in cognitive activities; see for example the 
work of Vygotsky 1931, 1960,1978; Luria 1971,1975a, 1975b; also Cole et 
al 1971; Cole and Scribner 1974; Cole et al 1997. However, it is probably 
true to say that the discipline of AI has been influenced far more by cognitive 
than by social aspects o f psychology. For my own purposes (and arguably 
ultimately those of AI also), it may be the case that neither social, nor 
individual psychological (or cognitive) explanations on their own are 
sufficient to account for knowledge and skilled practice, but that both need to 
be considered together. As stated previously, physical aspects (Thagard 
1999) for example the instrumentation, and also the images that surgeons use, 
must also be taken into consideration in any comprehensive analysis of this 
problem.
In any case, in novel situations, ‘the rules’ (no matter whether they are 
characterised as algorithms or heuristics) do not always apply, and then a 
practitioner must seek creative solutions based upon (but not identical to) 
situations that s/he has encountered in the past. Gooding (1990) called this 
novel, creative, problem-solving type of thinking ‘construing’, and situated it 
within an abductive model o f reasoning. Closer still to my own research 
problem, Hatt (1995) has suggested that medics construct construals of what ■ 
are novel phenomena to them to enable both themselves and others to 
understand their observations. This may be accomplished at least in part by 
means of visual representations. These aspects will be more fully discussed in 
later chapters.
It may prove illuminating at this point to examine in more detail the concept 
of ‘skill’, and how it differs from (and relates to) knowledge, if indeed it does.
2.5-W hati s IskjH’-?
Much of the literature uses the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘skill’ somewhat 
interchangeably, and indeed it is tempting to do likewise here. Up to this
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point, in fact, this is largely what I have done. However, it might now prove 
to be useful instead to give the term ‘skill’ some more individual 
consideration. Welford (1958) drew attention to the differing ways in which 
the concept is applied, for example in industrial settings, and in psychology. 
Skill in industry relates to the ability (usually acquired during an extended 
period of apprenticeship, or training), to cany out particular types of work 
which require knowledge, judgement, accuracy and manual dexterity, such as 
my illustrative examples of surgery and sculpture.
This can be misleading however, since many jobs and activities which are 
thought of in an industrial sense as ‘unskilled’, have been shown to be very 
skilled indeed, for example by Scribner (1997), who studied the ‘practical 
thinking’ of packers in a dairy product factory, and Saxe’s (1992) studies of 
unschooled children who worked as street vendors. Despite their almost total 
lack of formal education, these children were easily able to carry out the 
mental arithmetical calculations involved in their buying and selling activities. 
These studies stress the contextual specificity o f the skills under discussion. 
When transferred to the laboratory, tasks which appeared on the surface to be 
very similar to those undertaken during the course o f their daily work proved 
to be much more difficult for the subjects involved. If the context were 
removed, then much of the skill appeared to be removed also. Schaffer 
(1997), writing from a history of science standpoint, stressed how ‘skill’ can 
vary according to various factors such as the site of the performance, the 
social role of the performer and the instruments used. Context then, is an 
essential framework within which skill is developed and applied.
In psychology, the term ‘skill’ is applied in a much wider sense, to cover for 
example the perceptual-motor skills used in taken-for-granted everyday 
activities such as walking and speaking, in addition to more complex skills 
such as those involved in driving a motor vehicle or using a computer. Whilst 
my own use of the term falls closer to Welford’s ‘industrial’ notion of skill, it 
is useful nevertheless to bear in mind the broader psychological concept when 
thinking about these matters, for as Welford pointed out, the more complex, 
‘industrial’ types of skills make similar though greater demands upon the 
nervous system. Fitts and Posner (1967) drew attention to the fact that skilled 
performance always involves an organised sequence of activities which may 
include physical movements and / or the processing of symbolic information.
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Gellatly (1986, p.4) used the example of the relatively uncomplicated skill of 
sexing day-old chicks for the poultry industry, to illustrate the following 
features that are common to all skills:
• That skilled task performance may seem virtually impossible to the 
uninitiated
• That they seem to depend upon intensive practice; learning the task 
requires practical experience, and expertise is built up with further practice
• That they are dependent upon the specific social context in which they 
take place
Sloboda (1986) further listed the characteristics of skilled activities under the 
following five headings:
• Fluency; the parts of the activity run together in an integrated and 
uninterrupted sequence.
• Rapidity; appropriate responses to situations are made quickly.
• Automaticity; the skill becomes ‘easy’, and ‘just happens’ without us 
having to think about it.
• Simultaneity; complicated sequences of actions can be carried out 
simultaneously.
• Knowledge; not only in its possession but also in its being available at the 
appropriate time.
Sloboda then, located ‘knowledge’ as a component within ‘skill’. I feel that 
this is a useful and straightforward way of thinking about the problem; 
certainly more so than treating the two terms as interchangeable, which I at 
least found somewhat confusing.
2.6 How we acquire skillf and Jiecpme skilled practitioners: ‘stage* 
models of skill acquisition:
I concentrate here upon debates that exist as to how we acquire knowledge 
and skills; in effect how we become skilled practitioners. This will entail 
discussion of the nature of expertise, the differences that exist between 
novices and experts, and the implications that all of this may have for skilled
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practice. This is important to my arguments because my (surgeon) research 
respondents varied considerably in the amount of task-specific experience that 
they had accrued, and showed corresponding differences in their approaches 
to particular tasks. I use the term ‘experience’ here in the Heideggerian sense 
of what results when preconceived ideas and context-free ‘facts’ are 
transformed by an actual context or situation. This is o f course not as such 
directly related to the passage of time. However, it is probably true to say that 
longer periods spent in particular situations are likely to result in the 
accumulation of additional experience (and ultimately expertise) in these 
situations, hence the common sense connection made between time and 
experience. Expertise (like the nature of knowledge) is necessarily of interest 
and importance to those who work on the development of Expert Systems and 
AI programs. It comes as no surprise therefore, that the literature from these 
disciplines is of great relevance in its discussion. I am informed also by a 
considerable body of literature from psychology.
Several ‘stage’ models of skill acquisition have been proposed. An early 
example was that of Bryan and Harter (1899) who studied the development of 
skills in wireless telegraphy (the transmission and receiving of Morse code). 
According to such models, when acquiring a skill, we progress through stages 
from novice to expert performer, although it is fair to say that the boundaries 
between the stages are not well defined. One particular viewpoint sees the 
development of expertise changing in respect of changes in the practitioner’s 
use of declarative and procedural knowledge (Fitts and Posner 1967;
Anderson 1983, 1987; Rasmussen 1986). This model sees the development of 
expertise taking place over three identifiable stages, during which performers 
tend to move away from the use of declarative knowledge, more towards the 
use of perceptual, nonverbalizable procedural knowledge:
• Cognitive stage: characterised by the accumulation of declarative 
knowledge from various sources. If an actual task must be performed, 
relevant declarative knowledge is retrieved from long-term memory and 
operated on by domain-general procedural knowledge, or production rules 
(procedural knowledge that can be applied to declarative knowledge in any 
domain). Decision making is therefore slow and prone to error.
34
• Associative stage: as the practitioner becomes more competent in the 
domain, s/he moves into this second stage. Repeated use of declarative 
knowledge in given situations results in the accumulation of a bank of 
domain-specific procedures; direct associations between specific 
conditions and the resultant actions. Gradually the need to operate upon 
declarative knowledge is bypassed. When contextual conditions match the 
conditions of the procedural rule, the appropriate action is automatically 
invoked, thus avoiding the need to retrieve declarative knowledge and 
apply general productions to it.
• Autonomous stage: now the procedures become highly automatized, 
associations become stronger, and more specific. Procedural knowledge 
now works quickly and automatically. Simple productions become 
composed into more complex, inclusive ones. Because these compress a 
large number of iiistantiating conditions and resulting actions, they become 
difficult to verbalize. When this stage is complete, task performance 
requires virtually no cognitive resources, is autonomous, and unavailable to 
conscious awareness.
(Summarised by Gordon 1992).
A related stage model of expertise development was described by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986). This was developed from an earlier model (Dreyfus1979). In 
this model, (which I describe at some length because I feel it better describes 
the behaviour of learners than that summarised above, which is more 
concerned with theorising about the mechanisms that may be responsible for 
the actual progression), practitioners progress through not three but five stages 
from novice to expert performer. Dreyfus and Dreyfus described the stages is 
as follows:
• Novice: novice performers have no experience of the situations they are 
entering, and need to be given objective, measurable attributes which can 
be recognised without previous situational experience, and context-free 
rules to guide their actions in respect of these attributes. Behaviour is 
rule-governed, limited and inflexible in nature, since the rules cannot 
convey to the novice which tasks need to be prioritised in an actual 
situation. These facts and rules are valuable since they allow entry to the
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situation and provide opportunities to begin to accumulate experience. 
However, they must eventually be put aside if the novice is to progress.
• Advanced beginner: at this stage, the learner recognises similarities to 
previously encountered situations (or can meaningfully have them pointed 
out to him/her). S/he can therefore note the recurrence of meaningful 
aspects (situational now, not context free) on other similar occasions. 
Behaviour now encompasses situational as well as context free elements. 
Such aspect recognition takes a lot of time and the advanced beginner still 
has to ‘remember the rules’.
• Competent: at this stage, a performer has experience of similar, previous 
occasions, and sees a situation as a set of facts. He or she begins to see his 
or her actions in terms of long range plans or goals. These plans dictate 
which aspects or attributes of a situation are most important or urgent, and 
which can be ignored or postponed. He or she understands and decides 
upon courses of action in a detached manner, reflecting upon various 
alternatives. The behaviour of competent performers can be characterised 
as ‘problem solving’ behaviour.
• Proficient: such performers intuitively understand and organise the task in 
hand (based upon previous experience) but still think analytically about 
what action to take. Memories of past situations trigger plans similar to 
those that worked in the past, (resulting in periods of involvement in the 
situation followed by detached decision making).
• Expert: expert performers do not plan, and do not make decisions, they 
just do what normally works. They will however deliberate before acting 
in crucial situations, or where time permits, often in a critically reflective 
way. Over time they will have built up a ‘libraiy’ of distinguishable 
situations which can’t all necessarily be described or even remembered in 
words. Situations are seen as similar to a prior one, and actions and 
decisions undertaken on the basis of this, and simultaneously. Experts may 
describe or justify this in terms of hunches or feelings about something.
(Summarised from Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, pp. 21-32; and Benner 1984
pp. 20-34)
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Behaviour in relation to these various stages has been analysed by Benner 
(1984) in an influential work on the training of nurses in human medicine, and 
I have myself observed it in relation to the acquisition of veterinary nursing 
skills (Woodgate 1998).
2,7 The differences between novices and experts:
A body of research has shown that the knowledge structures (ie, the ways in 
which knowledge is organised) of experts differ from those of novices in a 
number of important ways. It is not simply a matter of experts having a 
greater quantity of knowledge at their disposal than novices. Studies of 
expertise, principally in games, have cast considerable light upon this. 
Chamess (1979) showed how skilled problem solving in bridge depends upon 
the possession of what was termed a ‘large vocabulary’ of meaningful (for the 
game ) and recognizable patterns, associated with the appropriate actions that 
need to be taken; in other words a detailed production system for the game. 
Chiesi, Spilich and Voss (1981) explained the acquisition of knowledge in a 
particular domain (in this case baseball) in terms of its being mapped onto 
existing knowledge structures; therefore the more knowledgeable a person is 
about a domain, the easier it will be for him or her to acquire new knowledge 
about it. This has obvious relevance here.
Chase and Simon (1973) argued that the superior ability of chess Masters lies 
in their ability to perceive structure in meaningful positions, and encode them 
into larger perceptual ‘chunks’ in memory than can less skilled players. What 
is more, the chunks themselves may relate to each other in more abstract ways 
in the case of experts. Similarly, Chi, Feltovich and Glaser (1981) showed in 
the context of physics how novices and experts represent problems differently 
right from the outset. The representational strategy of experts was shown to 
be far more abstract, and less concerned with the mechanics of actual 
equations than that of novices. McKeithen et al (1981) demonstrated how 
expert computer programmers used domain-related strategies for the 
memorization of new material (encoded in programming language), whereas 
novices used more general mnemonic techniques, and intermediate performers 
used both. Expert knowledge is then, qualitatively (as well as quantitatively) 
different from that of novices, and expertise is above all specific!
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2.8 The significance of plans:
The Dreyfus (1986) model of skill acquisition makes particular and explicit 
mention of the importance of planning at some stages o f skill acquisition, 
notably the ‘competent’ and ‘proficient’ stages. However, performers at all 
skill levels will plan where time and the situation allows. Schank and 
Abelson (1977) identified plans with goals and ‘scripts’ (related to Minsky’s 
concept of frames, and also schema theory (eg see Rumelhart 1980) as a 
means by which knowledge about particular situations may be organised. 
According to Schank and Abelson (1977), scripts allow us to take for granted 
certain items of information in a particular context. We acquire for example 
scripts for visiting a restaurant, attending classes, consulting a doctor, and 
other familiar social contexts. Merely specifying a particular context allows 
the appropriate script to be invoked. This allows certain things about the 
context to be ‘taken as read’. Schank and Abelson described how scripts are 
made up over time of plans and sub-plans that are used repeatedly.
That we use planning, especially in relation to complex problem solving is 
fairly unproblematic. The problem lies in our perceptions of just how we use 
it, and how experts can apparently by-pass it in some situations. Suchman 
(1987) argued that our attitude towards planning is largely a cultural 
phenomenon, using Gladwin’s (1964) example of navigation methods in the 
European and Trukese (a Pacific Island culture) traditions to illustrate two 
contrasting views of human purposeful action. Briefly, in the European 
tradition, the navigator begins with a formal plan (a charted course), and 
during the ensuing voyage, every move is related to that plan. Every effort is 
directed to remaining ‘on course’, and should unexpected events occur, the 
plan (course) must be altered. The Trukese navigator on the other hand begins 
not with a plan or a course, but with an objective, which s/he sets off toward, 
responding in an ad hoc sort o f way to environmental and other conditions as 
they occur. S/he reacts according to information provided by many facets of 
the environment. His / her effort is directed towards doing whatever is 
necessary to reach this objective. The navigator, if asked, could point toward 
this objective at any time during the voyage, but could not describe ‘the 
course’ in the European sense (after Berreman 1966, p.347).
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According to Suchman, the European model is to a great extent conceived as 
being context-independent (or ’cognitive’) , and uses an abstract, analytical 
type of thinking, whereas the Trukese thinks in a less abstract, and more 
context-situated way. Suchman argued that these ways of thinking (or more to 
the point, these models o f human thinking and purposeful action) are 
culturally learned. Great store for example is put in our society (but not 
always necessarily in others) on analytical, ‘scientific’ styles of thinking, as 
demonstrated by our navigator example. However, Suchman’s argument is 
that every purposeful action is a ‘situated action’, in that it is inevitably placed 
in a very particular spatial, temporal and cultural context, which directs and 
influences our thinking and behaviour on that, (and only that) occasion. I 
would argue that neither model of navigation is complete. It could be said 
that both models in effect do both of our navigators a great disservice, 
conferring upon our European an inflexibility and a rigidity which would 
undoubtedly place those who venture to undergo a voyage with him or her at 
great peril given the vagaries of winds, tides, currents and so forth, and 
suggesting that our Trukese navigator works in a completely undisciplined 
and haphazard way which negates his or her many years o f apprenticeship 
served in the craft.
According to Suchman’s argument therefore, plans cannot and do not work as 
definitive ‘recipes’ for carrying out a procedure, in such a way as I was taught 
to write the methods section o f a biological paper (so that another biologist, in 
another time and place, could exactly repeat my experiment or investigation), 
but on the contrary they lack fine detail, and are thus inevitably prone to 
change and adaptation. Just like the methods sections in biological papers in 
my experience!
I can personally vouch for the veracity o f this, since this thesis has been 
planned, replanned and planned yet again on numerous occasions, and each 
time this has happened, the ‘plan’ has changed, sometimes a little, sometimes 
a lot. What is more, it is still changing, and I expect these planning and 
replanning processes to continue until the work is completely finished; all of 
the reading, the trips back into the field to ask yet more questions, and 
especially the writing. That this planning has had to be revised over and over 
again is not to say that the original plan was necessarily ‘wrong’, or that the 
planning process itself has not been useful; on the contrary it has been very
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useful indeed. It helped me first of all to make a start, and has subsequently 
helped in refining and redefining my ideas. In short, it has been a very 
valuable tool. It cannot however in any sense be thought o f as any sort of an 
explanation, either for how this particular thesis was written (or as I would 
prefer to say, borrowing a term from several of my subjects, how it has 
evolved), or for how to write theses in general.
Knowledge then, can most usefully be thought about as a component of 
skilled, situated practice. I now move the discussion forward to consider 
more carefully ways in which knowledge (in this sense) may be represented, 
and form links between what has been discussed in this chapter, and matters 
which will be addressed in the following ones. I begin by outlining one of the 
ways in which knowledge can be communicated, encoded, and expanded. I 
refer specifically to the use of maps.
2.9 Mapping as a way of knowing...
The communication of knowledge about objects and their relationships in 
geographical space is not a straightforward matter. It may be done verbally, 
via the uses of directions, or spatial relational terms which situate a target 
object in relation to a reference object. Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin (1994) 
showed how language may be co-ordinated with perception in this way, and 
this analysis is interesting in that my surgeon research collaborators use their 
own form of spatial-relational language. Veterinary anatomical directional 
terms are shown in Figs 1-1 and 1-2 on p.42, and will be encountered in 
excerpts from fieldnotes in chapters 8 and 9.
As also shown by means of this diagram, communication about such matters 
can also be achieved by the use of visual representations, such as maps. This 
does not mean that the two are mutually exclusive, or that maps cannot be 
used together with language. Indeed this frequently happens. Merely 
producing a map in a location where there are other people present often 
prompts social interaction, discussion and communal perusal of the map. Like 
so many of the others discussed, mapping is a social, as well as a cognitive 
and physical practice (and as I will later show, this counts for anatomical, as 
well as geographical mapping). Neither do I mean that maps are merely tools 
for the communication of these types of information. They can do far more
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than this. As well as for orientation or navigation purposes, they can also be 
used for planning interventions (Beaulieu 2000), supporting knowledge claims 
(Alpers 1983), or as Camerini (1993) described, as tools for theory 
development. Tools, in effect, for thinking.
Camerini (1993) explored how mapping practices are used in this respect, in 
the context of the history of science. According to her arguments, the 
evolutionary theorists Alfred Russell Wallace and Charles Darwin made maps 
which, in their very construction, were instrumental in the construction and 
development of their theories, as well as in their dissemination. Camerini 
(ibid, pp700-701) identified the following functions of their mapping of the 
boundary between Asian and Australian faunas:
• To help organize and communicate their data
• As a potential device for predicting the range limits of other species (using 
their empirical data to theorise about other cases)
• As a means of argument and representation that was familiar to their peers
• As a method of analysis that ‘tested positively’ with their evolutionary 
hypotheses.
Camerini wrote, ‘ Maps served (Wallace) as a conceptual framework, a 
metaphor and a tool for synthesizing and communicating his results- they 
were the actual and mental space on which the processes o f  biological, 
geological and geographical change formed a comprehensible pattern
Wallace’s maps (both physical and mental) of faunal regions served therefore 
as instruments of both thought and persuasion. This calls into question the 
nature of the boundary between the ‘physical’ and the ‘mental’; of where 
physical imagery might begin for example, and its mental counterpart end.
My attempts to construct a coherent narrative dictates that this discussion be 
continued elsewhere - from debates about knowledge and knowing, I have 
digressed; wandered (or blundered perhaps) into others, about the nature of 
seeing, and imagery.
To summarise, I have considered various debates as to the meaning of the 
term ‘knowledge’, and examined two broad traditions as to its nature. I have 
concluded that neither of these traditions is sufficient on its own to address the
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problems under investigation here, but that both have something to contribute. 
After Sloboda (1986), I have located ‘knowledge’ as a component within 
‘skill’. I argue for the value of ‘stage’ models of skill acquisition, and for the 
importance of social and physical context in the exercise, development and 
communication of skills. All of these points are of considerable importance to 
what will follow.
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Figure 1-1. Lateral view of a dog to demonstrate anatomical directions.
KEY
P = Proximal 
L = Lateral 
D = Distal 
M = Medial
Figure 1-2. Cross-section of a dog at the level of the forelimb to demonstrate 
anatomical directions
Midline
Figs, 1-1 and 1-2;. Diagrams to show vcfcrinaiy anatomical directions. 
Reproduced from An introduction to veterinary anatomy and physiology  
by A. R. Michell and P.E. Watkins (1989), with permission of BSAVA,
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NOTES
* Professor David Gooding has suggested that this may be because we still 
identify ‘knowledge’ as that which can be articulated in serial, narrative 
form; the crux of my problem!
^ Independent of person, place, context or culture.
^ Thanks to Professor David Gooding for making this point.
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CHAPTER 3: SEEING......
To gaze is to think....
(Salvador Dali)
3.1 Introduction
The arbitrary divide that I have put in place between the present chapter and 
the previous one (and for that matter, the next) is ostensibly for. the purpose 
of ‘convenience’. But whose convenience? Not my own in any real sense, 
since I feel that inherent in such a textual divide is the danger of intimating at 
an actual divide which (like Dali) I deny. Nor yet that of the reader, since s/he 
might be moved by it to mentally separate too rigidly the matters discussed 
here from those considered previously, or those still to be addressed. Perhaps 
therefore the term ‘convenience’ is better replaced by that o f ‘convention’; 
theses, and other lengthy works are by convention divided into discrete 
sections, or chapters.
A possible purpose for such division might be to enable easier organisation 
and understanding of the material. Perhaps after all we deal with complex 
issues better piecemeal, and some sort of categorisation is essential to 
cognition. This argument has been put forward by a body of work in 
psychology (eg see Brown 1956; Rosch 1977). On the other hand, the 
dangers of ‘discreteism’ - too rigidly adhering to the notion (or reality) of 
specified boundaries, have been stressed by Rayner (1997), in the context of 
the discipline of biology. According to Rayner, ‘discreteness is an 
abstraction ...an unattainable ideal’(p.3). He argued that boundaries can 
never be wholly fixed, but merely define what he termed ‘dynamic contexts’. 
Thus it is at boundaries that life’s action really takes place.
It is certainly at boundaries such as that between this chapter and the last (and 
for that matter, between this and the following chapter) that these tensions 
become acute. It was necessary both for the structure o f this thesis, and also 
to reflect emerging distinctions which cut across existing, conventional ones, 
that I impose these (seemingly arbitrary) boundaries. The extent to which this 
imposition succeeds in promoting understanding is a matter for debate. It 
certainly does not seem to make either writing or reading about these topics 
easy; although perhaps in some special sense it renders it possible. Again I
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am unable to escape the narrative form. The only way in which I can justify 
actually making the division is by basing it roughly upon some or other 
vaguely relevant philosophical distinction.
Arthur Miller (1996) following Kant, Wittgenstein and Hansen, distinguished 
between the concepts of seeing as and seeing that, in which seeing that 
signifies seeing or understanding the deep structure of a phenomenon, 
whereas seeing as relates more to actual physical perception. These 
categories correspond roughly to the Kantian ones of Anschaulichkeit 
(visualizability) and Anschauung (visualization or intuition). To Kant, 
Anschaulichkeit is what can actually be seen (in the sense of being witnessed); 
the properties of an object that may be visualized in a physical way, for 
example in a drawing, a model or a simple experiment or demonstration, 
whereas Anschauung refers to abstractions made from such phenomena. 
Despite my mistrust o f categorisation generally, (and my disquiet with crucial 
aspects of the Kantian critique which places intuition above sensation), I feel 
that this distinction may nevertheless be a useful one upon which to base this 
division of the mass of related (though not totally homogenous) material that 
will comprise this chapter and the next. I therefore address matters roughly 
corresponding to the concept of Anschaulichkeit (or ‘seeing as’) in this 
chapter, and Anschauung (‘seeing that’) in the next. It is important to point 
out however that these categories are by no means fixed, or mutually 
exclusive. There are undoubtedly alternative ways in which this material 
could have been categorised or organised, and also possible disagreements as 
to whether individual snippets should be placed here rather than there.
Indeed, it is difficult in practice to consider one of these categories without 
relation to the other. I attempt to link the two by considering (mainly 
psychological) debates related to our uses of physical and mental imagery. In 
doing so, I doubtless provide further fuel for debates about classification!
3.2 Visualization of the body
Surgery, and for that matter medicine more generally, have understandable 
concerns with the visualization of the internal body; visualising here in the 
Anschaulichkeit sense of ‘making visible’. Hirschauer (1991) described the 
difficulties faced by surgeons in ‘creating anatomical visibility’ in terms o f a 
relationship that exists between experience and representation. He posed the 
question: ‘How do patients’ bodies come to embody the properties of
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anatomical pictures’? In chapter 2, ideas related to concepts of knowledge 
and ‘experience’ were discussed at some length. We need now to consider 
carefully those pertaining to ‘representation’.
The technologies enabling (or facilitating) visual representations of the body 
have a long history which can be traced from the earliest anatomical 
illustrations, through three dimensional models such as those produced by 
Fontana in eighteenth century Florence; and from a different angle, the 
development of technological and / or optical devices which allow us to go 
beyond that which the unaided eye can perceive, allowing, in effect, 
‘extra-sensory perceptions’. Crucially, all of these media in some or other 
form are still used in both human and animal medicine and surgery, and are of 
particular importance in the education and training of surgeons and medics. It 
is true to say also that this is a history that is still being written, for example 
with the continuing development of 3D body imaging techniques, and 
questions relating to their interpretation and incorporation into medical and 
other discourses (Beaulieu 2000).
The literature deriving from art history, the history of science and medicine, 
and also science studies more generally, has much to offer in considering 
these matters in the light of my research topic. Miller (1996) pointed to the 
fact that representing something involves re-presenting it as either text or 
visual image, or a combination of the two. Why however, is it necessary to do 
this? It is argued that there may be a number of reasons why we do so. A 
‘visual image’ may be simply a picture, a three dimensional model, a 
computer graphic, or alternatively some trace of the type termed an 
‘inscription’ (eg, see Lynch (1985; Latour 1986,1990), which is not 
necessarily ‘representative’ of the phenomenon in question in a literal sense.
For Lynch and Latour, ‘inscriptions’ were the results of ‘writing and imaging 
craftsmanship' (Latour 1986 p.4), and had a key function in the sciences as 
simplification procedures to render objects in the world ‘docile’ (Lynch 
1985); less confusing and easier (literally, in some cases), to grasp or to see. 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) described how many aspects o f laboratory practice 
could be made sense of in terms of processes such as that of ‘transforming 
rats and chemicals’ into marks on paper. Once simplified thus, such 
inscriptions lend themselves to novel processes of recombination and 
superimposition, which may in their turn lead to new representations, and new
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phenomena. Amann and Knorr-Cetina (1988) stressed also the persuasive 
function of inscriptions in transforming raw scientific ‘data’ into accepted 
scientific ‘evidence’. This rhetorical role centres upon social processes of 
collaboration and consensus-forming within scientific communities.
Work by Larkin and Simon (1987) relating to diagrams, and also by 
Nersessian and Greeno (1990), and Roschelle and Greeno (1987) on the uses 
of abstracted models in physics showed how clustering interconnected 
information can render visual (and visible) a chain of interconnected 
inferences. They described how images may be stabilized for the viewer by 
the use of such models, and also how they can make various alternative 
versions of phenomena available for direct comparison in a way not possible 
for internal, mental images due to constraints of memory capacity.
Kearsey and Turner (1999) described how illustrations can facilitate the 
exposition of important scientific concepts through a form of graphic or 
pictorial scientific language. Goldsmith (1984), and Kress and van Leeuwen 
(1990) showed further how it is necessary to develop ‘visual literacy’ in order 
to become able to ‘read’ these pictures, in a similar sort of way to that in 
which we learn to read text. These points will be explored further in Chapter 
4. One of the central concerns o f this present work is to address the issue of 
the different roles that representations may perform within the research 
contexts.
I continue by reviewing in turn relevant (mainly historical) sources relating to 
anatomical illustration, 3D modelling and the technical and optical devices 
which enable extra-sensory perception; allowing us in effect to ‘see’ things 
which were previously invisible.
3.3 The uses of anatomical illustration
Anatomy: ‘An opening up in order to see deeper or hidden parts. ’
Galen (130-200 AD).
Veterinary surgeon respondents were frequently observed to refer to 
anatomical atlases (eg see Boyd et al 1991), which comprise high quality 
photographic plates of the internal and external anatomy o f animals, with 
explanatory keys. They also consulted surgical manuals, which are typically
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made up of line diagrams alongside detailed instructional text. Those 
concerned with orthopaedic surgery also tended to contain in addition 
photographs or reproductions of radiographs. Such publications take on 
particular importance in circumstances where the operating surgeon is either 
in training, or qualified but still relatively inexperienced, and also when an 
unfamiliar procedure is being carried out, or when the patient itself is of an 
unfamiliar species.
These textbooks are very similar in design and content to those used by 
physicians and surgeons in human medicine. This is unsurprising given that 
the history of veterinary anatomical illustration is closely tied up with that of 
its human counterpart. One reason for this is that historically, the cadavers of 
animals were frequently substituted for human corpses for dissection purposes 
in medical universities. This occurred for a number of reasons, such as the 
lack of availability of sufficient human corpses, and social stigmatization and 
religious disapproval of the practice (Turner 1990). Many of the ‘mistakes’ of 
the early anatomists could be put down to their being unaware that human 
anatomy is not identical in every respect to that of the animals they dissected. 
To give an example, many of Vesalius’ drawings show the liver as a lobed 
organ, as indeed it is in cattle and deer; the human liver however is unlobed.
The history of anatomical illustration is well documented elsewhere, (eg, 
Roberts and Tomlinson 1992; Cazort et al 1996; Persaud 1997), but briefly, 
scientific anatomy began in ancient Greece before the time of Christ, and was 
continued and developed further in the second century AD by the Greek 
physician Galen. Little European material survives prior to the advent of 
printing in the sixteenth century. Probably the most famous anatomists of this 
period were Leonardo da Vinci and Andreas Vesalius. Leonardo’s drawings 
(although familiar now) remained unpublished during his lifetime. Those o f 
Vesalius however were used as teaching aids, alongside accompanying texts 
(a similar pattern to that of modem surgical manuals). Vesalius and others 
also produced interactive ‘flap anatomies’. These were woodcut prints 
representing the outline of the body, upon which smaller illustrations of 
separate bodily organs could be superimposed. This was suggestive of the 
three dimensional, layered nature of anatomy itself. These flap anatomies had 
detailed instructions for assembly, and it can be surmised that this handling of 
the material rendered it of considerably more learning value to novice 
surgeons than pictures intended merely to be looked at.
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Stubbs’ Anatomy o f  the Horse (published 1766) provided an early example of 
a veterinary anatomy. A number of comparative anatomies (i.e., comparing 
human anatomy with that of various animals) were also published at around 
this time, notably by Felix Vicq d’Azyr (1748-1794). Vicq was a particularly 
important figure in the history of anatomy because he was one of the first 
anatomists to treat the body’s organs as geometrically solid shapes, to be 
analysed in a systematic way. First he would examine the exterior planes, 
angles and edges of the organ, and then those of its interior. Camper 
(1722-1789) also ‘built bodies’ according to geometrical methods, using 
series of precise measurements (Stafford 1994). Anatomists at this time were 
already beginning to distance themselves from the world o f ‘art’, adopting an 
approach that could be seen as more ‘scientific’, in their use of such 
‘objective’ criteria as measurements. However, how far this stands up as a 
valid distinction between ‘art’ and ‘science’ per se is open to debate, 
dependent as it is upon a point of view that sees measurement firstly as 
peculiar to the sciences, and therefore outside of the province of artists, and 
secondly in some way more ‘objective’ than other human observational 
activities. We will later see that this approach is not without its own problems 
and inconsistencies!
Roberts & Tomlinson (1992) described how photographic atlases (as opposed 
to those based upon drawings) were first produced about a hundred years ago. 
These would at first seem to have obvious advantages over art work, in their 
apparent ‘realism’. However, dead corpses are not identical to living bodies, 
either in photographs or indeed in ‘the flesh’. Processes o f decay, the use of 
preservatives, and the act of dissecting itself can and does affect their 
appearance, and all of this can prove misleading and limit the usefulness of 
such photographs as aids at the operating table. Information obtained during 
surgical operations, from radiographs, scanning technology and endoscopy are 
therefore used to supplement images derived from the dissected corpse, in the 
same sort of way to that in which da Vinci would combine information from 
many dissections into one single illustration. Even here, images are 
accumulated, or superimposed to better enable visualisation.
It is I feel misguided to imagine that a photograph is necessarily less 
subjective (or conversely, more objective), than a drawing or an engraving, 
particularly in this context. Such a photograph (like all ‘scientific’ images) 
must in fact be carefully composed (or constructed), to be of any practical use
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at all, and in some senses and situations ‘subjective’ art work can be of equal, 
or greater practical value than seemingly more ‘objective’ photography. The 
camera, in essence, can (and frequently does) lie!
Roberts and Tomlinson (1992) distinguished between the roles of ‘diagrams’ 
and ‘images’ (pp.7-9) for anatomical illustration. In an anatomical image such 
as a photograph in an atlas, (however well constructed) the complicated 
structures of the internal body appear muddled, and it is veiy difficult to 
distinguish the individual parts. This is the case even where (to give an 
example I have used myself in conference presentations), entire systems have 
been removed to enable others to be seen more clearly (Boyd 1991, p.218). In 
this example, the entire gastro-intestinal tract has been removed to render 
more visible the reproductive organs of the female canid.
Moreover, images are less easily memorised than diagrams, because of their 
complexity. Diagrams on the other hand, are abstractions (or further 
abstracted, if like me you consider that photographic images too are 
abstractions from objects in the world). They are not intended to ‘look like’ 
the real thing, but are useful nevertheless in conveying certain properties 
relating to shape and relative position, and to help relate structure to function. 
They are thus more generalisable than images, and therefore more able to 
accommodate individual differences. They do not however, (and neither are 
they intended to) convey the actual appearance of the organs and structures in 
the dissecting room or at the operating table. Kearsey and Turner (1999) 
described how line drawings can act as a prompt in scientific communication 
to enable the viewer to create for him or herself the image depicted (p.87). 
This is an interesting idea in relation to the way in which one of my 
respondents explicitly spoke of combining physical and mental imagery (see 
chapter 7). However, following Lynch and Woolgar (1990), who described 
how scientists juxtapose different forms of (physical) representations for 
different purposes, I will later show also how, rather than any one 
representational form necessarily being used in preference to another, they 
may be used together, each enhancing the other by combining information.
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3.4 Displaying the third dimension....
‘The visual system creates the three-dimensional world we experience from  
the two-dimensional patterns projected onto the retinas - a feat that, odd as it 
may seem, is a hit like imagining a building from its blueprints... ’
Richard Mark Friedhoff and William Benzon, 1991.
I borrow this sub-title from that of a conference held in London at the 
Wellcome Institute and the Science Museum during Autumn 1998, which was 
of obvious interest to the present work*, and the accompanying quote from a 
publication whose interest lies at the other end of the temporal scale, but 
whose subject matter is arguably in many ways similar. Its concern is with 
recent innovations in computer imaging, whereas the subject o f the conference 
was the uses of 3D models in the history of the sciences, technology and 
medicine. The proceedings are as yet unpublished, but I refer extensively to 
conference presenters and their papers, in the hope and expectation that these 
will soon become generally available.
Many of the papers addressed this problem of the necessity to move between 
dimensions when visualizing real-world phenomena, which is essentially one 
of my central concerns. In the previous section I briefly discussed the history, 
uses and drawbacks of anatomical illustrations for visualizing the body. 
Alongside these two dimensional illustrations, 3D models were (and are) also 
used, and for similar purposes. I feel that it is important to stress that the 
boundaries between the two- and the three-dimensional are by no means as 
clear cut as would at first appear. Rooke (1994) for example suggested that 
all visual representations can be thought about as three dimensional, in that 
they involve a social dimension, a physical dimension and the brain. She 
argued that we experience a multi-dimensional interpretation due to our 
‘seeing’ an overlap between them.
I wish to introduce (or reintroduce) at this point the notion of superimposition 
(Latour 1986). As we have already seen, two-dimensional images of diverse 
origins can be (and often are) superimposed one upon another in complex 
ways, and I would assert that this can effectively blur, or breach such 
boundaries. The flap anatomies mentioned earlier, in which small pictures of 
various organs were superimposed upon a larger one representing ‘the body’ 
to give some idea of the three dimensional, layered nature of anatomy, provide
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an early (though ingenious) example of this. Modem examples are produced 
by the techniques of CT and MRI scanning technologies, which can 
superimpose one upon the other images of adjacent ‘slices’ of the body, thus 
building up a three dimensional representation of the body’s interior. 
Todd-Pokropek (1998), in a review of the journal Medical Image Analysis 
stressed the publication’s concern with the production of 3D displays by 
combining, displaying and interpreting data from different imaging 
modalities. I will later show how my own respondents superimposed and 
combined 2D images from a variety of sources in a much more ad hoc way, in 
order to better understand, construct, convince and communicate.
Tufte (1990) discussed precisely this problem of communicating information 
about a complex, three dimensional world in the confines of the two 
dimensional space of paper, or ‘flatland’ as he and others (e.g., Abbott 1884; 
Stella 1986) have termed it. Tufte shows examples of some of the ingenious 
ways in which this problem has been overcome, and also discusses some 
attempts which have failed, sometimes spectacularly. Alpers (1983) described 
how the Dutch descriptive painters of the seventeenth century shared similar 
concerns, and how they overcame the problem to some extent by treating the 
canvas as an ‘externalised retina’ to be painted upon directly, rather than as a 
window or stage looking out upon the world as the classical Italian narrative 
painters had tended to treat it. This metaphor was re-employed by Lynch 
(1985), when describing practices by which natural objects are rendered 
visible and analyzable in scientific research.
As has already been intimated, the complex, layered nature of anatomy is an 
area which has historically posed particular problems of dimensionality. 
Anatomical pictures, however accurate, are generally in two dimensions, and 
anatomical reality in three. From my own experiences of learning and also 
teaching anatomy, I would argue that this problem of dimensionality has by no 
means been overcome. This brings us to further consideration of 3D 
representations, or ‘models’. Baker (forthcoming) described the problems and 
ambiguities inherent in defining the term ‘model’, and also its shifting, mobile 
nature. A model may be used as a representation of a larger work (such as a 
sculpture, a monument or a building), as an explanatory device, a means of 
persuasion, or as part of a production process, (as in ceramics). They can be 
used also as a means of communication, perhaps to complement verbal
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accounts, and in turn be complemented themselves by drawings (which might 
be ‘models for the model’).
My own students have found the use of three dimensional models of 
individual organs such as the heart and the brain useful; more useful in fact 
than the real thing, since they are more solid, and can be dissembled and put 
back together again, (which is more than can be said for ex-abbatoir organs 
inexpertly dissected). They found them more useful in some ways also than 
pictures, which are unable to convey much sense of the size and depth of an 
organ, or the actual positions in 3D space of the parts and layers which it 
comprises. Actual or model skeletons are useful in the same sort of way, for 
demonstrating the positions of the bones relative to one another, and the ways 
in which they articulate. However, despite their seeming advantages, I will 
later show that the use of 3D models can be problematic in some 
circumstances, in ways that are complex and difficult to understand, and that 
in fact ‘layers’ of superimposed pictures can on occasion be more effective.
Latour (1986) has shown in the context of studies of both scientific practices 
and also more ‘applied’ endeavours such as engineering (which like me he 
considers are often inappropriately and unduly separated from science), how a 
paper world can be manipulated (despite its seeming limitations) as i f  in three 
dimensions, by means of such juxtapositions of inscriptions. As Latour (ibid 
p.22) put it, ‘the two-dimensional character o f inscriptions allows them to 
merge with geometry... space on paper can he made continuous with 
three-dimensional space\ A result of this is that ‘we can work on paper... but 
still manipulate three-dimensional objects ‘out there ’.
The world of the computer screen is also in a sense a two-dimensional 
‘flatland’, which shares many similarities with that of paper. However, it 
provides means of creating, modifying, combining and superimposing images, 
and parts of images, that seem not to be dependent upon the limitations of 
physical manipulation and working memory that constrain us when we work 
with paper (FriedhofF and Benzon 1991), but provide previously undreamt-of 
opportunities to visualize more actively. This was demonstrated very 
emphatically in relation to an example from very modem (even experimental) 
surgery recently encountered at a conference . Professor R. Kitney of St 
Mary’s Hospital and Imperial College, London described advanced 
technologies whereby images from MRI and micro-endoscopy can be used in
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combination. Eventually for example, the position of a micro-endoscope 
within the spinal column could be tracked by MRI, so allowing surgeons to 
see previously invisible details of anatomy and context. These interventional 
MRI technologies (iMRI) are still in the developmental stages at the time of 
writing. Imperial College / St Mary’s Hospital presently has the only 
equipment of this nature in the UK.
This problem of dimensionality in anatomy, far from being new, is one which 
has been readdressed at various times throughout the history o f surgical and 
medical education. The wax models commissioned by Felice Fontana, not 
only of the human body, but also of plants, animals and pathological 
conditions, are a case in point. These were intended as teaching aids, and 
supplemented by drawings and texts. Many were made larger than life size to 
better show the complexities of for example, the blood and lymph circulatory 
systems. These models were extremely detailed, and were themselves 
constructed from juxtapositions of images, from pictures in anatomical atlases 
and also directly from dissections, sometimes multiple dissections. The 
models were not handleable due to their delicate construction. Less detailed, 
and certainly less aesthetic, but according to Fontana himself, far more useful 
for didactic purposes, were other, wooden models which could be taken apart 
and reassembled by students. Fontana stressed the fact that it was the ‘putting 
together’ of these models which gained most knowledge. This shift from wax 
(which could not be handled) to wooden (handleable) models, even though 
these were less detailed, was significant, because the latter entailed the use of 
both eyes and hands so salient to surgery (Mazzolini, forthcoming).
Hopwood (1999) also described this idea o f ‘building a 3D model with the 
hands in order to visualise it in the head’, this time in the context of 
nineteenth century embryology. Microtomes were used to render structures in 
very thin slices, and embryologists subsequently made sectional wax images 
of these, which could then be used to reconstruct the whole. Hopwood (ibid 
p. 466) described this as a ‘complex interplay between two and three 
dimensions ’. These larger-than-life ‘wax plate reconstructions’ became a 
primary means of visualising embryos, which are often so small in life as to be 
almost invisible to the naked eye. These models were actually published to 
accompany textbooks and research papers, another example of the 
superimposition of complementary representations to aid understanding. 
Further than this, Hopwood stressed how embryologist and anatomist
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Wilhelm His constructed these intricate wax models alongside other, simpler 
‘mechanical’ models in rubber or leather (which were intended to mimic the 
processes by which the embryos developed, rather than to emulate their form). 
These ostensibly separate kinds of model were (as Hopwood put it) for him 
merely two modes by which he modeled. In the same laboratory, His colluded 
also in the construction of mathematical models.
Newman (1996) and Petherbridge (forthcoming) were concerned with the 
movement between dimensions entailed in the use of obstetrical illustrations 
and models intended as training aids for obstetricians and midwives. Again, 
both wax and wooden models were produced, and these were used in 
conjunction with both 2D illustrations and texts. Petherbridge described the 
dynamic nature of this particular use of models as a sketch, a means of 
moving towards something; terming them ‘obstetrical machines that talk to 
the eye\ This use of other sensory modalities alongside vision in ‘making 
sense o f  the world" (literally, in some respects) and gaining knowledge, is a 
theme that recurs frequently. These examples stress the importance of the use 
of the hands (touch sense) and eyes together in learning about things in the 
world. Elsewhere I have also discussed kinaesthetic sense, our sense of the 
orientation and movement of our bodies.
In a similar way to that shown by these historical examples, modern-day 
surgeons also have understandable concerns with touch-sense. Several of my 
research respondents alluded to this, describing for example the importance of 
the ‘feel’ or texture of different bodily tissues, and the ‘tension’ on certain 
ligaments. Professor Ara Darzi of Imperial College and St Mary’s Hospital, 
London, spoke about laparascopic techniques (keyhole surgery) in which 
surgeons’ ‘eyes are miniaturised and ... hands extended to enable operations 
to be performed through a tiny incision in places which could only be reached
'i
formerly via a large incision . According to Professor Darzi, such 
techniques ‘effectively exteriorise the internal body so that it can be seen on a 
monitor screen'.
He drew attention also to safety issues in relation to this, which are connected 
with the use of unfamiliar skills and instruments, but also with a lack of tactile 
feedback, and the fact that the 2D images on the screen take away the 
stereo-cue from the surgeon. This is especially interesting, since I have 
observed surgeons experiencing problems in reconciling 2D images with the
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3D reality presented on the operating table. It would seem though that, if  the 
3D is ‘taken away’ altogether from the surgeon’s point of view, even more 
problems may potentially arise. Although the ‘switching between 
dimensions’ that I have observed is difficult, it is apparently less so than 
trying to do without, or ignore the third dimension entirely. Future robotic 
technologies are planned which will ‘give back’ some of this sensory input to 
surgeons, via tactile feedback for example.
Recent work by psychologists Susan J. Lederman of Queens University 
Ontario, and Roberta Klatzky of Carnegie Mellon University (1998) has 
attempted to address questions about how we perceive touch. They have 
discovered six basic exploratory procedures that people use to learn about 
objects with their hands:
• rubbing the fingers across a surface to provide information about an 
object’s texture
• pressing down on an object provides information about its hardness
• static contact - holding the fingers in one spot provides information about 
an object’s temperature
• holding an object out away from a support provides information about its 
weight
• wrapping the hand around an object provides information about its global 
shape and volume
• moving the fingers about the perimeter of an object provides information 
about its exact shape
According to Lederman and Klatzky, these procedures are performed in a 
logical pattern, and in order to design robots that can use tactile sensors to 
analyse an environment, it will be necessary to devise sequences of systematic 
manual testing procedures that will extract the appropriate tactile information. 
Research indicates that touch sense is extremely sensitive to material 
properties such as those described above, but relatively poor at determining 
spatial and geometric properties such as whether an edge is sloped to the right 
or the left, or whether it is horizontal or vertical. This type of information is 
are far more effectively gained via the visual system (Azar 1998). It is 
research of this kind which may provide insights into how best to construct 
the surgical robots of the future, and indeed others which can be used to 
perform intricate tasks in ‘remote’ environments.
57
To reiterate, the problems discussed here are not new, but can be traced 
through the past, present and future of medicine and indeed science more 
generally, not only via the use of robotic technology and 3D models but via 
the history of optical technologies. I digress somewhat. It will be a 
considerable time before some of the new techniques described here will 
become available to veterinary surgeons like my research respondents. 
Nevertheless, I feel that this approach is relevant to, and supportive of, my 
own. I return to consideration of vision.
3.5 Extra-sensory perceptions
‘Material objects that till now were classified among atoms, since they far  
elude all human eyesight, presented themselves so clearly to the observer’s 
eye that when even completely inexperienced people look at things which they 
have never seen, they complain at first that they see nothing, but soon they cry 
out that they perceive marvellous objects with their eyes. For in fact this 
concerns a new theatre o f  nature, another world..... ’
Warp, J.A. (1897). Cited in Alpers 1983.
Warp wrote thus about microscopy, and this quote (whilst it conveys the 
excitement inherent in the use o f an optical device which allows us to perceive 
things that are invisible to the naked eye), skates too readily I feel over the 
difficulties likely to be encountered by the inexperienced in interpreting their 
observations. My disquiet with this idea stems from my experiences of 
teaching biology (particularly microbiology). It is true that there does indeed 
come a day for most people (if they persevere for long enough) when they can 
perceive for themselves ‘marvellous objects’ of the type referred to, but such 
skills take a long time to acquire, are hard to grasp and even harder to 
understand. Moreover, the acquisition process itself seems to be social in 
nature.
Dennis (1989) described the extraordinary lengths that Robert Hooke had to 
go to in the seventeenth century in order to enable other people to use his new 
microscopes. The instruments themselves were not standardised at that time, 
since no two lenses were likely to be ground exactly alike. There was not the 
technology available. His problem was therefore to move observations made 
via this non-standardised instrumentation from the realm of private experience 
(his own) to the status of public, and therefore verifiable knowledge. He
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accomplished this by means of his book Micrographia (1665), which 
contained detailed instructions for the ‘disciplined seeing’ (Dennis 1989 
p.323) of various specimens; a form of standardisation of the viewing method, 
to compensate for the non-standardised nature of the equipment. Briefly, this 
method involved multiple viewings under various (specified) lighting 
conditions in an attempt to discover the ‘true’ appearance o f his specimens. 
Micrographia contained likenesses of this purported ‘true’ appearance o f 
various specimens alongside the instructions that enabled their viewing using 
the microscope.
One of Micrographia* s central themes was the employment of instruments to 
enlarge the scope o f man’s (sic) imperfect vision (Dennis 1989 p.318). It 
provided in addition (and probably more importantly) the standard by which a 
community of microscope users could be built up. It was intended not as a 
book to be simply read, but as a tool to be used in conjunction with the 
microscope itself. Though Hooke’s drawings were inevitably interpretations 
(or representations) of what he himself had seen, he considered on the 
contrary that he had reproduced ‘objective’ representations of his specimens. 
This led to disputes with engravers who worked on Micrographia whom 
(Hooke considered) did not exactly reproduce his drawings as he had 
intended. It was essential that the prospective microscope user learned to 
‘see’ in the manner described by Hooke (and therefore, inevitably, that he 
‘saw’ the same likenesses), otherwise he would merely ‘wander in the 
labyrinth o f groundless opinions * (Dennis 1989 p.330), as opposed to seeing 
what was ‘really’ there.
The social nature of microscope use, this need from the inception to build a 
‘community’ of microscope users, can be easily surmised in classroom 
observations of students learning microscopy. Students seem to become able 
to ‘see’ objects by social means, by talking about, and comparing what they 
see, with each other, with their teachers and also with pictures or projected 
images of a similar specimen. In essence, modem microscopy students use 
similar methods to those used by the readers of Micrographia; our 
instruments are now uniform and standardised in nature, but our students still 
seem to need to learn to use them by means of standardised (and consensual) 
methods.
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If the microscope was effective in extending the power of the eye through 
magnification, other technologies could be said to further extend it by means 
of enabling one to see through opaque surfaces, such as the surfaces of the 
body. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
development of radiography and endoscopy made it possible for the first time 
to look inside the body without first cutting it open. Such technologies 
brought with them however similar problems and debates relating to their use, 
and particularly to the interpretation of the images produced.
Bemike Pasveer’s (1993) paper was interesting in that it criticised 
‘traditional’ histories of radiology (eg Brecher & Brecher 1969) for their 
assumption that the content of x-ray images is essentially unproblematic, 
given the ‘fact’ that the pictures would naturally relate to ‘what was there’, 
and that it was necessary only to learn how to read, or ‘decode’ the pictures in 
order to decipher their implicit meanings. Pasveer argued on the contrary that 
it was necessary for the pictures to have been ‘coded’ in the first place, by 
specific ‘rendering practices’ (in which the pioneers of medical radiology set 
out to construct the ‘true’ content of the pictures, in much the same way as 
Hooke had done for microscopy by means of Micrographia), prior to any such 
‘decoding’ being possible.
One way in which the ‘coding’ of radiographs was accomplished was by 
‘creating likenesses between the shadows produced and other modes o f  
representing, qnd between shadows alone’ (Pasveer 1993). Radiographic 
pictures of, for Example, the chest, would be compared with the sounds it 
produced on percussion, and with radiographic pictures of other chests. For 
Pasveer, the content of visual representations is ‘made’ by such methods, 
rather than ‘discovered’. Decoding becomes possible only as a result of the 
emerging representational practice; the two, the coding and the possibility of 
decoding the images, develop together in order to enable their visibility.
Vasseleu (1991) continued this theme o f the construction of medical imagery 
in relation to endoscopy, which collective name covers a range of techniques 
which enable the visualisation for diagnostic purposes of internal body 
cavities by means of a tiny video camera attached to a flexible tube. Rooke 
(1994) similarly described how modem day CT images are constructed by 
means of corroboration between expert practitioners, the surgeon and the 
radiologist; the radiologist adjusts the contrasts on the scan in line with the
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initial hunches of the surgeon (p. 33); essentially Hirschauer’s (1991) relation 
o f ‘experience’ and ‘representation’.
Since then, ultrasound, and more recently, the still-developing technologies of 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), computer-aided tomography (CT 
scanning) and positron-emission tomography (PET), have provided still 
further opportunities for visualising the body, the latter three with the 
important difference that they can provide 3D, rather than 2D imaging. While 
MRI and CT technologies image the structure of the body, PET scanning 
visualises biological functioning in a related sort of way to the graphical 
techniques referred to below. Crary (1990, p .l) argued that modem 
techniques such as these are relocating vision to a plane separated from the 
actual human observer, and that this causes most of the functions of the 
human eye to be supplanted by practices in which visual images no longer 
have reference to an observer in a ‘real’ optically perceived world. However,
I feel that this point of view depends upon a particular (and contentious) 
notion of ‘seeing’; similar in fact to that displayed by Hooke in his 
disagreements with his engravers. Such an explanation takes too literally the 
idea of the ‘reality* and ‘objectivity’ of our perceptions, and fails to address 
the notion that all of the things that we perceive can in fact themselves be 
construed as ‘representations’ of things in the world. Gombrich (1959) 
stressed the extent to which our knowledge and expectations influence our 
perceptions: ‘Allperceiving relates to expectations and therefore to 
comparisons' (p.254). Our own particular slant upon ‘reality’ is therefore 
likely to depend heavily upon the social, cultural and intellectual milieu within 
which we are situated.
The use of these latter-mentioned imaging technologies is limited in 
veterinary medicine at the present time, to a very few specialist units (for 
example in connection with animals of great economic value, such as 
racehorses, and for research purposes at veterinary universities). They are not 
used in the type of local general practices in which my fieldwork was carried 
out, and so are outside the scope of the present empirical work. This is not to 
say, of course, that they are not of interest, and worthy of investigation in their 
own right in connection with the research questions posed here. For an 
interesting introductory overview setting these methods in the context of the 
history of body imaging, see Stafford (1992). For more contemporary 
accounts which give specific examples, see Rooke (1994), Friedhoff and
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Benzon (1991), and Beaulieu (2000). Their emerging use in veterinary 
medicine is something that I would very much like to research myself in the 
future.
3.6 The graphical method
Alongside technologies which enhance and magnify objects enabling them to 
be seen and studied, there exist others which enable otherwise imperceptible 
movements to be perceived where this would be impossible were they not 
slowed down and recorded, or traced. Early examples included the 
kymograph, which could be adapted to record movements such as those of the 
heart during the cardiac cycle and other physiological events which had 
literally been ‘invisible’ prior to this. De Chadarevian (1993) referred to these 
technologies as ‘bodily inscription devices’ which provide a ‘solution for  
visualising and quantifying time intervals not perceptible to our senses' 
(p.275). She described the debates that arose with regard to their accuracy, 
which were compounded when it was discovered that the same phenomenon 
(for example, the human pulse) when transcribed by different devices, would 
yield different traces.
This situation again, led to a need for standardisation of both the instruments 
themselves and of the methods by which the traces are interpreted. This was 
accomplished, by the establishment of common standards which ‘disciplined 
experimental practice and normalised experience ’ (de Chaderevian 1993 
p.290). These technologies are collectively known as ‘the graphical method’ 
(after Marey 1878), and were the forerunners of modem devices such as the 
electrocardiograph.
Hatt (1995) researched the history and significance of the measurement of 
blood pressure. She described how this ‘digitisation’ of bodily events has 
been used to determine whether a body is ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’. This 
concept is in itself interesting, particularly since my observations have led me 
to conclude that digitisation does not produce one version of a ‘normal’ or 
‘abnormal’ body, but measurements are considered ‘normal’ within a given 
range. This ‘normal range’ varies between animal species and even within 
species is sometimes quite wide, and also subject to some variation.^
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Borrell (1986) wrote of the ways in which the tracings of early recording 
devices enabled the gradual evolution of a new conception of such bodily 
processes as interrelated, rather than separate events, and conversely, to allow 
the visual separation of simultaneous events via simultaneous registration.
She described how such techniques became an important means of revealing 
the internal workings of the body and helping physicians to evaluate the 
course of a disease’s progress, as well as detect its presence at an earlier stage 
than was previously possible. Again, Borrell’s paper stressed the tensions and 
debates that existed (and exist still) with regard to the interpretation of the 
traces of these machines. Similarly, Hartland (1993) showed how the 
interpretation of electrocardiograph data remains problematic.
Still other devices are used to quantify substances within the body. Examples 
include haematology analysers which count the various (normal) fractions 
present in the blood, and biochemistry machines which measure, among other 
things, substances such as enzymes in blood serum or plasma which are not 
present under normal circumstances, or are present only in extremely small 
amounts, but whose level may be elevated as a consequence of certain 
pathological conditions. Such analyses can provide information relating to the 
functioning of various bodily organs such as the heart, liver and kidneys, and 
also assist in monitoring the course of a disease process. Some models also 
provide a list of potential diagnoses of problems that could be causing the 
occurrence o f levels of these substances outside of their so-called ‘normal 
range’. These lists appear to be of some, but limited value to veterinary 
practitioners. This is borne out by examples from the literature pertaining to 
the use of computerised diagnostic equipment in human medicine, (see for 
example Hartland 1993).
So much for consideration of the uses that ‘physical’ imagery may have to 
participants in my main research context. Of particular importance are firstly, 
the ways in which pictures and other ‘inscriptions’ that are of interest to 
research respondents are constructed, and the ways in which various types 
may be used, either alone or in combination with others. Secondly, the 
tensions implicit in the interface between two dimensional ‘images’ and 
three-dimensional ‘models’, and the observation that the division between 
what is 2D and what is 3D is by no means as clear cut as would at first appear. 
Thirdly, that many of the examples quoted have highlighted the importance o f 
the use of the hands alongside that of the eyes. Fourthly, that the
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interpretation of images produced by ‘new’ technologies is not a simple 
matter, but successive historical and present-day examples have shown them 
to be dependent upon both specific ‘rendering’ or ‘coding’ processes and 
social consensus.
I now move on to consider ‘mental’ imagery. I begin by briefly discussing 
debates as to whether or not it actually exists (or as I interpret the situation, 
debates as to the nature o f the underlying processes and mechanisms 
responsible for the imagery we experience).
3.7 The great mental imagery debate....
Mental imagery is a contentious subject for a variety of reasons. Like 
‘knowledge’ considered previously, we find it difficult to define precisely. 
Paivio (1991) reviewed some of the various definitions that have been put 
forward, in the realms of literature and psychology and also in more general 
parlance. ‘Imagery’ can refer to descriptive language and figures of speech, or 
‘picture words’ (Paivio 1991), as used in poetry and other creative writing 
forms. It can also be used to describe the ‘mental pictures’ that we experience 
when imagining the appearance of familiar objects, places and people. Paivio 
also described how imagery can be used unconsciously. It is not necessary for 
example, for mental visual images to be actively ‘in the mind’s eye’ all of the 
time, since they can be invoked as and when required (p.252).
Paivio (1991 p.252) divided these various definitions or uses of imagery into 
two general categories; imagery as expression and imagery as process. In the 
first category, the expression can be either overt (as in art, literature and 
science), or covert (as in internal, mental images). In the second, the term 
process refers to the mental representations and mechanisms that are involved 
in the production of expressed images (of either type). No-one denies that we 
experience mental visual imagery in the expressive sense; the debates revolve 
rather around imagery as process. Imagery in this sense lies largely outside 
the remit of this thesis. Neither my methodology nor my experience are 
appropriate for the investigation of this phenomenon, particularly since it has 
now largely moved into the realms of neuroscience. I think it interesting and 
useful however to briefly consider some of the main arguments that relate to 
it.
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The main thrust of the debate appears to lie in the way(s) in which information 
is thought to be coded^, stored in memory and processed. Steve Kosslyn and 
his various co-workers have argued that an analogue processing mechanism 
(or mechanisms) for dealing with imagery exists alongside a prepositional one 
which deals with linguistic input (see for example Kosslyn 1973; 1980;
1987; 1994; Jolicoeur and Kosslyn 1985; Kosslyn and Jolicoeur 1980; 
Kosslyn et al 1978; 1984; 1985; 1990; 1993; 1995). Kosslyn’s view is 
supported by the work of Shepard (1975; 1978) and his associates (Shepard 
and Cooper 1982; Shepard and Feng 1972; Shepard and Metzler 1971), 
which shows how ‘mental’ objects can be rotated and otherwise transformed 
in much the same way as ‘physical’ ones. Also, Paivio’s (1991) ‘dual coding 
theory’ of information processing, which proposed that cognition is served by 
two experientially derived and modality specific symbolic systems, one of 
which is specialised for language and one for imagery. Paivio stressed 
however that although they can work independently, these codes are not 
totally separate, in that information encoded in one modality can easily be 
transformed to the other, and where necessary they can both be used together 
and simultaneously.
Various evidence from neuropsychology, including the use of PET scanning 
technology, and studies of subjects whose visual cortex has been disrupted 
due to brain damage, has also been put forward to support the imagist (or 
analogue) thesis (eg, Farah 1988; Farah et al 1992; Kosslyn 1994). This has 
shown that some visual areas of the brain are topographically organised in the 
same way as the retina o f the eye, and also that mental imagery uses some of 
the same neural representational mechanisms as vision. Countering this 
argument, others have been proposed, notably by Pylyshyn (1973; 1978; 
1979a; 1979, and Anderson (1978; see also Anderson and Bower 1973), 
which deny the existence of any such analogue mechanism (although they do 
not deny our experiences of imagery). According to these theories, only a 
prepositional mechanism exists. Imagery as we experience it is thus 
epiphenomenal, and largely a consequence of our goals, beliefs and tacit 
knowledge. It has been proposed that during the course of many of the 
psychological experiments carried out by members of the ‘imagist’ lobby, 
subjects were actually simulating witnessing real events taking place, and their 
tacit knowledge of the imaged situation caused the reported transformations to 
take place along the lines that they would in reality.
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These arguments are fascinating. However, as previously stated, they deal 
with subjects largely beyond the remit of the present work, and I concentrate 
rather upon (visual) imagery as expression. I move on to consider what such 
imagery (as we experience it) is actually like, and how we use it, (or rather 
how people may use it in the present research contexts).
3.8 Imagery as expression (Paivio 1991): What is it like?
Imagery: ‘Seeing ’ in the absence o f the appropriate sensory input, a 
‘perception ’ o f remembered input rather than new information.
Steve Kosslyn (1995 p.267)
Somewhat simplistically, mental visual images have been compared to 
‘pictures in the head’. Such explanations imply however the necessity for a 
Tittle man inside the head’ (or ‘homunculus’ - 1 remain uncertain as to why it 
is necessary for such an entity to be gendered) - to look at them. This in turn 
implies a necessity for other little men, and so on ad infinitum, a situation 
leading to infinite regress. More sophisticated explanations avoid the need for 
small beings of either gender. According to Kosslyn (1980) for example, 
images are actively constructed, dynamic, 3D, ‘quasi-pictorial’ displays 
which are not necessarily ‘photographically’ accurate. They may be scanned 
in a similar sort of way to ‘physical images’ o f the type discussed earlier in 
this chapter. They can be maintained (with some difficulty; Kosslyn (ibid 
p.280) described them as ‘fleeting’ and ‘ethereal’, Pinker (1998, p. 294) as 
‘fragmentary’). They can also be transformed in various ways - think of 
visualizing for example the rearrangement o f furniture in your room before 
you physically do the rearranging. We often try things out in this way prior to 
actually acting. Speaking as a biologist, it saves energy! (This is incidentally 
not a ‘funny’ remark; imagery may have had very real evolutionary benefits 
in some such respect). They are also flexible in ways not possible with words 
alone. Linguistic material is necessarily sequential; this is one of the core 
problems with which I am trying to deal. Images though are synchronously 
organised, like a fabric, and so free from such linear or sequential constraints 
(Paivio 1991 p. 266-267).
Though flexible, they are also specific; try as you might, it is impossible to 
visualise a bird, or a triangle for example, in general (Pinker 1997). A 
specific (often prototypical) bird, triangle, or other object has to be imaged.
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At the same time however, these ‘specific’ objects can somehow substitute for 
others in a ‘general’ sort of way. Paivio (1991 p. 255) described visual mental 
images as ‘visual metaphors’. I will return to consideration of this idea later. 
Though not the main focus of this study, these psychological theories about 
how cognitive construction takes place deserve consideration in respect of 
their potential contribution to any broader theory of how people construct 
useful imagistic representations, and how these interface with their ‘physical’ 
counterparts.^
3.9 And how we use it.....
The process of ‘looking’ at imaged objects seems to share many of the 
properties of actual perception (Kosslyn 1995). Pinker (1998) described our 
use of imagery as a means of answering certain types of questions pertaining 
to familiar (or relatively familiar) objects. To address the question ‘What 
shape are a beagle’s ears?’ for example, we visualize a beagle, which feels 
like conjuring up a picture available for inspection in the mind’s eye. Pinker 
differentiated between such ‘concrete’ questions and the more ‘abstract’ type 
(he gave the examples o f ‘What is your mother's maiden name? ’ and ‘What is 
more important, civil liberties, or a lower rate o f  crime? *) best addressed by 
linguistic means (p.284). Such differentiations however need to be considered 
in the light of difficulties relating to ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ phenomena 
already discussed.
According to Paivio (1991) we use imagery in certain, distinct ways:
• As a mnemonic device; ‘concrete’ objects are more easily remembered as 
visual images than by means o f words (see Paivio 1971; Richardson 
1980). Generating mental visual images in response to material to be 
learned can assist with retention (Paivio 1971).
• In certain types of creative thinking (eg in art, or science). This is 
discussed much more fully in the following chapter.
•  In conjunction with language. I return to this theme in Chapter 5.
Kosslyn (1995 p.268) described how imagery can be used to identify objects, 
their parts and characteristics, particularly when the information to be
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remembered is of a subtle nature, or where the property has not been explicitly 
considered before, or cannot easily be deduced from other stored information. 
In his analysis, a second role for imagery is in that it parallels the role of 
vision in allowing us to navigate, track and reach for objects; imagery is thus 
a means of anticipating what will happen when one’s own body or a physical 
object moves in a particular way. Kaufinann (1990) argued that imagery is 
especially valuable in what he called ‘ill-structured task environments’
(p. 173), which are characterised by a lack of experience of the task in hand, or 
in the case of especially complex problems (such as those likely to be faced at 
times by my research collaborators), and that it becomes less important in 
more familiar task situations.
It is interesting to speculate about how and when ‘mental’ visual imagery is 
used in conjunction with the ‘physical’ kind, and to consider related topics 
such as when it is sufficient alone, and how we cope in situations where we 
are unable to form a satisfactory mental image because we have too little 
experience of the object or situation in question. It is to be hoped that my data 
will contribute some small insights into these questions. It is now time 
however to carry the discussion forward to reflect upon ‘seeing’ in the 
Anschauung (‘seeing that’) sense.
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NOTES
1 Conference entitled *Models in the Sciences, Technology and Medicine ', 
13-14 November 1998, at the Wellcome Institute and the Science Museum, 
London, UK.
^ ‘ Visualisation in Surgery * Saturday 9 September 2000, at Imperial 
College, London, UK. Part of the BA Festival of Science.
^ Ibid (note 2).
^ See chapter 9 for further discussion of this point.
^ Professor David Gooding pointed out that this meaning o f ‘coding’ is 
different from that used previously. Here, it represents a hypothesis about 
how the brain works; in sociological studies (such as that of Pasveer 
1994), social or cultural ‘encoding practices’ are the focus.
^ I am indebted to Professor David Gooding for raising this point
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CHAPTER 4: ‘KNOWING AND SEEING*




In this chapter, I consider a number of related matters that are also related (as 
usual) to those previously discussed. Again, my attempts at communicating 
complexity are constrained by narrative, principally because many of the 
complex relations and connections that exist between things and ideas are not 
fully addressed by the sequential, narrative form. I explore more fully here the 
notion of Anschauung or insight introduced in chapter 3. This refers to 
instances in which we move beyond our perceptions to make inferences about 
things in the world. This creative type of thinking is essential not only for 
artistic and scientific innovation, but (I will argue), in more everyday skilled 
practice also. I approach this concept from the point of view of the following 
three topics. In doing so, I argue for the cruciality of a social dimension to a 
phenomenon which is traditionally thought about in terms of private, 
cognitive experience.
Firstly, and following on from my considerations of the significance of maps 
in Chapter 2, and of the various things referred to as ‘imagery’ in chapter 3 ,1 
explore the idea of ‘visual languages’ (Rudwick 1976). These have evolved 
for various disciplines, both as a means of communicating complex ideas, and 
also (and arguably more importantly) as a tool for thinking about them. I give 
further examples of their use and usefulness in the mental and physical 
mapping of places and spaces. Visual languages need to be considered with 
respect to the following arguments already mentioned:
•  That we need to develop an ability to ‘read’ visual images in a similar way 
to that in which we read textual material (Goldsmith 1984; Kress and van 
Leeuwen 1990).
• That the ‘meaning ' of a new mode of visual representation is largely 
constructed along with its ‘products ’ (Dennis 1989; Pasveer 1994).
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They also need to be thought about in their relation to verbal languages, in 
particular to metaphor, for reasons that will become clear. I continue this 
theme in chapter 5.
Secondly, I consider competing ‘models’ that exist of ‘mental models’, (as 
opposed to the physical models discussed in the previous chapter). It may be 
however, that we use these in similar ways, and for similar purposes. Again, 
the division put in place between matters considered here and elsewhere is 
shown to be problematic. I reflect upon how all of this links with the key 
concepts o f ‘knowing’ and ‘seeing’. Thirdly, I consider modes of inference.
I argue for the usefulness o f the abductive model, in which we make 
construals that go beyond what is ‘known’ via visual or other modes of 
perception, or through ‘the rules’ that pertain to a particular practice.
4.2 Visual languages...
Gombrich (1960) argued that, because the relationship between an object to be 
depicted and its visual representation is never straightforward (despite any 
intentions that the illustrator may have towards ‘realism’ or objectivity), any 
form of artistic representation is in essence a visual language. Martin 
Rudwick (1976) traced the emergence during the nineteenth century of a 
‘visual language’ (represented by a widening range and increased number of 
illustrations) for the evolving discipline of geology. This came about largely 
because of the discipline’s concerns with phenomena that could not be 
communicated adequately by words or mathematical symbols alone.
Alongside this role in the communication or description o f complex 
phenomena however lies another (and arguably more important) one; that of 
inferring (or theorising) beyond what was known, or could be seen of them. 
This process was a social one, of working towards a consensus about the 
nature of these phenomena.
Wittgenstein (1953) argued against the possibility of ‘private languages’. His 
argument is based on the idea that language (any language, whether it be 
expressed in words, symbols, images, sounds - as in music, or movement - as 
in dance) is an inherently social activity, hence it cannot be ‘private’. 
Following this line of contention, Gooding (1990 p. 19) argued against what 
he termed ‘epistemological individualism’, and for the importance of social 
processes in bringing ‘unruly experience into the domain o f public discourse
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The unruly experiences referred to are individual human perceptions.
Gooding used the example of the Gruber-Sehl shadow box experiment to 
show how people’s conflicting reports of their perceptual experiences are 
resolved, and consensus reached. The experiment involved individual 
observers seated in such positions they could each see (different) shadows 
projected by a single object hidden inside the box. They literally saw different 
perspectives of the same object. Subjects therefore reported these conflicting 
experiences.
Not only did their perceptual experiences conflict with each other, but also 
with their shared belief that they were ‘seeing’ the same thing. Gruber and 
Sehl had hypothesised that subjects would reach consensus about the nature of 
the object in the box, and this is eventually what happened. Initially however, 
their reaction to such contradictory evidence was disbelief; each challenged 
the other’s point of view. In order to reach agreement, they first each had to 
come to trust the other observer’s reports of what they saw, and then to 
reconsider their own experiences in the light of them. This process involved 
not only finding a common system of representing and describing their 
experiences, but also the realisation that one’s own experience may be 
incomplete, and hence merely one aspect o f a larger possible whole. 
Essentially, what we see with our own eyes may be neither the whole story, 
not the only possible one. Observers reach consensus by constructing and 
exchanging ‘construals’ (Gooding 1990 p.23), or tentative possible 
interpretations of their perceptual experiences, and these are subsequently 
revised in line with those o f others. Gooding observed that the point of this 
experiment for science (or for any collaborative human activity), is that what 
we see with our own eyes is mediated by, and made consistent with what 
others see.*
Visual languages, like verbal ones, are tools that may be used in the search for 
consensus of observation in science (since ‘construals’ may be expressed in 
the form of visual as well as verbal representations). Returning to our geology 
example, the ‘visual language’ of geology consists of maps, diagrams and 
sections with associated texts, and relates to phenomena which generally 
speaking cannot be seen (in the sense of being witnessed) in nature. A 
geological map for example, represents an attempt to depict on a 2D surface, 
3D phenomena that can only really be seen where isolated outcrops of rock 
bare of soil and vegetation occur. It is necessary therefore for those who
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construct these maps to abstract (or extrapolate) further, from what is actually 
visible (in a literal sense) in nature; to move, as it were, from Anschaulichkeit 
to Anschauung.
Rudwick (1976) compared geological section diagrams to thought 
experiments in which it is imagined that the land is sliced vertically at a 
particular point, to produce a kind o f artificial cutting or cliff. These sections 
(like the maps), are constructed from observation data but extrapolated further 
from what is actually visible. These extrapolations are based upon the 
inferences of theorists that the geological phenomena depicted continued as 
they would expect from  what could actually he seen. Sections were (and still 
are) often shown on the same sheets as the geological maps to which they 
refer, to help facilitate their interpretation. Again, this represents a further 
example of how complementary images may be superimposed upon one 
another in an effort to better enable visualisation. However, it is important to 
take on board that, apart from these roles of showing both what is actually 
‘visible’, and also what (it is surmised) would be visible, were it not obscured 
by surface soil and vegetation, these pictures were used to communicate ideas 
beyond that of the actual structural configuration of rocks and strata. As 
Rudwick pointed out, they also hinted at causality; the temporal and physical 
factors which could have brought them about. Over a period of time, these 
illustrations became more abstract, and the ‘language’ more esoteric as 
traditions merged and became standardised (ibid p. 181).
Keller (1998) traced a similar development in the visual language that arose in 
the study of seismology in the eighteenth century. Although the actual causes 
of earthquakes were unknown at this time (and would remain so until well 
into the twentieth century), recent events had aroused a great deal of interest 
in them. Considerable controversy about their possible causes led to an 
‘explosion’ (as Keller termed it) in the amount of research, and consequently 
the quantity of published material linked to these events, as authors strove to 
put forward their competing theories. Illustrations were used to supplement 
the verbal arguments proposed in these publications. Keller described the 
difficulties implicit in representing invisible forces’, only their effects are after 
all visible in a literal sense. The causal processes themselves could not 
actually be observed. The earliest pictures in fact chronicled only these 
effects. They consisted of pairs of landscape paintings or drawings depicting 
the same area before and after the occurrence of the disaster.
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Later illustrations became gradually more abstracted, or diagrammatic; less 
concerned with producing a literal likeness, but more with theorising about 
possible explanations, following the pattern described by Rudwick for 
geology. For example, Michell (1760) and Drijfhout (1763) used diagrams to 
demonstrate their theories relating to both the stratified nature of the earth, 
and also the invisible forces and actions involved in an earthquake. These 
diagrams were closely linked to the accompanying texts, with extensive 
cross-referencing which encouraged the reader to ‘read* both text and images 
simultaneously. Keller, like Rudwick (1976) compared these expressions of 
highly theoretical constructs to thought experiments.
Moving closer in topic to my own research contexts, to an example that I have 
already touched upon, Pasveer (1993) described the processes by which the 
contents of xray images were rendered readable in terms of series of 
comparisons. Different representations of specific objects were compared in 
order to bring about a new ‘pictorial’ mode of depicting the body and 
diagnosing disease, in essence a new ‘visual’ language of medicine. She 
described the work of nineteenth century British physician J.F. Halls-Dally, 
who visualized the sounds produced by the chests o f healthy and tubercular 
patients upon percussion and compared these with drawings of the shadows 
produced when they were xrayed, actively constructing likenesses between 
sounds and shadows by translating them both into drawn images. The 
shadows were also compared with the thoracic anatomy of dead patients as 
revealed at post mortem and with radiographs of skeletonised cadavers, in 
order to get an idea of the appearance of shadows produced by the empty 
chest. According to Pasveer, on the basis of such comparisons the shadows of 
the lungs became readable; the content o f the images could eventually be read 
alone. However, my findings will show that images produced by radiology 
and other imaging technologies were rarely used on their own by my research 
respondents, either to make a diagnosis or to make decisions about operative 
procedures or techniques, but rather seemed to be used in conjunction with 
other images and information. This may be because Pasveer’s example was a 
historical one. Radiology was novel at that time, as opposed to the largely 
accepted and standardised practice that it has now become. X-ray images had 
not at that time become totally incorporated into the ‘body’of medical 
knowledge, hence their consideration apparently in isolation from other 
aspects o f this knowledge.
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This is echoed in many respects by Anne Beaulieu’s (2000) study. She 
showed how images from MRI and PET technologies were superimposed onto 
anatomical atlas pictures by brain researchers, in attempts to visualise the 
mind within the brain. Eventually, these superimposed images came to 
supersede the original, atlas pictures. Beaulieu showed also how the interests 
of clinicians in individual, pathological brains, and those o f researchers in 
pursuit of the ‘definitive’ brain sometimes came into conflict. This apparent 
tension between the ‘actual’ and the ‘typical’ is reflected both in general 
approaches to the acquisition of skills (whether these be developing 
‘individual’ skills, or more broadly, new skills which are developing within a 
form-of-life), and their application within a particular and specific context. 
Beaulieu showed how the (undeniably ‘cognitive’) mind itself is in the 
process of becoming ‘biologised’ (and therefore made ‘physical’) through 
revolutionary representational, social practices.
Visual languages thus appear to play a part in breaking down the barriers that 
we have put in place between the physical, cognitive and social spheres. One 
of my aims here is to show how surgeons use a ‘visual language’ of their own 
in their efforts to map the body. I will show how my respondents used series 
of anatomical illustrations, radiographs and other images, presumably 
supplemented by their own internal mental images based upon knowledge of 
previous, similar cases, in order to aid their thinking and visualize the internal 
body. This visual language of surgeons (like the historical examples 
described) has evolved over time, and although it is less developed in 
veterinary than in human surgery, it is developing still, as further modes and 
forms of imagery become incorporated into its practices. As for how all of 
this interfaces with verbal (or natural) language.... this is the concern of 
chapter 5.
4 3  Mental models
In the previous chapter I discussed some of the ways in which physical models 
were used in the context o f the history o f science and medicine. I also 
outlined various psychological theories relating to our uses of mental imagery. 
Both o f these areas need to be kept in consideration when thinking about 
mental models. Dawkins (1989, p.59) speculated upon the possible 
evolutionary advantages involved in our apparent ability to run mental 
simulations (a bit like computer simulations) of real life situations when we
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have to make difficult decisions involving unknown quantities in the future. 
We imagine what would happen if we followed each of the alternative courses 
of action open to us. We set up a model in our heads, not of everything in the 
world, but of relevant parts of it. According to Dawkins, we may see these 
vividly in our ‘mind’s eye’, or alternatively we may operate on stylized 
abstractions of them. Like computer simulations, mental models can be run at 
far less cost (whether cost be counted in economic terms, or in terms o f time, 
or energy expenditure) than that of trying things out ‘for real’ every time.
Are mental models then, the same as mental imagery discussed in the previous 
chapter? One might speculate that they are perhaps a complex, specialised 
kind (or system) of imagery that we use for solving problems in the world. 
Nersessian (1992) supports this viewpoint, suggesting that the usefulness of 
mental models lies in their ability (once constructed) to produce images o f an 
object or situation from a particular perspective. From her examinations of 
the history of scientific change, she identified a number of ‘modelling’ 
activities, including analogical reasoning and its imagistic counterpart. It is 
important to point out that these activities are not necessarily separate ones, 
but may be used together.
Gamham and Oakhill (1994, pp 341-2) have argued that the mental models 
framework appears to be the most promising one in existence for bringing 
together research on thinking and reasoning. According to their thesis, mental 
models theory provides possible answers to difficult questions about the 
nature o f thinking itself. What do people actually do when they think? They 
think about parts of a world (which may or may not be the ‘real’ world), and 
represent these parts in a mental model. This is then manipulated to reflect 
possible changes in those parts of the world that they are thinking about. 
Mental models theory was developed by Johnson-Laird (1981,1983; see also 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991) mainly to account for deductive inference 
(discussed further below). It is probably true to say however that thinking 
about mental models can be traced much further back than this, to 
Wittgenstein’s (1922) ‘picture’ theory of meaning, Bartlett’s (1932) early 
work on schemata, and Craik’s (1943) argument that thinking depends upon 
people’s internal models of the world.
According to Gamham and Oakhill (1994, p. 14)) such approaches are 
consistent with the following observations:
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• People find it easier to reason about4concrete’ situations. That is why 
many people have difficulties with the sort of abstract reasoning necessary 
in logic or mathematics.
• Information stored in long term memory plays a crucial role in human 
thought; problem solving becomes easier if  we can relate the present 
problem to what we already know.
• People find it easier to reason from a single model; difficulties arise in the 
face of multiple possibilities, presumably because of limitations on the 
capacity of short term memory stores that are used for manipulating mental 
models (but see the previous chapter for consideration of the use of 
physical representations such as pictures in instances where multiple 
possibilities must be compared).
Mental models of familiar ‘concrete’ situations are easier to work with than 
those o f unfamiliar or ‘abstract’ situations. A mental model of a current 
situation is structured in a similar way to models of particular situations and 
types o f situations stored in long term memory, and people find it easier to 
solve problems by retrieving stored models than by manipulating models in 
short term working memory (Gamham and Oakhill 1994 p.342).
Schumacher’s and Czerwinski’s (1992 p.61) ‘working definition’ of a mental 
model as ‘a collection of knowledge about a physical device, system or 
process’ is one which has obvious value in our thinking about surgical 
practice. So too does that of Bower et al (1969), which broadly termed them a 
‘framework’ for thinking about a device. Norman (1983,1986) described 
them in terms of knowledge structures which are messy, incomplete and 
indistinct. Ehrlich (1996) discussed different ways of thinking about mental 
models, in psychology and cognitive science (where the term usually refers to 
abstractions in people’s heads), and in computer-related disciplines such as 
Artificial Intelligence and Human-Computer Interaction, where it can refer 
variously to:
a) the actual model of the system,
b) the engineer’s model of the system which gets embodied in its 
implementation,
c) the user interaction designer’s model of the system,
d) the user’s model of the system, or
e) the system’s model of the user (often referred to as User Modelling by those
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in Al who build adaptive systems and need a way to represent the target user), 
(Ehrlich 1996, p.225).
Again, the boundaries between the ‘actual’ and the ‘mental’ seem to be 
unclear. In a similar way to that in which distinctions between mental and 
physical imagery in the historical examples given have been seen to be 
considerably less rigid in actual use than one might assume in a common 
sense sort of way to be the case, so too the partition between the types of 
physical models already discussed and people’s mental models is shown to be 
obscured (and therefore problematic) in present day computer science 
applications. In a similar vein, a view exists within social psychology that 
knowledge and expertise become distributed among members of a group o f 
people who work closely together. For example, Hutchins (1990) reported 
how expertise in navigating large ships was distributed amongst a group of 
skilled seamen. This is significant because surgical skills become distributed 
in similar ways. I hope to offer (in chapters 8 and 9 in particular) some 
insights into how this may come about.
Mental models have been compared to metaphors or analogies for systems (ie, 
where one’s mental model of a device is seen to have certain similarities to an 
analogous one - for example heart as pump, word processor as typewriter, 
brain as computer-see Collins and Gentner 1986; Gentner 1983). I discuss 
metaphor and analogy further in the succeeding chapter. Rumelhart and 
Norman (1981) suggested that such a usage may be indicative of the early 
(novice) stages of knowledge acquisition. However, other work (eg, Hinsley 
et al 1977; Halasz and Moran 1982; Clement 1988) has highlighted experts' 
(rather than beginners’) uses of examples and case studies. They argued that 
links exist between a reliance on analogies in problem solving and the 
progressive construction o f a mental model, and that drawing an analogy 
between a new system to be learned and a familiar one is inappropriate as a 
learning tool for novices. According to these arguments, more abstract 
conceptual models are more useful (and carry less potential for misleading) as 
initial learning devices. This echoes behavioural differences proposed by 
‘stage’ models of skill acquisition, between novices and more experienced 
practitioners. Novices need ‘context-free rules’ that can be applied in 
indiscriminately every situation, whereas more skilled performers base 
solutions to particular problems upon similar, previous occurrences (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1986).
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Schumacher and Czerwinski (1992), in discussing this analogous way of 
thinking about mental models stressed that the implication is that every mental 
model or representation o f something is in a sense an analogy for that thing, 
and that there may in fact be little or no difference between considering a 
mental model as an analogy of what it represents, and thinking about it as a 
collection of knowledge. They cited the work of Brown and de Kleer (1981; 
see also de Kleer and Brown 1983) which described mental models as 
‘topologies’ of device models, which they took to mean a mapping between 
the user’s mental model o f a device, and the physical representation of the real 
system. This work stressed that it should not be assumed that an individual 
necessarily has only one mental model of a particular system. On the 
contrary, it is far more likely that we have several; o f the device as a whole, 
of its parts, and at different levels of abstraction, for example. They also 
differentiated between the relatively stable types of models that we build up 
over an extended period of time which explain our everyday interactions with 
a system, and derived ones that are built ‘on the run’ to explain freak or 
unusual occurrences that we either have not come across before, or have 
encountered only rarely, in a system with which we are otherwise familiar.
As was intimated by the quote from Dawkins at the beginning of this section, 
it would appear that the thinking about mental models falls roughly into two 
more or less contrasting viewpoints. One strand of opinion sees them as being 
rather like ‘pictures in the head’ of the modeler, (eg, Johnson-Laird 1981;
1983), whereas another views them as rather more dynamic and interactive in 
nature (Gentner and Stevens 1983). These categories are (as usual) by no 
means absolute, as the discussion o f the range o f opinions that exists about 
them above demonstrates. It could be argued that in a sense both may be 
right. ‘Concrete* and ‘abstract’ models are referred to, and debates exist as to 
which of these is more suitable as a learning tool for novices. It might be 
surmised that, whether or not it is more suitable as a learning tool, the more 
static type of mental model is in fact the type that is most likely to be available 
to the novice, and therefore the one that he or she is likely to use. This may 
account in part for the rule-bound patterns of behaviour that novices exhibit, 
and for some of the mistakes that they make and misconceptions that they 
have about the object or system under consideration. As they gain in 
experience, it may be that their mental models become more adaptable and 
interactive, more ‘abstract’ perhaps, in that they can be applied to a range of 
similar or related situations.
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An important point about mental models made by Hutchins (1983) is that they 
are necessarily culturally derived. There are many ways in which a complex 
problem can be approached and solved, and therefore many possible mental 
models of it. Hutchins probably had ethnic cultures in mind when he made 
this observation, but the argument could equally well be applied to 
occupational cultures, or forms-of-life. According to this view therefore, my 
task as a researcher is to attempt to ‘model’ the problem solver’s own theory 
o f the task; care must be taken to avoid the danger of imposing my own 
assumptions upon it.
I have reviewed theories about the role o f visual languages and mental 
models, particularly as a tool for reasoning, or inferring about complex 
phenomena. It is time now to consider inference itself in a little more detail.
4.4 Inference and logic
Inference (particularly scientific inference) is usually thought about in terms of 
inductive and / or deductive processes. I briefly discuss this terminology 
below. However, it is fair to say that limiting our thinking about scientific 
method in this way to the construction of inductive or deductive arguments 
has been criticised (notably by Nersessian 1992, Gooding 1996a, and Shelley 
1996) for impairing our ability to make sense o f what scientists actually do. I 
therefore continue by considering Peirce’s notion of abductive inference, 
which (it is argued) offers a fuller and more convincing explanation for 
processes of innovation and discovery, not only in science but as applied to 
learning and problem solving more generally.
4.5 The ‘problem’ of induction.... (writ small!)
... the way scientists were supposed to proceed was first systematically 
described by Francis Bacon.... It goes like this. The scientist begins by 
carrying out experiments whose aim is to make carefully controlled and 
meticulously measured observations at some point on the frontier between our 
knowledge and our ignorance. He systematically records his findings, 
perhaps publishes them, and in the course o f  time he and other workers in the 
fie ld  accumulate a lot o f  shared and reliable data. As this grows, general 
features begin to emerge, and individuals start to formulate general 
hypotheses - statements o f a law like character which f i t  all the known facts
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and explain how they are causally related to each other. The individual 
scientist tries to confirm his hypothesis by finding evidence which will support 
it. I f  he succeeds in verifying it he has discovered another scientific law 
which will unlock more o f  the secrets o f  nature.
Biyan Magee 1985, p. 19.
Magee was discussing the inductive (or traditional) model of scientific 
enquiry, in which theories are formulated from accumulated observation data 
in roughly the way described above. To use an example from my own 
experience, a microbiologist might observe on a number of occasions that a 
particular strain of bacterium grows more luxuriantly on a culture medium 
with a low pH (ie, a relatively acidic medium), than on other culture media. 
This may lead her to mduce (or hypothesise) that an acidic culture medium is 
the most effective one to use for culturing this particular bacterium. This 
‘fact* may then become incorporated into the body o f knowledge of 
microbiology, either locally (within our microbiologist’s own laboratory), or 
more formally, for example if she wrote it in a book or thesis.
This model is not of course restricted to science; it has frequently been 
assumed also to be the way in which we internet with the world on a much 
more mundane daily basis. The validity of this view has been disputed, 
notably by the philosopher David Hume. Hume argued (from the standpoint 
of logic), that the fact that something has occurred in a particular way at some 
time in the past cannot be taken as a guarantee that it will recur in the same 
way on any future occasion. This idea challenges the possibility that 
experiments or observations can ever be meaningfully replicated, and theories 
thereby ‘proved’. According to Hume, the fact that people expect things to 
happen in much the same way as they have done in the past is a problem for 
psychology, not logic.
Popper (eg., 1959,1977) also rejected the inductive model (or at least this 
particular version of it; he argued that we should in fact strive to falsify, 
rather than verify our hypotheses). He stated that natural laws (and 
presumably also our more mundane, day-to-day hypotheses) are testable, in 
spite of being unproveable; we can test their effectiveness by attempting to 
refute them. If we cannot do so, they can be taken to be correct to the best o f  
our current knowledge. If they are refuted, the hypotheses can then be refined 
in the light o f the refutation. And so on. Popper (after Wittgenstein) argued
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also that observation that is not itself informed by some or other theory does 
not and cannot exist. This ‘theory-ladenness’ of observation is also insisted 
upon by much of the work that has been carried out in science studies (eg 
Bames et al 1996; Collins 1985), although it must be said that there is not 
wholehearted agreement with Popper upon all points linked to these 
arguments (see Collins 1985 pp.29-30).
Collins (1985) explored the problem not from the standpoint of how we could 
be certain in principle about the induced regularities that we perceive, but in 
the light of how we come to be certain about them in practice. He closely 
examined scientists’attempts to repeat others’ work. In doing so he 
highlighted what he called ‘experimenter’s regress’ (p.2), in which skill was 
implicated. As he saw it, because experimentation is a matter of skilled 
practice, it can never be clear whether a second experiment has been done 
skilfully enough to count as a check on the first. Some further test is 
necessary to assess the quality o f the experiment, and so on.
One of the examples that Collins used was that of the American physicist 
Weber’s attempts to develop apparatus to detect the gravity waves that are 
given off by massive, moving bodies in space. Detection of these is (or would 
be) very difficult because of their weak nature. Weber’s design was based 
upon the premise that gravitational radiation would cause measurable 
vibration in an object. His design comprised a heavy bar together with a 
means of measuring its vibrations, plus a device that could record these 
measurements. The problem was, other forces would cause the bar to vibrate 
also, and this led to the necessity to insulate the bar from all other known and 
potential sources o f disturbance.
Even when such insulation was carried out however, the bar would still be 
expected to vibrate somewhat due to the movement of its own atoms. These 
vibrations were recorded or traced as series of random peaks and troughs on 
graph paper. To detect gravity waves therefore, Weber had to decide which 
peaks were the result o f this ‘normal’ noise, and which were caused by 
gravity waves. The problem was to decide upon some sort of threshold above 
which such a trace would count as a gravity wave as opposed to background 
noise. In 1969, Weber claimed to have detected several peaks a day that could 
not be accounted for by noise. However, these claims were sceptically 
received because he found too much gravitational radiation to be compatible
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with current cosmological theories. Although similar designs are still used in 
attempts to detect gravity waves, recent apparatus is much more sensitive. 
However, the problem remains: we do not know whether or not it is possible 
to detect gravity waves in this way until we try to see i f  obtain the correct 
outcome. But what is the correct outcome? In other words, we wouldn’t 
know if we had built a good detector until we tried it and obtained the correct 
result, but we would not know what the correct result would be until... and so 
on (Collins 1985 p.84).
*
All of which leads us back from the realms of philosophy to a more central 
concern: the idea of skilled practice.
4.6 Deductive inference
Syllogism: a logical argument in three propositions, two premises and a 
conclusion that follows necessarily from them; deductive reasoning; a 
clever, subtle or specious argument.
The Chambers Dictionary.
Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977 p. 75), identified a valid deduction as one 
where the conclusion follows from the premises; if the premises are true, then 
the conclusion is necessarily true. Deduction then, works in more or less the 
opposite way to induction. According to mental model theory (Johnson-Laird 
1981,1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991), people reason by drawing 
putative conclusions from their initial models o f a situation, and evaluate them 
by searching for alternative models that might falsify them. The term 
‘deduction’ itself can be taken to relate to both the ability to evaluate and 
make deductions in this general sort of way, and also to the higher order skill 
of the deductive testing of more explicit hypotheses, rules or generalisations. 
In this type of instance, a scientist for example could be said to derive 
predictions from an accepted axiom system and then carry out experiments in 
order to test them (Miller 1996).
Going back to our microbiology example encountered earlier, another scientist 
might try to test out our original microbiologist’s observation that a certain 
strain o f bacteria grows best in an acidic culture medium (which she had 
published in a textbook, or thesis perhaps). Our new scientist might do this by 
carrying out a series of experiments designed to prove or falsify the
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hypothesis, in other words to test it out. By so doing, he could deduce that the 
first scientist’s hypothesis had been correct, ... or otherwise.
Deductive processes (especially in the sense of syllogistic inferences defined 
above) have historically been much studied in psychology (Stoning 1908; 
Wason 1959, 1965; Trabasso et al 1971; Wasonand Johnson-Laird 1972; 
Erickson 1973; Clark 1974; Carpenter and Just 1975). However, there is 
little consensus about the psychological mechanism (or mechanisms) 
underlying them (Johnson-Laird and Wason 1977). Artificial intelligence has 
also shown considerable interest in deductive processes (eg Robinson 1965; 
Winograd 1977; Newell 1980).
The concepts of induction and deduction are indeed useful in explaining many 
of the things that scientists (and other skilled practitioners) do. However, they 
are insufficient on their own to account for the phenomenon of innovation or 
‘discovery’, whether this be world-changing scientific discovery, or merely 
the small, routine, discoveries that form part of skilful practice. In essence, 
they seem unable to explain creativity. This brings us on to the consideration 
of the related concept of abduction, particularly visual abduction.
4.7 Abduction
In fact however, no branch o f  logic is a particularly valuable method o f  
discovery....
P.N. Johnson-Laird and P.C.Wason, 1977.
Abduction is inference to the best available explanation (Harman 1965). 
According to Josephson and Josephson (1996 p.5), it is a fallible form of 
inference that goes from descriptive data (which can include perceptual data), 
to a hypothesis that best explains or accounts for those data. As such, it is 
characterised by uncertainty, and often accompanied by doubt and hesitation. 
C.S. Peirce (1839-1914) coined the term for what he saw as a specific and 
distinct form of reasoning that occurs in science and indeed in everyday life, 
whereby explanatory hypotheses are formed and come to be accepted. This 
process is important therefore in theory formation and in the interpretation o f 
events and situations.
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Josephson and Josephson (1996) argued that knowledge arises from 
experience by means of abductive inference, built up bit by bit from 
explanatory hypotheses relating to it. The abductive model is context-specific 
(hence my own insistence upon investigating it within specific contexts), and 
not necessarily based upon logic, or ‘deductively valid’ criteria.
Johnson-Laird (1993, chapter 2) used the term ‘specific induction \  
(alternatively abduction) to describe situations where an explanation for an 
event or situation is generated from a theory of how the world works. To 
return yet again to our microbiologist, she might thus form hypotheses about 
the best culture medium for a specific type of bacteria, from a combination of 
her knowledge of the physiological requirements of bacteria in general, and 
her previous experiences of using different culture media. Such hypotheses 
may prove to be correct, but (so far) are unproved. Abductions are useful 
then, because they generate possible hypotheses, and explanations for events. 
Gamham and Oakhill (1994) described how abduction can be used to learn 
about the world. In ‘explanation-based learning’ a single event of a kind not 
previously encountered can be explained on the basis o f a theory about 
relevant aspects of the world. This explanation can then be generalised so that 
it will be useful in other situations.
All of this is interesting in relation to the models of knowledge and expertise 
considered earlier, and it is speculated that abductive processes may go some 
way towards explaining how algorithmic or book knowledge becomes 
transformed by actual practice as expertise is acquired. It is interesting to 
speculate also that by means of abductive inferences, knowledge and therefore 
action is possible in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty. Shelley (1996) 
described several examples from archaeological discovery, in which a leap 
was made from what might be (to an outsider) apparently insignificant visual 
clues or evidence, to a possible explanation of the purpose or history of an 
observed object. This evidence could then be ordered into a sequence - a 
narrative- as a means o f forming a tentative explanation for what was 
observed.
Peirce’s theory has also been applied to a variety of other complex human 
cognitive activities, for example by Harman (1965) to the evaluation of 
evidence in the law courts; by Eco and Seboek (1983) to the crime-solving 
activities of fictional detectives, and by Gooding (1996a, 1996b) to the field of 
physics, specifically to the experiments in electromagnetism carried out by
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Michael Faraday. It has been applied too, to historical knowledge, and to 
language understanding. According to such accounts, the necessity to explain 
novel or uncertain observed phenomena leads to abductive reasoning which is 
creative and context-specific, not necessarily based in logic, and often difficult 
to explain or to put into words. One reason cited by Gooding (1996a p.82) for 
this difficulty, is the seemingly inevitable impression of a linear sequence of 
events given by the use of scientists’ explanatory narratives, which is 
unsatisfactory in communicating complex abductive processes.
Shelley (1996) characterised the recognition of the significance of an object, 
reconstructive identification processes and the use of visual analogy as 
examples o f abductive reasoning. He stressed the importance of expert 
knowledge in the recognition and identification of objects whose condition 
and appearance may be difficult to anticipate, such as pieces of fossilised 
skeletal matter, and stone tools. It is important to point out here that not all of 
the knowledge of an expert is communicable by means of words, as close 
examination o f some of the literature pertaining to knowledge acquisition 
methods in expert systems research has shown. Some aspects may be 
expressed for example in skilled practice itself.
The recognition by archaeologists of significant objects has been described in 
terms of mental templates, or search images. As Leakey and Lewin (1992), in 
discussing the difficulties of recognising and identifying fragments of 
fossilised bone stated, ‘the search image has to have an infinite number o f  
dimensions, matching every conceivable angle o f  every bone in the human 
body ’. This has obvious parallels with my own research problem. During 
recent fieldwork, I was told of an operation that had taken place a short time 
previously, in which a dog’s shattered scapula was repaired by a veterinary 
surgeon who specialises in orthopaedic work. The procedure, which 
reportedly took five hours, was likened by my veterinary nurse informant to 
‘piecing together the pieces o f a jigsaw puzzle ’, so badly had the bone been 
damaged. The scapula is a bone with a complex three-dimensional shape, and 
the necessity for visual mental imagery of the kind described above can be 
imagined, in comparing the shattered, randomly shaped pieces of bone with 
the surgeons’s knowledge (or mental template) o f intact scapulae.
I argue for the value of an abductive model o f inference in explaining the 
working hypotheses apparently formed by my respondents to account for
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ambiguous perceptual data during surgical operations, and the alterations 
made in actual practice, to plans which had been previously stated or 
discussed when unexpected or uncertain situations arose. Behaviour in 
relation to plans has been discussed already, but I would like to make a link 
here between planning and abductive inference. Josephson and Josephson 
(1996 p. 25-26) reported Eugene Chamiak’s comment that there are two 
fundamental operations of mind; abduction and planning. Planning depends 
upon predictions and outcomes, and while, according to Josephson it can be 
classed as reasoning, it is not inference, since planning decides action rather 
than belief. However, although he thus asserts that prediction (and thereby 
planning) are distinct as phenomena, he admits that they often become 
entangled as processes. Prediction can be used as a sub-task in abduction (for 
example, to tentatively ‘test’ a hypothesis), and likewise abduction can be a 
sub-task of prediction (for example, for assessing a situation). This 
entanglement of abductive inference and prediction-planning behaviour can 
account for surgeons’ actions in situations that varied from what was 
expected, and in which the outcomes were thus uncertain. An example of this 
is shown in chapter 8, where a surgeon is seen to encounter - and deal with - 
an anatomical variation that he had not previously seen.
We have travelled a circuitous route, from consideration o f knowledge and 
knowing, to that of seeing (in the senses both of observation and of inference), 
and back to the very foundations of knowledge again. This underlies the ways 
in which these activities are inextricably linked, and in a sense undermines the 
linear, sequential narrative structure that it was necessary to impose upon 
these chapters in order that they ‘make’ sense. Remember, this story is only 
one of a number of possible alternatives.....
MOTES
By personal communication, July 2001.
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CHAPTER 5: PUTTING THE ‘LANGUAGE* INTO ‘VISUAL
LANGUAGES’—
Sitting at a table writing words on paper; what is it that forms those words? 
What is going on in my mind as I  write them? I  haye no doubt that in my case 
it is a matter o f  a series o f  visualizations. Not two dimensional, as i f  looking 
at a television screen; three dimensional perhaps, as i f  I  were a thin, invisible 
ghost walking about on a stage while a play is in actual performance... One 
might call itfour-dimensional, because lam  aware o f  their emotions and their 
motives as w ell...
C.S. Forester (1964, p.71).
5.1 Introduction
This thesis is primarily concerned with visual (rather than verbal) modes of 
thinking and representation. Indeed, there have been several instances within 
the work so far where language has been shown to be problematic. Narrative 
sequencing for example, has shown limitations with regard to adequately 
communicating process and complexity. This short chapter is itself a case in 
point, since it has caused even more difficulties than normal in relation to its 
‘proper’ place in the narrative sequence that I attempt to construct. It started 
out as a discrete chapter, but was later split up and became part(s) of various 
other chapters for a time. It has now settled (uneasily) here, closely bound up 
with the issues discussed before, but once again separate.
It was tempting, in view of these problems to either ignore this language issue, 
or to bypass it in some way. At one point I seriously considered dropping it 
completely, justifying this to myself for a while in relation to the pressing 
need to focus this work, to keep it manageable, to finish it! Language is after 
all the subject itself of a vast literature to which I have neither time nor space 
to do justice here. However, it cannot be ignored. It creeps into the very 
substance of any discussion of knowing and seeing. To ignore it would be to 
ignore the very crux of the problem that I have set myself. Researching these 
topics in a real-life context was never going to be straightforward. However, 
having decided in favour of doing this, and against the over-simplification of 
experiments, I must accept this challenge, and grasp the fact that this work 
was never going to be as straightforward as the sort of ‘writing up’exercises,
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of experiments or investigations, that I was expected to carry out for my 
biology degree.
Even though I have separated out the particular issues discussed below, and 
called them ‘chapter five’, I do not intend that they should be considered apart 
from chapters two, three and four (or for that matter any o f the others), but 
integrated. It has not been possible to separate out all reference to ‘language’ 
from the other chapters, just as it is impossible (and would be unhelpful) to 
remove all reference to ‘knowing’ or ‘seeing’ here. The boundary that I have 
placed here perhaps proves to be even more problematic than previous ones!
Besides all of this, language is so fundamental to human beings and their 
behaviour that any analysis of human action must at least acknowledge that 
fact. It is useful also to reflect upon the ways in which a consideration of 
language is of use (even essential) to my arguments, and anyway, as Forester’s 
quote illustrates, the visual and the verbal are not so easily separated. Indeed, 
any attempts at a rigid separation would hint at a dualism equivalent to those 
that have already been examined and found limiting to any understanding of 
the topics under consideration, such as those of mind / body, concrete / 
abstract, seeing / knowing, and enculturational / algorithmic theories o f 
learning.
5.2 ‘Shop-talk...*? (Lynch 1985)
My laboriously collected research materials are themselves mostly (although 
not exclusively) in linguistic form. They consist largely o f field notes 
describing places and events, scraps of jotted-down or recorded conversation 
from the workplace, interview transcripts and so forth, and they represent a 
great deal of ‘language work’ of my own. The snippets of talk recorded in the 
workplace itself are of particular interest. Michael Lynch (1985) has shown 
how such ‘occupationally specific’ (p. 7) talk is instrumental in getting work 
done. He described it as ‘shop talk... talk in the work; talk which is part o f  
the work’ (p. 10, my emphasis). Part o f their work (the respondents’, that is), 
and also part of mine.
We have already seen that social interaction in the workplace is important, not 
merely as a means of communication, but in the transmission of skills as well. 
It is vital also for the interpretation of novel or unusual things or events, or as
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Karin Knorr-Cetina (1983, p. 117) put it, of actual ‘knowledge production’. 
Knorr-Cetina’s study of the work of biochemists showed how scientific ‘facts’ 
are established through processes of social negotiation. Although initial 
scientific discoveries (or at least that part where it is realised that a ‘discovery’ 
has been made) may be private, cognitive events, their subsequent 
development and (especially) their dissemination, is inherently social in 
nature.
Amann and Knorr-Cetina (1988) made interesting connections between 
visualization and language in the context of the analysis of scientific images. 
According to this view, ‘the machinery of seeing is talk’. Image analysing 
talk is closely bound up with the objects to which it relates; it is not merely 
‘about’ them, but ‘with’ them also. ‘Seeing’ in this context could therefore be 
described as a verbal accomplishment. Amann and Knorr-Cetina showed how 
the talk itself appeared to be ‘organised’ in many respects by the images 
themselves. Participants returned repeatedly to the same or related displays, 
to discuss and debate anew their content. I will later show how veterinary 
surgeons and nurses also gathered to look at and to talk about (again 
repeatedly, in ‘difficult’ cases), the images encountered during the course of 
their work, (I refer here to xray images, anatomical photographs and diagrams 
in surgical textbooks).
5 3  Writing *down% or writing ‘up’?
Latour and Woolgar (1979) compared the position of the social researcher in 
the scientific laboratory with that of the scientists they study. Both are 
confronted with the problem of making sense of what amounts to a 
‘disordered array’ (p. 34) of observational information. Both too, have to 
solve these problems by means of language. This may take the form of the 
consensus-seeking talk and argument already discussed, or alternatively those 
other verbal processes of ‘writing up’, which are crucial to the transformation 
of raw ‘data’ into ‘hard’ scientific (or social scientific) ‘evidence’ or ‘fact’.
For language as a topic includes o f course texts as well as speech, and texts as 
well as talk are important to my principal research setting. Texts can take 
many forms; scripts, letters, recipes, case notes, books, academic papers, lists 
and descriptions, for example. Various studies of work (eg see Garfinkel 
1967; Weinstein 1975; Pack 1975; MacAndrew 1979; Lynch 1985) have 
shown how such texts have come to be used within ‘occupationally specific
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competencies of “reading” and “writing”’ (Lynch 1985, p.8). The meanings 
that texts have to participants in a particular work setting may be very 
different from those that they have for others outside of this particular 
form-of-life.
5.4 The verbal and the visual
Because my primary concern is with visual representation (and it becomes 
more and more difficult - and conversely, more and more necessary- to 
arbitrarily limit the scope o f this work), I will concentrate upon written and 
spoken language only as it impinges upon and interacts with the visual. I will 
pick up themes introduced in the previous chapters, but temporarily 
abandoned since to include a fuller discussion o f them there would have 
compromised too much the narrative structure o f this work. Notwithstanding 
this, two major topics related to language have already been examined at some 
length; that of visual languages discussed in chapter 4, and that o f the tacit (in 
the sense that they become hidden in verbal attempts to communicate them) 
dimensions of knowledge itself, in chapter 2. In addition, in the sections that 
follow there is a need to bear in mind the following broad themes already 
intimated:
•  The limitations o f language (for our purposes); particularly of the narrative 
form in the communication of process, and as far as the ‘tacit’ dimension of 
knowledge is concerned.
•  The ways in which language is useful; for example as used in conjunction 
with images, in abstract thinking, and in consideration of the social and 
interactional basis o f the interpretation of scientific images.
I continue by discussing the importance o f metaphor and analogy, to everyday 
speech, thought and action generally, and to science and art more particularly.
I pose the question: Is there such thing as a ‘visual metaphor’ - and if so, what 
are its relations to the ‘visual languages’ already considered?
5.5 M etaphor and analogy...
Metaphor and analogy are part o f  the common currency o f  ordinary language 
and ordinary thinking; they provide the bridge between the known and the 
unknown....
Helen Haste (1993), p.26.
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... And part of the ‘common currency’ of scientific and medical language and 
thinking also. Haste (1993) defined drawing an analogy in terms of seeing 
similarities between apparently unrelated things (eg, the brain as a computer, 
or the heart as a pump). Analogy moves into the realms o f metaphor when the 
comparison moves from ‘as i f  to making actual equivalences (ibid p.37) 
between the objects. When this happens, the characteristics of the metaphor, 
rather than those of the original object itself, start to shape our thinking about 
it. In this sense, analogy and metaphor are better understood (at least here, for 
my purposes) in terms of a continuum, rather than as two totally separate 
concepts. Hence I largely conceive of them together.
I consider metaphors not so much as ‘figures of speech’ or literary devices, 
(although as we will see, it may prove useful to meditate upon this use of 
metaphor as ‘imagery’ when thinking about the possibility of ‘visual 
metaphors’), but rather in Lakoffs and Johnson’s (1980) sense of ‘metaphors 
we live by’. According to this view, metaphor (and analogy) are characterised 
as ‘tools for making sense’ of things in the world (Haste 1993). The human 
conceptual system itself is grounded in metaphor; metaphor pervades our 
language, thoughts and actions (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In discussing this 
‘groundedness’, Lakoff and Johnson were careful to make clear that any one 
concept is only partially structured, (and thereby understood), by means o f its 
associated metaphor. If it were totally so, one concept would actually be 
another. By ‘partially structured’ it is meant that we comprehend one aspect 
of a concept in terms of another concept, which allows us to focus upon that 
aspect, and take others ‘as read’. Dimensionality again!
Lakoff and Johnson (ibid) gave the example of the ‘argument as war’ 
metaphor (pp.4-6). This focuses upon the confrontational aspects of argument 
at the expense o f possible others, such as the way in which argument could be 
thought of as cooperative in nature, the participants helping each other 
towards mutual understanding. Goodwin (1994, p. 168) stressed the 
embeddedness of science itself in a metaphorical framework. The value of the 
‘selfish gene’ metaphor (among others) to an understanding of evolution is a 
case in point. Hatt (1995, p. 1) described how such metaphors help us make 
sense of Neo-Darwinist theories ‘in terms that are familiar to us from our 
embodied experience within a cultural context \  Conceptualizing ©in­
experiences in such a way (although the act of doing so necessarily limits the 
view we take of them) helps us to pick out those aspects of them that are
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important to us, at a given time and in a given place), which in turn enables us 
to categorize, understand and remember them.
Metaphors are based then, in our physical and cultural (and indeed 
5wZ?-cultural) experience, and as such can be extended in some ways but not in 
others, dependent upon their context. Whole systems of concepts (and their 
associated metaphors) are structured in turn, in terms of other, organising (or 
according to Lakoff and Johnson, orientational) metaphors, most of which 
have to do with spatial orientation relating to our embodiment (the fact that we 
have the types of bodies we have and they function as they do in our physical 
environment (p. 14). Examples o f these organising metaphors are up-down, 
in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, and central-peripheral.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980 p. 18) cited the example ‘more is up, less is down 
(eg, ‘high status’). They stressed the internal systematicity of these 
spatialization metaphors. 'More is up... ‘ defines a coherent metaphorical 
system, not random or isolated cases. Even concepts that could be thought of 
as purely intellectual in nature, such as those involved in scientific theories are 
also often (or even always) based within these physical or cultural 
metaphorical systems, eg, 'high energy particles ’ is based upon the *more is 
up ' system. ‘Happy * and ‘rational ’ are also 'up \ All of these concepts have 
different experiential bases, but the 'up ’ concept is the same. Since verticality 
is experienced in many different ways, so it may give rise to many different 
metaphorical systems.
There is also an overall systematicity which defines coherence among (as well 
as within) the various spatialization metaphors. Mark Johnson (1987, p.xix) 
explained this orientational nature o f metaphorical structuring'in terms of 
‘image schemata’, or nonpropositional, abstract structures of embodied 
imagination. According to Johnson, our ‘embodiment’in this sense is the key 
to our understanding o f Who ‘we’ are, what ‘meaning’ entails, and our abilities 
to infer rationally and to be creative (ibid, p.xxxviii). He thus posed 
arguments against theories which involve rigid dichotomies, in particular the 
mind-body dichotomy characteristic of the theories of Descartes and Kant.
Different forms-of-life will have different metaphors (or understand the same 
metaphors in different ways). Also, new ones are continually being created.
As such, metaphors, like language itself, are not fixed or static, but fluid and
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dynamic through time and space. Metaphors can thus be creative (or enable 
creativity), by allowing new understanding, and the possibilities thereby of 
new interpretations o f our experiences, and new meanings to our concepts; as 
such creating new realities (Lakoff and Johnson 1980 p. 145).
5.6 M etaphor, science and art...
The scientist, like the artist, interprets the world around him and within him 
(sic) by making images ’
Rudolf Amheim, 1971.
Miller (1996, p.218) too, described the cruciality of metaphor to science, as a 
means of extending scientists’ understanding of novel phenomena by their 
relation to familiar ones. He gave the example of James Clerk Maxwell, 
whose electromagnetic field equations were based upon a comparison of the 
electromagnetic field to an array of wheels, pulleys and fluids (p.221). The 
secondary subject - the familiar array of wheels, pulleys and fluids (along with 
its associated visual imagery) - was used by Maxwell as a mental mapping 
device to enable the exploration of the unfamiliar primary subject (the 
electromagnetic field). This example of the use of a metaphor as a model, or 
more specifically as a mental model provides links with issues discussed in 
previous chapters.
Donna Haraway (1976 p. 189) drew attention to the ways in which what she 
termed the concrete nature of models, metaphors and in turn the artifacts 
whose construction they inform, is essential to science because of its role in 
limiting the implications (and thereby the influences) of more abstract 
systems. She showed how sets of mathematical relations, for example, can be 
inappropriately and erroneously applied, whereas the very crudeness of what 
she called the ‘picture paradigm’ can both stimulate and constrain the 
imagination, thereby linking the images themselves with the words with 
which they are communicated, and their underlying or emergent theories. I 
restate here problems already discussed that are inherent in the notions of 
‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’. However, essentially I agree with the point that 
Haraway is trying to get across. It seems that (like me) she uses this concrete / 
abstract terminology in a metaphorical sense simply because there does not 
seem to be any other way (or words) with which to get across her meaning, 
rather them necessarily assuming a deliberate or accidental dualistic stance. Is
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our very language then based in dualism? Or does it merely give this 
impression because of its inherent limitations? This could offer a clue to the 
very basis of dualism (and dualistic philosophies), and the reasons why they 
appear to be so pervasive and difficult to escape, at least in our Western 
culture.
Vasseleu (1991) used the example of the development of medical endoscopy 
to show how what she called (after Derrida and Bachelard), the ‘figurative 
strategies’ of scientific practice, are ‘constitutive of the objects whose essence 
they describe’, (pp. 59-60). By this she meant that, not only is there metaphor 
in the texts of science, but that the manufacture of these metaphors is implicit 
in (and indeed part o f the process of) scientific practice itself. So much for 
the cruciality o f metaphor to science. What then of art? The key to this lies in 
the notion of representation which is so central to this work. Miller (1996, 
p.380) described how scientists, along with artists, strive to find ways to 
represent unseen worlds. Miller’s work is so interesting because of the 
parallels that he drew between developments in art and science, in particular 
between modem art and science. He showed how the shift in representation 
in art from the figurative and naturalistic to the increasingly abstract, 
coincided with increased abstraction in scientific theory also. It would be 
tempting to linger here over some of the examples that Miller gave of this 
increased abstraction, both from science and from art. However, to do so here 
would be to digress too much; an indulgence. It is necessary to move on.
Gill Hatt (1995, p.42) argued that visualization is significant because of the 
ways in which it informs metaphor, citing Sontag’s (1991) example of the 
co-development of ‘modem medical thinking’ with a new kind of 
investigative scrutiny in which the body became overlaid with military 
metaphors. (Think about the ‘invasion’ of the body by disease-producing 
organisms). This occurred principally through the development of 
microscopy, which rendered visible many things which had previously been 
unseen. I continue then, towards a consideration of visual metaphor, and how 
this may engage with the emergence of visual languages.
5.7 Towards the possibility of ‘visual metaphor’........
Mental things are alone Real; what is it call’d  Corporeal,
Nobody knows o f  its Dwelling Place;
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It is a fallacy, & its Existence an Imposture.
Where is the Existence Out o f  Mind or Thought?
Where is it but in the Mind o f a Fool?
William Blake: A Vision o f  the Last Judgement.
Visual representations, like metaphors, can be thought about as things that 
stand for other things. It is interesting to speculate upon the ways in which 
both o f these representational forms can be used, either separately or together, 
and in many instances interchangeably, as tools with which to think, 
communicate and explain. It might be useful for example to think about the 
bodily representations produced by medical imaging technologies, or 
reproduced as anatomical illustrations in atlases or textbooks as visual 
metaphors used by scientists and medics in their efforts to make sense o f the 
body and its pathologies.
Martin Rudwick (1976) and others have shown how visual and verbal modes 
of representation come together in the ‘visual languages’ o f emerging 
scientific disciplines. It is interesting also to note how the word ‘image’ itself 
can be subsumed from the visual to the literary sphere. It might be useful at 
this point to consider some of the other disciplinary areas o f which ‘visual 
languages’ may be o f significance, even unexpected ones such as literature 
(which one might after all feel secure in considering to be purely verbal in 
nature). The work o f William Blake for example, consisted largely of 
collections of poems and engravings which together form a whole, in much 
the same sort of way as the text and engravings in Hooke’s Micrographia.
The modem anatomical atlases and surgical manuals used by my research 
collaborators (and their historical antecedents) could also be thought about in 
the same sort o f tradition.
I mention the work of Blake not purely out of personal interest, but also 
because of his own anti-dualist stance, in particular against the ideas of John 
Locke (as illustrated vehemently by the quote above). Northrop Fiye (1946, 
p. 15) described how Blake termed the unit of mental existence 
undistinguishably as a ‘form’ or an ‘image’.
Tf there is such a thing as a key to Blake’s thought, it is the fact that these two 
words mean the same thing to him. He makes no consistent use o f the term 
“idea ”. Forms or images, then, exist only in perception. Locke’s philosophy
97
distinguishes sensation from reflection: the former is concerned with 
perception, the latter with the classification o f  sensations and the development 
o f them into abstract ideas. ’
The terms ‘form’ and ‘image’ may also be used interchangeably with this 
other term ‘representation’, which in turn can equally well be applied in 
respect of either visual or verbal modalities. The point that I am trying to 
make here, is that the terms ‘visualization’ and ‘metaphor’ (like ‘form’ and 
‘image’) can be part and parcel of the same thing, our attempts, by the various 
means available to us, to make sense of our world and our experiences.
Barbara Stafford (1991, p.2) wrote of difficulties that arise in attempting to 
express certain ideas and relationships in words alone. She outlined the ways 
in which metaphor can be used to ‘combine and synthesize experience that 
analysis has fragmented or dissected’. Sometimes though, even metaphors are 
insufficient, for example when discussing or describing concepts that lie too 
far outside the range of our embodied understanding. I have found these ideas 
to be of particular interest when thinking about visualization and surgery. For 
example, my collaborators frequently seemed to ‘combine’ visual images of 
vaiying types and from various sources to ‘synthesize’ the surgical body, and 
once this synthesis was accomplished to cluster around it, attempting to 
interpret the array so produced, by verbal means.
So, is it possible therefore that ‘visual metaphors’ exist? It is argued here that 
they do, and furthermore, this concept is one that has been invaluable in the 
analysis and interpretation of my case material.
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CHAPTER 6: HOW WE GOT HERE
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In Section 6 .1 ,1 summarise 
the main points that have arisen from the literature review chapters. Section
6.2 comprises a discussion of the research methods used, with an emphasis on 
ethnography. In between, I provide a brief breakdown o f the topics of the 
research question.
SECTION 6.1
6.1.1 Getting here •••
‘The only good classification is a living classification. *
Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star (1999)
This study is centred upon a number of related propositions. The first is that, 
when faced with a complex task, people often construct some sort of mental 
image, model or map of the situation (or invoke some existing one) in order to 
enable them to cany it out. Secondly, they may use this mental imagery in 
conjunction with physical images of one or more kinds, and thirdly, that the 
extent to which they rely upon (or use) imagery o f either type may change as 
they gain in experience and become more familiar with a given task. Although 
these propositions are not especially controversial in themselves, they have 
proved difficult to investigate, for a number of reasons which I discuss in 
section 6.2 and elsewhere.
I began by introducing the research contexts, and discussing some literary 
sources that are of general interest and relevance to them, but which would not 
fit easily elsewhere. I would like to stress particularly here the work of Pinch 
et al (1996), and also that of Hirschauer (1991). Both o f these papers are 
concerned with surgery, the former with veterinary surgery, the latter with its 
‘human’ counterpart. These pieces of work could be seen in a many ways as 
a starting point for my own. Of major (even primary) importance to both of 
them I feel, are the ways in which people deal with task uncertainty. I 
reiterate, this work is primarily about knowing, seeing and how we become 
able over time to do these things. As such it raises questions about the very 
nature of ‘knowing’ and ‘seeing’ themselves.
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Although these terms are used in everyday parlance and we are all familiar 
with them in a common sense sort of way, they are in fact difficult to define 
precisely, and moreover subject to intense philosophical and psychological 
debate. A major interest therefore lies in what these things may actually be, 
and my instinct (along with evidence from the literature) tells me that, rather 
than being totally separate one from the other, they can in fact be seen as 
forming part of a single phenomenon, and as such, and for the purposes of my 
arguments, are perhaps better considered together. But how to investigate it?
I attempt to do this in actual situations rather than by the arguably more 
conventional method (for this type o f investigation) of psychology 
experiments. My reasons for this are themselves complex. Firstly I feel that 
psychology experiments inevitably over-simplify real-world problems, and 
secondly (and more importantly), although such questions are ones that are 
considered to be a matter for psychology (hence the use o f  psychology 
experiments to investigate them), I wish to address the social and physical 
aspects that they entail, as well as the purely cognitive ones (Thagard 1999).
This has already created a number of difficulties, not least those to do with the 
complexity of ‘real’ situations and skilled practice. So, is it after all possible 
to shed some small additional light upon their nature in this way? Time will 
tell, and you (the reader) must judge. One thing (and only one thing) is 
certain. I am aware that I seem to be raising considerably more questions than 
I am able to answer. Perhaps it is the case that some of these cannot yet be 
answered, either by myself or anyone else. However, I do not consider that 
sufficient reason not to ask them, and to think about them. So that leaves us 
with uncertainty, and the potential that this would seem to have for 
creativity....
One of the most pressing of the problems that I have encountered so far is that 
of categorisation, which could also be variously termed as dualism, 
discreteism or dichotomy, which, although so commonplace as to excite little 
comment in our everyday way of going about things, appears on closer 
inspection to be unhelpful, even at odds with thinking about the ‘problem’ of 
skilled practice. Several such groupings have come to light. Apart from the 
major ones o f ‘knowing’ / ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ / ‘doing’, there is the 
associated dichotomy of enculturational / algorithmic traditions of learning, 
neither of which seems able on its own to provide a satisfactory explanation 
for the learning process. Considered together however, they provide a more
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holistic, and therefore more comprehensive view. Speaking of dichotomies, 
several others also spring to mind, those for example o f ‘mind / body’, 
‘physical’ / ‘mental’, ‘concrete’ / ‘abstract’, ‘procedural / declarative’, 
‘perception’ / ‘interpretation’, ‘2D’ / ‘3D’, and ‘visual’ / ‘verbal’. There is a 
view within psychology and elsewhere that categorisation of objects and 
situations along some or other lines is essential to cognition, enabling us to 
make sense o f our world, perhaps because it reduces its complexity (see 
Brown 1956; Rosch 1977; Bowker and Star 1999). However, this very 
reduction appears to limit the understanding that it is possible to acquire of 
complex situations, and what is more appears to affect the capacity of 
language to communicate it.
Alan Rayner’s (1997) concept of ‘dynamic boundaries’ seems to be one that 
may be o f use in thinking about this problem. According to this view, the 
boundaries between objects, rather than being seen as solid, fixed and 
immutable, merely define dynamic contexts. As such they resemble the 
boundaries (or membranes) between the body’s cells; permeable, fluid and 
subject to constant change. As Rayner put it, because o f these properties, it is 
at such boundaries that life’s action takes place (just as does much of the 
‘action’ that takes place in a cell). Looking at some of these ‘dualisms’ from 
this angle permits a somewhat different grasp upon complexity. Whilst still 
allowing some understanding of these concepts as separate (and therefore 
more easily graspable) entities, some sort of an acceptance o f the fact that the 
boundaries that exist between them may be dynamic ones of the type 
described above, enables an understanding also that at the edges of such a 
boundary situations may occur where it may become breached, and the 
concepts merge; also that such situations are shifting and complex, 
inextricably linked as they are to very specific contexts and meanings.
Linked also to all of this are problems of narrative, and o f ‘finding the right 
words’ to express complex ideas. My literature review has spanned four 
chapters, several disciplines, and many (diverse) topics. Although it is 
seemingly so wide ranging, all the various concepts and subjects discussed in 
fact merge, interact and connect together in myriad ways; so much so that as 
we have seen, the actual division of this material into chapters is often 
arbitrary and problematic. This is partly what is meant by the ‘problem of 
narrativity’ to which I have referred, and which I attempt to escape or avoid. 
The narrative form (which seems to be effectively enabled by the sorts of
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categorisation alluded to above), appears inevitably to ‘hide’ important 
aspects, giving the impression of a situation as a linear, straightforward 
sequence of events which is often far from what is found in reality to be the 
case.
A major difficulty that I seem to have encountered, even in the literature 
review (to say nothing of the case studies o f complex procedures that make up 
the main investigative part of this thesis), is that virtually everything 
connected with these topics seems to be interlinked in extremely complicated 
ways. Narrativity dictates however that I categorise or separate out this 
jumble in some sort of way, thereby enabling it to be stated in separate though 
linked ‘chunks’, whether these chunks be (variously) sentences, paragraphs, 
chapters or case studies. A point raised by Paivio (1991), that, since visual 
images are organised in a synchronous (rather than linear) fashion, they do not 
necessarily give this misleading impression of an orderly, linear sequence of 
events, has prompted me to explore the use of images for my own (as well as 
my research respondents’) purposes. I attempt therefore to investigate their 
use as a means of extending the ability of narrative to communicate aspects of 
complexity and process that it normally conceals.
I had planned originally that in this part of the thesis, I would work through 
the literature review chapter by chapter in a logical sort of way, flagging up 
the most salient points as I go. However, I have already drawn attention to the 
work o f Lucy Suchman (1987), which closely questions the role and purpose 
o f such plans. She stated in essence that they are useful tools, but poor 
providers of explanations as to how things are actually accomplished. Like 
Alan Rayner’s (1997) ‘dynamic boundaries’, plans too, are shifting and 
inconstant. I recently read (and greatly admired) the thesis of a predecessor in 
this department, in which the author did precisely this (Hartland 1993). 
However, narrativity has constrained me enough. Hence, I choose to breach 
these self imposed chapter-boundaries, and do so under the headings of 
visualization, representation and dimensionality. In doing so I hope to begin 
to illustrate how categories can merge, boundaries become blurred, and new 
categories (and hence new boundaries) formed. I fully anticipate though, that 
I will encounter the same sorts o f problems with these new categories; 
essentially that some material will not sit comfortably within one or the other, 
but will seem instead to somehow inhabit the boundary between them.
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Before I do this however, I restate my general research objectives.
• to consider some of the ways in which we apply knowledge in 
approaching and performing skilled practical tasks.
• to consider alongside this the role of mental visual images in skilled task 
performance; particularly their use in conjunction with more ‘concrete’ 
forms of imagery.
•  to examine the ways in which people use two dimensional images to help 
them cany out three dimensional tasks, or solve three dimensional 
problems.
• to experiment with the use o f text alongside alternative representational 
forms in the communication o f process.
6.1.2 Visualization
Following Miller (1996) I have explored the meaning of this term from two 
standpoints, the Kantian ones of anschaulichkeit, or ‘seeing as’ in the sense of 
‘making something visible’, and anschauung, that far more complex one of 
‘seeing that* something is as it is, and means what it does. These categories, 
like so many of the others that we have come across, are by no means 
mutually exclusive. I have discussed the idea of ‘imagery’, and the different 
meanings that this term has. For the purposes of this work, I concentrate 
mainly upon visual imagery, both ‘physical’ (eg, pictures, sculptures and 3D 
models), and also ‘mental’ (mental images, mental models). I have however 
drawn attention also to the connections that the term has with language, in 
particular with verbal imagery. Metaphors for example can be thought about 
in this respect, not merely from the point of view of ‘literary imagery’, ‘poetic 
language’, or ‘figures of speech’, but also because, like mental and physical 
visual images, they too can be seen as ‘tools’ to aid reasoning. I have argued 
that it is not always easy in any case to separate totally the ‘visual’ from the 
‘verbal’, and that, following on from this, the concept of ‘visual metaphor’ is 
one that is of use in explaining the phenomena under investigation. As far as 
mental imagery is concerned, I concentrate here upon it in the sense of 
‘expression’ rather than as ‘process’ (Paivio 1991), thus sidestepping to a 
great extent debates as to the nature of cognition itself, to which I feel that I 
am (and my methods are) ill-equipped to contribute.
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I have focused upon various ways in which the body has been mapped, or 
‘made visible’, in particular for (and by) medics and surgeons, by the use of 
‘physical’ images o f various types, and derived from various sources. Also the 
possible role that various pre-operative procedures may have as ‘visual aids’ 
for example in relating the interior of the body to the exterior, (although it is 
true to say that these procedures may be explained by participants in quite 
different ways) ( see Katz 1981; Hirschauer 1991). I am particularly 
interested in instances where we appear to use either single images, or 
juxtapositions of numbers of them to supplement in some way our own 
‘mental’ images of an object or a situation, as opposed to those where we 
seem able either to rely upon mental imagery alone, or apparently no longer 
need even this, as we gain in experience, and tasks become more familiar 
(Kaufmann 1990).
Just as importantly, how may /  best approach this process of ‘mapping 
surgeons mapping the body’? I wish somehow to go beyond narrative alone 
in order to better communicate this complex operation. All of this is difficult; 
I cannot presume to look ‘inside people’s heads’, and I will not rely upon 
experiments carried out in a laboratory situation where all of ‘real life’ is 
effectively condensed to minute aspects of it. I wish to confront complexity, 
not ignore it, nor side-step it. I must therefore rely upon people’s own 
descriptions o f their experiences, and upon my own observations of them as 
they work, and recognise (and work with the fact) that this as a method has 
inherent flaws and limitations. Of particular interest are the (quite frequent) 
situations where these sources of information appear to directly contradict one 
another. These would seem to offer at least a possibility o f some insight into 
the ways in which the mind functions in these situations. However, I digress; 
this is probably a matter better considered in the second section of this 
chapter, rather than here.
I have pinpointed possible problems that exist with the interpretation of 
images, particularly of those images deriving from ‘new’ medical and optical 
technologies, mainly by means of an historical comparison between the 
development of x-rays and that (earlier one) of microscopy. I have also 
alluded to my own observations and experiences o f teaching microscopy, 
which although not part o f  the ‘official’ fieldwork carried out for this study, 
nevertheless yields insights that would probably not be obvious to someone 
undertaking a relatively short term period of observation. They are rather the
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result of several years of experience, and the application to it of the 
‘reflective’ approach which underpinned my initial teacher training. It would 
appear that quite similar methods were (and are) required in order to render 
these various images meaningful, and also that these processes are essentially 
ones of the construction (by social means) o f the meaning and content of 
images. From this, I consider that all such viewings are essentially subjective; 
related to social consensus, our own experience and expectations, and the 
comparisons that we make, (Gombrich 1960), and therefore that ‘objectivity’ 
of observation in this respect is an unachievable ideal, (although this does not 
mean that we should not aspire to it in some or other sense).
The term Anschauung, or ‘seeing that’ refers to ways in which we abstract 
further from our actual observations of phenomena, to make inferences about 
things in the world. I have considered this from the point of view of three 
topics, visual languages, mental models theory, and the various modes of 
inference themselves. Visual languages are similar to their verbal equivalents 
in that they have to be learned, and are subject to change over time. They 
evolve as a means o f communication and as a tool for thought in new 
disciplines and areas o f expertise, and are from the outset dynamic and fluid, 
not static (Rudwick 1976; Camerini 1993). The boundaries that exist 
between physical and mental imagery are particularly called into question 
when thinking about visual languages. I argue that many practices, including 
surgery have their own ‘visual languages’ (as well as their own verbal ones), 
and that these carry particular and specific meanings for specific forms-of-life.
I draw attention to the connection between mental images per se, and mental 
models, and speculate that mental models are special types o f mental images 
(or their precursors) that allow us to focus upon, and solve problems in the 
mental and physical world, and which, like ‘computer’ or ‘virtual’ models 
avoid the costly necessity of trying things out ‘for real’ every time. Of interest 
and importance also are the following points: firstly, that the actual term 
‘mental model’ is defined in a number of different ways, for different 
purposes; secondly that a person does not necessarily have just one model of 
a system, or even just one type of model (it is far more likely on the contrary 
that we have several, which we invoke on different occasions and for different 
purposes); thirdly that the boundary between mental and physical ‘models’, 
like that of mental and physical images more generally, is frequently obscure
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and indistinct; and fourthly that mental models are necessarily culturally 
derived.
In discussing inference, I have argued for the usefulness of Pierce’s abductive 
model in thinking about discovery or innovation, over and above the inductive 
and deductive models which are more often used in explanations of scientific 
(and other supposedly ‘logical’) activities. I wish to extend this idea, from 
innovative scientific discovery to the realms of more everyday, personal 
discovery, such as happens as we become skilled in performing a procedure. 
Abduction, according to Gooding (1996a) is creative, context specific, not 
necessarily ‘logical’ and its communication and understanding are often 
constrained by the narrative form. Shelley (1996) characterised the 
recognition of the significance of an object, reconstructive identification 
processes and the uses o f visual analogy as examples of visual abduction. He 
stressed that such processes are different from passive perception; however, 
what is passive perception? If the arguments about the ‘theory ladenness’ of 
observation are to be believed, surely it is not possible to ‘passively perceive’ 
something without forming some sort of theory as to what it is? Of course, 
such a theory may well be incorrect Shelley also stressed the importance of 
abduction to expert knowledge. This is interesting, and offers a possible 
explanation for what happens in situations where experts sometimes ‘just do’ 
something in order to rectify a situation in an emergency, without apparently 
stopping to think it through in a logical way (see Benner 1994). In connection 
with this, Gooding (1996a) argued that it may be misleading always to 
prioritise the visual over other sensory modalities, drawing attention to the 
importance also that other sensory data may have for these processes. In 
chapters 7,8 and 9 ,1 provide my own examples of the use of aural, tactile and 
proprioreceptive data by research respondents, often in conjunction with 
visual data.
6.1.3 Representation—
This notion o f representation is obviously very closely connected to, and 
overlapping with, that of visualization considered above. However, thinking 
of the boundary between them as a ‘dynamic’one (Rayner 1997), rather than 
one which is fixed, or static, makes it easier to deal with the difficulties of 
organising the points that I wish to make. One way of differentiating between 
them (there are of course others possible), might be to take representation as
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an inherently social process, whereas visualisations could be thought about 
purely as private, cognitive matters. A key question here would seem to be 
‘How do practitioners represent a domain in which they are trying to solve 
problems’? A major difficulty would seem to lie in the perceived similarities 
and differences already alluded to, which exist between ‘mental’ (and 
therefore essentially ‘private’) and the ‘physical’ representations which are 
available for public scrutiny.
Then too, there is the modality of representation to be considered, for 
example, visual, verbal or some combination of the two? And in any case 
how do we even begin to go about representing complex phenomena such as 
the body? The answer to this latter question would seem to be ‘in a complex 
way, using the range of modalities’. I choose to examine the role of 
representations in construing, in reaching creative solutions and (it follows) in 
abductive inference. I am particularly interested in ways in which 
representations from various sources (and modalities) may be superimposed 
one upon another in order to ‘add dimensions’ (Gooding 1996a) and the 
purposes which this may serve in ordering our thinking*.
Aside from thinking about representations as physical or mental, visual or 
verbal, abstract or concrete ‘pictures’ o f things (as if  this were not 
complicated enough), I wish to consider also the notions o f ‘knowledge’ and 
‘skill’ here. I have discussed the difficulties inherent in defining the term 
‘knowledge’ itself, despite its being a word that is used (and understood) in an 
everyday sort of way. Among the various definitions that I have considered, 
that of Newell and Simon (1972), which described it as a ‘writing-like’ 
representation in the mind of a cogniting agent, is particularly interesting, for 
the following reasons. Firstly, I am intrigued as to why knowledge is 
necessarily seen as ‘writing-like’ rather than ‘picture-like’. This brings to 
mind the debates that exist within psychology between those who argue for 
the existence of analogue and propositional representational mechanisms 
within the brain (eg Kosslyn 1973; 1980; 1987; 1994; Paivio 1991), or 
propositional ones only (eg Pylyshyn 1973; 1978; 1979a; 1979b). Secondly, 
because of what may happen when knowledge as such is applied, in particular 
where uncertainty arises from a contradiction between one’s training, or 
‘book’ ‘knowledge’ and one’s experience of actual practice; essentially a 
process which we need to go through in order to become ‘skilled’ in some or 
other domain.
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Hirschauer (1991) wrote of this problem of relating ‘experience to 
representation’, although it is probably true to say that he was thinking more 
about physical representations of the body (for example, in anatomical atlases) 
than about the knowledge about it that is stored in memory (bearing in mind 
that this is likely at least in part, to be derived from such sources). However, 
he did not specifically state this, and he may indeed have had both in mind as 
he wrote. Most of us, for most of the time do not appear to distinguish greatly 
between ‘physical’ or ‘concrete’ objects such as texts, models and pictures, 
and their ‘mental’ or ‘abstract’ counterparts. Instead, like so many of the 
other entities and subjects considered here, they merge, and interact together, 
so much so that it becomes difficult to define precisely where one begins, and 
the other ends.
6 .1 .4  Dimensionality ill
I have investigated largely from a historical perspective the different forms 
that visual images may take, and the different ways in which we may use 
them, including most notably the combination or superimposition of different 
types of images (Latour 1986), which could be seen in some respects as an 
attempt to get over the problem of dimensionality. This problem of the 
necessity to move between dimensions when visualizing phenomena was 
addressed by Tufte (1990), in considering the difficulties inherent in 
communicating information about a complex 3D world within the confines of 
the 2D space of paper, or ‘flatland’ as he and others have termed it. The 
problem was also discussed by Alpers (1983) in respect o f the history of art. 
However, this is not the full story, since as data from sculptor respondents in 
chapter 7 demonstrate, 3D representations likewise seem to be of limited 
usefulness by themselves, and certainly cannot be seen as providing a 
complete solution. In a series o f papers presented at a conference entitled 
Displaying the Third Dimension (Wellcome Institute / Science Museum 
1998), speakers described examples o f the uses of actual three-dimensional 
models in science and medicine. Despite their seeming advantages, these 
models themselves were usually only ‘one’ version of the various 
representations of a particular phenomenon that were available, and were 
themselves often combined with others in the same sort o f way as 
two-dimensional pictures in actual use.
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The problem of dimensionality would seem to be particularly salient when 
thinking about the complex, layered nature of anatomy. How can surgeons, 
for example, learn about it from pictures? The answer to this is that they do 
not, or not at least from pictures alone. Like Latour’s (1986) scientists, they 
combine and superimpose numbers of physical representations. Actual 
dissections, observations of surgical procedures, and 3D anatomical models 
are used alongside different types o f pictures; pictures incidentally which, far 
from being ‘objective’ representations of what is actually ‘there’, are very 
carefully constructed to serve particular purposes. (Goodingl996a, p.86) 
drew attention to a process of ‘representational enhancement by the addition 
of dimensions’ in explaining how visual representations change over time as 
theories develop. Gooding was writing here in the context o f innovative 
scientific discovery. However, there is no reason to think that such a concept 
cannot be applied to more eveiyday, personal forms of discovery such as that 
entailed in learning.
Of additional interest to this debate upon dimensionality, is a suggestion made 
by Rooke (1994), that all visual representations are three-dimensional, in that 
they involve social, physical and cognitive dimensions, and that we ‘see’ (or 
interpret) them in a multi-dimensional way because of our perceptions of the 
overlaps between these dimensions.
To conclude the first section of this chapter, I restated the general objectives 
of this research. I now wish to relate these objectives to the above 
summarised material, and to the fuller discussions that preceded it, in breaking 
down my research question, and thus framing the issues which it will address 
more precisely.
• What measures do surgeons use to help map the internal body during 
operations?
• How do they come to relate their actual experience to textbook accounts 
and representations of the body?
•  How are 2D images o f the body related to actual 3D bodies?
• How do surgeons mediate uncertainty in relation to bodies?
• How do these things change as they progress from novice through to more 
expert stages?
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Also, how do I render these problems that I set myself (seemingly so casually, 
at the outset) ‘graphically’, and in doing so, attempt to communicate more 
nearly their complexity? I now move on to discuss methodology.
SECTION 6.2: SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF METHOD
In this section I discuss my research methods, with a particular emphasis upon 
ethnography, which term encompasses a range of techniques. I describe the 
fieldwork undertaken, and also the experience of analysis and writing. In this 
research (and I suspect, in much other also), these aspects did not take the 
form o f discrete stages or phases, but became merged together so that, in 
retrospect at least, it is very difficult to differentiate between them.
6.2.1 The method of ethnography
‘I t ... is my belief that any group ofpersons - prisoners, primitives, pilots, or 
patients - develop a life o f  their own that becomes meaningful, reasonable and 
normal once you get used to it, and that a good way to learn about any o f  
these worlds is to submit oneself in the company o f  the members to the daily 
round o f petty contingencies to which they are subject *
ErvingGoffinan(1961: ix - x)
This quote from Gofiman gives a pretty good idea of how to go about 
collecting ethnographic data (or at the very least it represents a fair description 
o f how /  went about it). Nigel Fielding (1993 p.154) described ethnography 
as A form o f  qualitative research which combines several methods, including 
interviewing and observation.' According to Fielding therefore, it is not one 
method, but a combination of several. Denzin (1970) likewise referred to it as 
‘A curious blending o f  methodological techniques \  McCall and Simmons 
(1969 p.l) went into a little more detail. For them, it includes 4Genuinely 
social interaction in the field  with the subjects o f  study, some direct 
observation o f  relevant events, some formal and a great deal o f  informal 
interviewing, some systematic counting,some collection o f  documents and 
artifacts; and open endedness in the direction the study takes ’. Basically, all 
o f this is what I did. Even this fairly exhaustive list does not however capture 
the essence o f  what ethnography is, or what an ethnographer does. Geertz
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(1973 p.30) following Gilbert Ryle, defined it as ‘thick description’. I feel 
that this term captures its essence (and what I have tried to do) rather well.
Many ethnographic studies are pleasurable and satisfying to read, almost like a 
good novel. Neither does the similarity end here. Atkinson (1990, p.2) 
described how in ethnographies, like novels, the ‘narratives and descriptions, 
the examples, the characters and the interpretive commentary are woven 
together in a highly contrived product’. Ethnographies it seems, are explicit 
and acknowledged constructions. As an approach, this seems a good deal 
more honest than those that profess objectivity. This does not mean of course, 
that ethnographers do not (and should not) strive for this ideal, taking pains to 
guard against undue and misleading bias. Geertz (1973 p.30) cited Solow’s 
very pertinent analogy between the quest for objectivity in research and 
asepsis in surgery. Like perfectly aseptic environmental conditions in the 
operating theatre, objectivity in research is impossible to achieve. However, 
one would not ‘perform surgery in a sewer 7
Fielding, whilst calling attention to the drawbacks o f the method (the most 
pertinent one for me being the difficulty of creating a coherent analysis from 
the reams of data of different types that one has to deal with), stressed its 
particular value as a ‘method o f discovery ’ (ibid. p. 155), in novel contexts. 
This context is certainly a novel one, and what I, like Stefan Hirschauer 
(1994), have attempted to produce in relation to it, following in the traditions 
of anthropologists such as Geertz, is a ‘thick description ' of what I observed, 
what I was told, and most significantly of instances where the two seemed to 
be in direct contradiction to each other. I describe the process below. My 
account is divided into three sections, on data collection, analysis and writing. 
These three stages are by no means distinct however, either in the doing, or in 
the reporting.
In addition I describe some early introspectionist experiments, and a pilot 
‘micro-study’ which I carried out early on when access to veterinary practices 
was temporarily curtailed, in order that I could begin to try out methods and 
define initial concepts. This latter study forms the subject for chapter 7. My 
major concern in this section is to show how this research has evolved over 
time, rather than to enter into prolonged discussions and defence of my 
methods. I justify this on the grounds of the original nature o f this work.
There simply is not a standard, approved method for carrying out a study o f
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this nature. In many ways it represents in total a series of experiments. It 
seems however odd in some ways that something as fundamental as human 
skill requires to be researched by means that apparently hover on the forefront 
of what is possible, and outside of what is conventional. However, this can be 
explained in terms of the verbal character o f much academic research, and the
9
non-verbal character of many skills.
6.2.2 Collecting the data: into the field
At the commencement of this study, I had assumed (with some justification I 
felt), that access to veterinary practices would be unproblematic for me, 
because of the large number o f contacts that I had amassed as a result o f my 
previous employment . Indeed, I was offered an opportunity almost 
immediately to spend a two week period in a practice in which a former 
student and also a former colleague worked as veterinary nurses. This 
practice was of particular interest because its principal carried out orthopaedic 
referral surgery, as well as general veterinary work. As the year advanced 
however, and I busied myself working to fulfil the various requirements of the 
Masters degree in Social Research that I was following as part of my research 
training, the contacts that I had made over several years began to dry up. The 
orthopaedic surgeon for example, was in the process of moving his practice 
into a newly-built veterinary hospital in a different part of the town in which 
he was based. I felt that my presence at this time, even if  permitted, would 
have added to the inevitable upheaval. Another contact had sold his 
partnership in a local practice, and gone to work as an administrator for a 
major animal charity in another part o f the country. This made opportunities 
for further placements difficult to come by, especially since the type of 
research that I was intent upon carrying out is unfamiliar for the most part to 
veterinary surgeons.
Ethnographers have historically tended to concern themselves mainly with 
groups of people who have (or had) relatively little power to resist (should 
they wish to do so) the research process, and this has led to criticism from 
various quarters. The ‘exoticising’ of ethnic cultures for example by some 
anthropologists for example, has been implicated in establishing ‘primitive’ 
human life as ‘other’ in the eyes of the ‘civilised’ European world, thereby 
serving or justifying colonialism (see Asad 1973). More recently, deviant 
groups (particularly inner-city, working class youths) have been the subject of
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ethnographic study, for example by the Chicago School of sociology (Shaw 
and McKay 1969). Such groups can also be viewed as lacking in power, in 
many respects, to resist being studied. The people who are the subject of this 
study however belong to a relatively powerful professional group, and 
although the ethical issues involved are considerably less contentious (though 
by no means entirely absent), this was not without its own problems.
For several months I tried to forge new contacts, initially with little success. 
The veterinary form-of-life has little or no tradition or experience of social 
research, and I became increasingly pessimistic about my chances of finding 
practices which would allow me access. The fact that I found it so difficult to 
explain in lay (or indeed any) terms exactly what I was hying to do, due in 
great part to the exploratory nature of my research topic, did not help. I sent 
off batch after batch of letters in an effort to obtain observation opportunities, 
and in the meantime applied myself to other research activities referred to 
above, and discussed in more detail further on.
Eventually however, my persistence in attempting to make contact with 
prospective respondents paid off. After a brief absence from the department, I 
returned to find waiting for me a letter from a veterinary practitioner in a 
nearby town, inviting me observe as many surgical procedures as I wished at 
his practice. The only stipulation was that I telephone before 10.00 am on the 
mornings when I wanted to go in. Soon afterwards I received a telephone call 
from another vet offering the opportunity to observe operations at his practice. 
I cannot pretend that any overnight transformation took place. The pace of 
work was at times agonisingly slow, due to the necessity of fitting in with the 
schedules of these very busy professionals, but at last the work started to take 
on a pace and a life of its own.
6.23 The experience of fieldwork
Fieldwork, in my experience at least, is a far cry from the impression given by 
the tidy narratives with which most research is reported. On the contrary, I 
found it to be a difficult, messy and frustrating process, which could be 
likened to trying to piece together concurrently several jumbled up jigsaw 
puzzles without the benefit o f the pictures on the box lids to follow. It was 
often a physically exhausting experience, as well as a mentally tiring one. My 
initial period of observation was spent standing in the very busy and stressful
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environment of an orthopaedic referral practice, which was at that time 
chronically short o f space and resources with which to carry out this work. I 
use the term ‘standing’ advisedly; there was nowhere to sit, except in the 
clients’ waiting room, which brought its own difficulties. Clients frequently 
questioned my presence there without an animal, and on being told that I was 
engaged in research, asked barrages o f questions about what I was 
researching. They seemed to equate what I was doing with a number of 
popular TV documentaries related to veterinary medicine that were currently 
being shown, which at times caused some considerable amusement to the 
practice staff.
Writing of the range of difficulties that field researchers face, Lofland (1971) 
highlighted the issue of marginality, with its accompanying feelings of 
anxiety. Although in the social setting, with the agreement of the participants, 
the researcher is not o f  it. Geertz (1973) too, described the process of ‘finding 
one’s feet ’ in the research setting as an unnerving business which ‘never more 
than distantly succeeds \  Frankly, I felt in the way a lot o f the time, 
particularly since space in veterinary practices is generally at a premium. I 
dealt with these feelings (it was after all, my problem) by helping out in small 
ways. Staff initially seemed a little surprised that a ‘researcher’ did things like 
washing up the coffee cups and clearing up dog faeces. I later helped out in 
more significant ways^, though I fought shy of total ‘participant observation’ 
per se. However, I sometimes felt guilty that I did not help out more than I 
did, particularly in the very busy practices.
Aldrich (1997) described her experiences o f ‘role conflict’ when carrying out 
research in a setting in which she had previously worked. I too found that this 
if anything tended to add to the difficulties. However, Atkinson (1995 p. 18) 
stressed the advantages to researchers working in specialised settings, o f 
having or acquiring a degree o f ‘insider’ knowledge, and I certainly found that 
it was extremely useful to be able to ‘follow’ a lot of the procedures without 
constantly having to ask what was going on. Also, such things as my having 
an awareness of the health and safety issues that relate to veterinary medicine 
tended to put respondents at their ease (at least as far as such practicalities 
were concerned), and helped lessen the impact of a stranger in their midst 
However, familiarity with a research setting clearly has its drawbacks as well 
as its advantages.
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Another early stumbling block was my reluctance to tape interactions, mainly 
for fear of making subjects feel ill at ease, but also because o f the fraught 
nature of much interaction in what was often a stressed work environment. 
Early fieldnotes are sprinkled with remarks such as ‘Still haven *t had the 
nerve to ask i f  I  can make tape recordings in the operating theatre. Went in, 
full o f  intentions, but what was supposed to be a fairly routine liver biopsy 
ended up with two surgeons, very fraught, entrails out all over the table, 
blood everywhere, excising a huge liver tumour. Anaesthetic not good, nurse 
harassed'. Needless to say, I did not tape on that occasion! Later I did 
audiotape, and even videotape some procedures. It is in the end debatable 
however whether this really is a superior method of data collection to plain 
note taking, given the amount of background noise that is always present in 
veterinary practices, and the considerable time taken to review and transcribe 
tapes. One also tends to be less vigilant whilst actually in the field, relying 
too much on the fact that the data can be reviewed later. Perhaps in the end 
you actually notice less if  you rely too much on the technology, and not 
enough on your own perceptions and intuition at the time.
Looking back, I was initially extremely (and amusingly - now) uncomfortable 
with the researcher role. Eventually though I found it much easier (even 
pleasurable) for example to sit in a practice waiting room and chat with 
curious clients. Sometimes they even offered interesting insights, new ways 
of looking at things which I had not previously considered. I still however 
tended to avoid any reference to ‘psychology’, since this tended to lead to 
sometimes embarrassing questions concerning the odd behaviour of 
colleagues or neighbours, or revelations about the problems and actions of 
elderly relatives suffering from Alzheimer’s. The general public (or at least 
that section of it to be found in veterinary surgeons’ waiting rooms during the 
observation period) seemed overwhelmingly to equate ‘psychology’ with 
clinical psychology, or even psychiatry. Even any mention of the PhD process 
itself seemed better avoided, since it had an apparent tendency to be 
transformed into ‘training to be a doctor’ with associated questions about, and 
discussion of physical ailments! It usually proved to be safer to tell enquirers 
that I was a teacher engaged in a form o f educational research, which was 
after all loosely true.
On a rather more serious note, I had occasionally to contend with resentment 
at my having been in a sense ‘imposed’ upon practices by the practice
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principal, almost as if  I were some sort of spy for the management. I managed 
to get around this, (at least as far as the nurses and receptionists were 
concerned) by making friends with them, listening carefully to what they had 
to say, asking their (often valuable) opinions on various matters, and helping 
out in various small ways. Employed veterinary surgeons on occasion 
however presented rather different problems. Somewhat naively, I had 
assumed that my presence would have been discussed with colleagues by the 
principal prior to my arrival. This was not always the case, and I did 
experience one or two difficult moments in which the person whom I had 
been put to observe, whilst not openly hostile, showed resentment, suspicion 
or nervousness at my presence.
I soon learned not to assume individual informed consent from the ‘blanket’ 
consent of the principal, but to introduce myself to each ‘new’ person, explain 
what I was doing in the practice, and ask if they minded my watching, if it was 
OK to ask questions and so on. Even one practice principal assumed that I 
was there to 'see how efficient we all are ’ (despite having given willing 
permission for me to be there). This remark was made in a  jocular tone, but 
was I am sure not entirely intended as a joke. I went to great pains to explain 
that my study was not in any sense about efficiency, that I am a researcher, not 
a time and motion expert in any shape or form, an identity that I certainly do 
not aspire to, and in any case would be supremely unqualified to claim.
In one practice in particular, it was necessary to be the very soul o f discretion, 
simply because some members of staff were frequently to be found gathered 
together in huddles talking about and criticising the others. I felt that it was 
important not to get mixed up in this in any way. It certainly did not feel 
comfortable to tape any material anywhere in this practice, and in fact I did 
not, although I had initially sought and been granted permission to do so. I 
even had a veterinary student who was ‘seeing practice’ whilst I was there, ask 
my advice (as someone older, unconnected with the practice, and an 
‘academic’ based at the University in a neighbouring city to his own), on how 
to deal with this type of occurrence. I suggested that he abstained at all costs 
from participating in this behaviour, repeated nothing of this nature that he 
heard, and mentioned the problem privately to his own tutor when he or she 
visited him at the practice.
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Fieldwork did not ‘officially’ come to an end at any particular point, in the 
way that I had envisaged that it would do so. My visits to practices rather 
tailed off, as I accumulated more and more data, and had to apply myself to 
deal with it. I still occasionally visit practices, even as I am drafting this 
chapter. By the end of the ‘main’ fieldwork period however, I had carried out 
many hours of observations of surgical operations carried out upon domestic 
animals, mainly cats and dogs. These observations were carried out in five 
different veterinary practices, and involved many individual veterinary 
surgeons. As far as the nature of the various operations was concerned, I was 
obviously limited by the cases which presented requiring surgery on 
observation days. Some procedures I was able to observe only once. Other, 
more routine ones were observed on numerous separate occasions, in some 
cases carried out by different surgeons, even on different species of animals. 
Whilst observing, I was able to ask questions relating to the procedures, and 
the methods used, subject of course to constraints caused by the necessity for 
the surgeons to devote all of their concentration (at some times, but not others, 
as shown in chapters 8 and 9) to the task in hand
As well as observations of surgery, I also spent periods of time consulting 
surgical textbooks, watching training videos intended for veterinary students, 
shadowing (and helping) veterinary nurses, and observing vets and clients in 
consulting rooms. I also carried out interviews and informal conversations of 
varying lengths with vets and veterinary nurses, both during surgery and at 
other times. Veterinary nurses were valuable informants because a large 
proportion of their work generally involves assisting surgeons when they 
operate, chiefly by helping prepare the animals for surgery, and monitoring 
them once anaesthetised. I chose observation (which often approached 
‘participant’ observation) rather than interviews alone, partly because I knew 
it would be much easier to get vets to allow me to watch them operate than it 
would be to pin them down for long periods o f time to talk about what are to 
them rather nebulous matters. They are very busy people, often working long 
hours and packing a great deal o f actual work into those hours.
Also, I was struck several times by the differences between what people say 
that they do, and what they actually do. This was not, I am certain, due to any 
intention to mislead. I feel that it is not a problem restricted to this particular 
research setting, but probably one that is inherent in this type of investigation. 
There are all sorts of possible reasons for this; often people try to portray
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themselves in what they see as the best light, they also tend to want to please, 
saying whatever it is that they think that you want to hear, for example. 
Sometimes I am sure they genuinely think that they really do behave at all 
times as they report. However, my evidence often suggests the contrary.
6.2.4 On observation and analysis
‘As I  sat and listened, I  learned the answers to questions I  would not have had 
the sense to ask i f  I  had been getting my information solely on an interviewing 
basis ’
(Whyte 1955)
SSK (sociology of scientific knowledge) has long argued against a common 
sense view of the natural sciences as processes whereby scientists discover by 
objective means, knowledge that is ‘out there’ in the ‘real world’, emphasising 
instead its skilled, creative and interpretive nature (e.g. Knorr-Cetina 1981; 
Latour and Woolgar 1979). Gooding (1990 p.60) argued that human agency is 
central to producing representations o f phenomena (which may be mental or 
physical, visual or verbal), that subsequently become separated from the world 
of human activity that produced them. Observers have to create or achieve 
dualism, ie make the separation of representations from their objects.
As Hammersley (1993) noted, the separation of the knower from the known is 
unrealistic, and in some respects the social sciences too need to come to terms 
with this. My personal feeling is that an investigator inevitably becomes 
herself part of the context of her investigation, and leading on from that, 
completely detached and impartial observation is impossible. Far from being 
a passive, objective process, observation is an active one of interpretation. 
Barnes et al (1996) argued that even the language o f observation is contextual, 
dependent upon existing presuppositions and assumptions which are often of a 
very theoretical character; and observation is in fact ‘theory-laden’ (p.2). It 
was in the light of all o f this that I approached the lengthy observations that 
formed a significant part of the fieldwork for this study. I will not however 
say that it was not difficult; at times (indeed often, in retrospect) draining, 
exhausting, tedious, but occasionally absorbing, exciting and fun.
Unburdened by illusions of objectivity, I opted for what I will call involved 
observation; overt, not totally participant observation as such, but in no sense
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detached. Collins (1992) referred to his own particular take on such a method 
as ‘participant comprehension’. I invariably and inevitably became part of the 
research contexts during the time I was there, involved both in interactions 
with my research subjects and with the work that they did. My own 
background, and relative familiarity with both the contexts and the types o f 
work carried out within them undeniably assisted in my ability to follow what 
was going on.
In the light of all this, it follows that the data gathering and data analysis 
stages in a project such as this are not totally separate entities. Geertz (1973 
p.26) compared ethnography to the medical diagnosis of illness. Rather than 
starting with observation data and attempting to subsume it under some 
general law, clinical inference begins with a set of symptoms and attempts to 
make sense of them. Although generalisation across cases can at times prove 
hazardous, generalisation within cases (known in medicine as clinical 
inference) is essential. Geertz advocated also a clinical approach to the use of 
theory, directing conceptualization toward generating interpretations of 
matters already in hand, rather than predicting outcomes, as for example with 
experimental manipulations.
6.2.5 Analysis and writing
‘The New History o f  Cephallonia ’ was proving to be a problem; it seemed to 
be impossible to write it without the intrusion o f  his own feelings and 
prejudices. Objectivity seemed to be quite unobtainable, and he fe lt that his 
false starts must have wasted more paper than was normally used on the 
island in the space o f  a year. The voice that emerged in the account was 
intractably his own; it was never historical. It lacked grandeur and
impartiality.....
Louis de Bemieres 1994.
Like de Bemieres’ would-be author, I have the evidence o f many such ‘false 
starts’ in my filing cabinet. As intimated above, writing did and does not 
form a discrete stage of this research. It began with the writing o f fieldnotes 
(which was also analytical since I had to choose which things to write down 
and which not to bother with). This implies selectivity, an active and 
subjective process. It is after all not possible for one person to record every 
event and conversation that takes place in such a busy environment. Hence,
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even in these early stages, data collection involved embryonic writing and an 
early form also of analysis.
I approached the ‘proper’ analysis of my data in the traditional way, putting 
events and talk into categories, comparing them, looking for similarities and 
differences, and this did yield some interesting insights. However, when I put 
aside my notebooks and files of fieldnotes, transcriptions o f tapes, and the 
snippets o f events and conversations laboriously written on filing cards 
(though all of these things were always close at hand for further reference, and 
are at my elbow now as I type), I found that the analytical process was by no 
means complete. In the transformation that must take place from piles of 
rather untidy (it must be admitted) papers and cards to something approaching 
a finished product, further analysis is accomplished.
As far as the writing itself is concerned, since the processes that I wish to 
communicate are often problematic in that it seems to be very difficult to do 
so by verbal means alone, I have attempted to use in conjunction with text a 
form of diagrammatic mapping notation; ‘mapping surgeons’ mapping o f the 
body’. I feel that the narrative form in particular gives a misleading 
impression of linearity, that events proceed in an orderly and sequential 
fashion from beginning to end, which is in many ways inappropriate and 
unhelpful when applied to complex practical tasks.. I am therefore greatly 
interested in alternative forms of notation which may be more revealing of the 
procedural, skilled aspects of such work. To this end, one o f my earliest 
research tasks was an interview with the dance teacher at my daughter’s 
school, in respect of how sequences of movements are recorded and 
communicated by dancers and choreographers.^
This use o f visual images to facilitate comprehension of complex phenomena 
or instructions is hardly a new or revolutionary idea, and neither is it restricted 
to the performing arts. We have seen how Rudwick (1976) and Shelley 
(1994) wrote of similar ‘visual languages’ which developed early on in the 
histories of the sciences of geology and archaeology, due to the inadequacy of 
words alone in expressing certain complex configurations, and surgical 
manuals, and come to that the more mundane instruction manuals supplied 
with items of domestic equipment, also contain diagrams that are intended to 
be used in conjunction with the accompanying text. To this end I have 
adapted ideas that were initially applied to the work of Michael Faraday by
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one of my supervisors, David Gooding (1996a), in his attempts to 
communicate process.
6.2.6 The pilot study; conversations with sculptors
At this point I introduce a ‘micro-study’ based upon interviews with, and 
observations of sculptors (I use this term rather loosely to account for artists 
who work in three dimensions, albeit with very different media), that forms 
the subject matter for chapter 7. This small study was carried out as a pilot to 
help develop methodology and define concepts, during a period when 
sustained access to veterinary practices for the purpose of observing surgery 
was unavailable. I justify its inclusion (rather than relegating it to the depths 
of my dusty filing cabinet, along with many other ‘false starts’ and ‘potentially 
promising papers’), because it too is concerned (at least partially) with 
representations of the body, and also because of the insights that it may 
contribute to an understanding of (particularly) the role o f dimensionality 
within skilled task performance.
This study involved initial, hour-long, semi-structured interviews with four 
participants^, plus further informal follow-up questioning. Additionally, in all 
cases I was able to see either finished examples, or photographs o f their work, 
and also to observe them working for short periods of time. I have termed the 
participants as ‘sculptors’. This terminology is somewhat loose, because in 
three out of the four cases, participants in fact practised a number of different 
art or craft forms. In the remaining case the participant sculpted in wood only. 
By chance, two were male and two female, although gender is not of interest 
here. It merely happened that these particular participants were available and 
willing to take part in the research. The only criteria used in their selection 
(apart from the aforementioned availability, and willingness to participate) 
was that they presently worked in three dimensions rather than two (as in 
drawing or painting, although some did this as well), and that they sold work.
I realise that this is a very questionable, even dangerous criterion upon which 
to base any judgement of the quality of an artist’s output. However, in the 
lack of any other, it did at seem at least reasonable to assume that, as people 
were willing to pay for their work, they were reasonably skilled and 
experienced at what they did. It was this skill and experience, rather than any 
aesthetic or artistic merit present in their work (which I am in any case 
ill-equipped to assess, or judge), which is my main focus.
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In addition, I made a number of other ‘pilot’ observations, though too few 
data were collected to warrant chapters of their own (and besides, the 
necessity to limit the scope and length of the present work was becoming 
urgent). These included observations of lambing (the correction and delivery 
of malpresented full-term foetuses in sheep), carried out by shepherds and by 
vets, and also of the the interpretation of ultrasound images of the gravid uteri 
of various types o f animals; sheep and cattle on local farms, and dogs and 
cats in veterinary consulting rooms. I also observed the use and interpretation 
of blood biochemistry analysis by veterinary surgeons. This is of especial 
interest to me, since I have carried out these analyses myself, and trained 
veterinary nursing students to do so. What I had not really considered before 
however (in the confines of the laboratory) were the uses that vets make (and 
do not make) of the results that are obtained. These results visualise, not the 
form o f the body, as do those deriving from other techniques discussed, such 
as ultrasonography and radiography, but its function. All o f these would 
provide interesting contexts for future research in relation to ways in which 
the body can be represented, and thus thought about, and known.
I mention these observations here since they formed part o f the ‘evolution’ of 
this project (to borrow a term from research respondents whom we will meet 
in chapter 7), even though I do not report them at length. The first and last 
mentioned observations (of lambing and blood biochemistry interpretation) 
provided me in addition with the idea of using myself as a research subject, 
since these are procedures that I have carried out on numerous occasions. 
Though I did not pursue it for any length o f time, or do so in anything other 
than a rather superficial way, I explore this idea further below.
6.2.7 Surgery as simulation
An interest in the history of psychology, particularly in the debates that 
surround the emergence of behaviourism, gave me the idea of making small, 
impromptu experiments into introspection. This technique was devised by 
Wilhelm Wundt and his followers in the nineteenth century. It had particular 
concerns with consciousness, and involved individuals’ attempts to observe 
and analyse their own thoughts, images and feelings as they occurred. 
Introspection was discredited by the behaviourists for being overly subjective 
and unscientific (and remains contentious in some quarters today, although, 
since we no longer rely entirely upon behavioural cues, much ‘conventional’
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psychological research depends at least partly upon respondents’ reports of 
their own experiences in just such a way). My experiment is of interest, like 
the observations described above, because it too formed part o f the evolution 
of this work, and so undoubtedly influenced the standpoint that I have adopted 
towards other forms of evidence.
This experiment involved a ‘simulation’ of one of the surgical techniques 
under investigation, that o f spaying (a term used for the neutering of female
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domestic pets), using rabbit corpses provided by a local fanner' and my 
dissection instruments. This procedure appeared in the first instance to be not 
especially useful (seen in terms o f a direct comparison), since dissecting a 
dead animal is very different from operating upon a live one. In addition, the 
internal anatomy of rabbits is strikingly different from that o f cats and dogs, as 
a consequence of their different digestive strategies. Upon opening the 
abdomen of a rabbit, one is confronted by the enlarged coils of the caecum 
and colon (sections of the large bowel involved in the digestion of tough 
vegetable matter) which effectively mask the other organs in a way that is not 
found with carnivorous species. The reproductive organs were in fact very 
difficult to locate at all until I had removed large portions of the digestive 
system. It could be argued that this location would not prove nearly so 
difficult for a more experienced person. I am after all not a veterinary 
surgeon, though I do possess modest skills relating to anatomy and dissection. 
However, since this operation is not routinely carried out upon rabbits in the 
UK, it may be the case that such experienced persons are infrequently to be 
encountered.
This seeming failure on my part to locate the reproductive organs is 
interesting in that it reflected the construction of anatomical pictures discussed 
in chapter 3, in which organs are removed to render others visible. Such a 
procedure is of course not possible in actual surgery, since the intention in this 
case is for the animal to be kept alive and make a full recovery. Surgeons’ 
skills, it would seem, are different from those of the mere anatomist or 
dissectionist! _This calls into question the actual use of anatomical texts to 
surgeons. That they do use them is in no doubt, as will be seen in chapters 8 
and 9. But how?
In the next chapter, I briefly report some of the findings of my pilot study of 
‘sculptors’.
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n q t .e s
* Gooding (1996) actually emphasises that both the processes o f adding and 
removing dimensions are creative and important.
^ Personal communication. D.C.Gooding (2001).
I previously worked as a lecturer in animal science at a land-based college, 
developing and teaching vocational courses for those who wanted to work 
with animals (and who were already doing so). Students included trainee 
veterinary nurses, and those who wished to enter this career. Also those 
who wished to work (or were already working) in the agricultural sector, 
with horses, at zoos, safari parks, kennels, or in the pet trade for example, 
and occasionally also students who wished to gain practical experience with 
animals with a view to taking related undergraduate and postgraduate 
university degrees.
^ I later assisted veterinary nurses in general animal care tasks, carried out 
occasional laboratory analyses and helped students prepare for 
examinations 
and NVQ assessments.
Thanks to Mrs J. Vosper of The Corsham School, who told me of the 
formal and informal methods that dance teachers and choreographers use to 
communicate and record sequences of movements. Although there are 
official’ or formal notations used by some choreographers in ballet for 
example, many prefer to use ‘informal’ methods of their own devising. The 
example that I was shown looked a bit like shorthand, with short notes, 
squiggles and little diagrams.
^ ‘Sculptor’ participants included Peter (woodcarver and walking stick 
maker), Christine (dress maker and theatre costumier), Barbara (sculptor 
and garden designer) and John (diy stone waller and walking stick maker).
n
' These animals were culled as a result of large numbers of them damaging 
crops, NOT for the purposes of this experiment.
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CHAPTER 7: BUILDING BODIES: SCULPTURE AS PRACTICE. OR 
‘SCULPTURAL PRACTICES’?
‘ ‘I ’d like to be able to carve my results on a Henry Moore statue ", she was to 
say later, meaning not only that the results should be gopd enough and enduring 
enough to justify such an act but that statue and inscription together would bear 
witness to the same creativity at work in carving a sculpture and constructing a 
scientific theory'
June Goodfield, (1991, p. 14)
7.1 Introduction
For Hirschauer (1991, p.279), the anatomical body (ie, the body as it is 
represented in anatomical pictures) is deemed to be ‘an accomplishment o f  the 
sculptural practice o f  opera tionsIf surgery can be seen thus as ‘a sculptural 
practice’, is it possible then, that the actual ‘practice of sculpture’ may have 
something to contribute to an investigation whose principal concern is with 
surgical operations? In this short chapter, I present evidence from pilot fieldwork 
observations and interviews with ‘sculptors’, carried out during a period when 
access to veterinary practices was temporarily curtailed. For the sake of this 
exercise, the term ‘sculptor’ is taken to mean an artist and / or craftsperson who 
works in three dimensions, rather than two. I am aware that the discipline of 
sculpture (as it relates to art) may define itself rather differently.
In the quotation which heads this chapter, June Goodfield and her (scientist) 
research collaborator drew explicit comparisons between the nature of the 
creative processes involved in carving a sculpture and in ‘carving out’ a scientific 
theory. It is not my stated (nor implicit) intention to effect any such comparison 
here between these two groups of participants (surgeons as ‘scientists’, or 
sculptors as ‘artists’?). My interests in these practices are bound up rather with 
skilled task performance. It is nevertheless fairly inevitable that some differences 
will emerge, (and more notably perhaps, some similarities, since, because our 
society for the most part places science and art in separate, and often conflicting 
categories, the differences are highlighted quite effectively without any input 
from me).
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Several factors of potential interest emerge from these data. Firstly, the uses that 
respondents made of two dimensional pictures when making three dimensional 
art. This is notable because it mirrors in some respects the uses that surgeons 
make of anatomical pictures in their attempts to map the three-dimensional 
internal body during operations. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, pictures seemed 
to be of rather more use to these artists than equivalent three dimensional 
‘models’ which were also available. Secondly, and linked to this, the way in 
which the artists were observed to build up their work in stages by (literally) 
‘adding dimensions’ (Gooding 1996a), was also interesting. Thirdly, the 
respondents’ perceptions of when their work is or is not ‘right’ are useful in 
relation to insights that this can provide about the nature of expertise. As we will 
come to see, all of these issues are of relevance also to the work of surgeons, and 
to surgical practices.
7.2 Pictures as ideas (or ideas as pictures?): representational practices
‘And when Isay  1inspires ’.... it inspires an idea, and it may not be the same as 
what I ’ve seen... ’
Peter, (1999)
The question addressed here concerns the number and types of ways in which 
artists use two-dimensional pictures in the making of three dimensional art or 
craft work. Some possibilities that immediately come to mind include their use as 
sources of initial ideas, or as Peter (woodcarver) termed it, ‘inspiration’, or 
alternatively as a device for more precisely planning their work (a bit like a 
blueprint), as models to copy directly, as an aid to thinking and problem solving 
at various stages in the execution of the work, or as a rhetorical device to 
persuade clients to commission work. I discuss here the uses that my respondents 
actually made (and just as significantly, did not make) of pictures.
7.2.1 Pictures as ‘inspiration’
Unlike surgical operations, artistic creativity has no clearly defined starting point. 
The making of a single piece of art can be only one stage in the execution of a 
much larger project, and much protracted consideration and research can (and 
indeed usually does) precede its production. However, since our account must
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begin somewhere, I will begin at the point where an individual piece is 
conceived. It would appear that initial ideas for artistic creativity can originate 
from a range of sources. Respondents cited commissioning clients, previous 
work (their own or that of others), objects or images previously or presently seen 
or experienced by the artist, the suggestions or ideas of other people, the 
properties and constraints of the materials and tools that the artist works with, or 
combinations of any of these.
‘Pictures’ of various types were perhaps the most frequently reported of these 
sources of initial ideas. This is interesting in that these artists were concerned 
with making three dimensional objects, and ‘pictures’ implies two dimensions. 
This begs the question of why, and how they use them. One typical use was 
described by dress-designer Christine:
Christine; ‘Well, I  get a request from a client we talk about what she wants,
we might look at some pictures in a magazine, Harpers and Queen, Vogue, 
something like that She usually has an idea o f  what she wants, and I  sort o f  
adapt that to what would suit her... what she looks like, her figure. But more than 
that, like, her personality, what kind o f  person she is, her interests
Christine did not copy the dresses pictured in these fashion magazines, but 
apparently combined certain aspects of them with her own ideas and those o f her 
client, and with her impressions of the client’s appearance and personality to 
create a new and unique design. Peter too, spoke of using pictures as sources of 
ideas for his work in a similar sort o f way:
Peter: ‘Very often it may be a picture in a book or a magazine... It just happens 
that I  saw a picture o f an elephant at a certain angle. Usually, pictures o f  big 
animals like elephants you see head on, but this one was at a different angle and 
it was that design angle that inspired me to do the elephant. I f  I  hadn (t seen that 
picture, I  wouldn ‘t have done it... 1 wouldn ‘t have thought o f  that, but I  suddenly 
realised that, looking at that picture, an elephant’s head can be easily 
transcribed into a shepherd’s crook It looked like an elephant and a shepherd’s 
crook at the same time... ’
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Connections are thus made between things that would appear on the surface to be 
unconnected. Peter again, had not attempted to copy the picture, although he did 
report having looked at it now and again to ‘make sure the angles were right'. His 
finished carving bore only a slight resemblance to the picture (insofar as both 
were representations of elephants). As sources of initial ideas then, it would 
appear that individual pictures ‘inspire’ only certain aspects, and tend to be used 
either together with other pictures, or in combination with other resources which 
may include the artist’s own mental images. This calls to mind Lakoffs and 
Johnson’s (1980) view of metaphors as tools by means of which certain aspects 
(but not others) of concepts can be understood. This is discussed more fully in 
chapter 5. Viewed in this way, Peter appeared to be using pictures as visual 
metaphors which helped him with certain aspects of his carvings, but not others.
7.2.3 Pictures as rhetorical devices
A third respondent, Barbara (sculptor and garden designer), initially denied that 
she used pictures as sources of ideas. Perhaps however she had misunderstood 
my question, since her answer seemed to indicate that she thought that I was 
asking whether she drew pictures as ‘plans’ of how she wanted or intended her 
gardens to look:
Barbara: ‘Oh no, I  can‘t work in two dimensions, can‘t draw at all on a piece o f 
paper. I  might start o ff with something like a bit ofstring for the line o f  a path... 
but I  always change it. . . '
However Barbara too, did make certain uses of pictures as sources of ideas, 
although for clients rather than for herself. She showed me a portfolio consisting 
of photographs and drawings of some of her gardens. The drawings were not her 
own work, but that of a draughtsman friend. She used this portfolio to show 
examples of her work to prospective clients. These very engaging pictures must 
(I would surmise) have served to provide Barbara’s clients with ideas for how 
they would like their gardens to look, as well as to persuade them to commission 
Barbara to do the work for them. Barbara could then presumably work with, and 
adapt these ideas in a similar sort of way to that described by the other artists.
The only difference seemed to be that Barbara apparently used only pictures of 
her own work, rather than those from other sources.
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7.2.4 Pictures as ‘blueprints’
Whilst it was fairly evident that these respondents used pictures as sources of 
ideas, either for themselves or for clients, all of them denied that they drew 
preliminary sketches or pictures as part of a planning or preparation process, as 
Barbara’s statement above indicates. Christine too, refuted this as follows:
Christine: 6 Oh no, I  never do that, I  don‘t think it would work.... I  start with an 
outline idea and sort o f  adapt it as I  go along. It develops as I  make it. I  used to 
do oil paintings like that too, when I  was a student. The idea o f  drawing 
something andfollowing that wouldn‘t work.. ’
Having read, (and also seen examples in galleries) of sketches executed by 
famous artists, purportedly as ‘models’ for major paintings or sculptures, I had 
assumed prior to this fieldwork that it is a normal course of events for all artists to 
produce such sketches, or even a fairly detailed plan of an intended major work, 
in a similar sort of way as a design engineer or architect would prepare a 
blueprint. It is true to say also that I would expect that these models or plans 
would be altered or adapted, possibly quite drastically, as the work progressed. In 
the event however, I was surprised that they did not seem to use such devices at 
all.
I had by this time become a little sceptical about what respondents ‘say’ that they 
do, since observations quite often contradicted this. I am sure that this was not 
due to any intention to mislead, but that they quite genuinely believed that they 
behaved as they reported. Sometimes, as they spoke, respondents themselves 
realised that this was not always the case, as shown below.
7.2.5 Pictures as ‘models’ (to copy directly)
The fourth respondent, John, (stickmaker and drystone waller), despite initially 
denying that he used pictures at all, remembered that he had done so on at least 
one occasion whilst showing me a particular example o f his work. It appeared 
that John had actually attempted to copy directly a design that he had seen in a 
picture, and this had proved to be by no means easy:
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John: ‘No, I  don‘t use pictures, I  use these umm (respondent was referring here to
templates that he makes himself) well, yes, that’s a lie, because that round
one (describing a walking-stick handle) I ’ve got, you seen it? I  saw that one in a 
picture, and it was a picture ofLord Snowdon... And I  copied that... mind you, I  
had to do several before I  got it right, because all 1 saw was a stick in a picture, 
the side o f i t ’.
This was interesting. The single picture that John described, featured a side 
(profile) view of Lord Snowdon carrying a walking stick of an unusual design. 
John’s claim that he had ‘copied’ this therefore needs to be viewed in relation to 
this. John went on to describe in detail a series of experiments in which he had 
tried to make a ‘working’ walking stick (ie, one that was strong enough to use 
without breaking), that looked from the side, like the side view of the one in the 
picture. He expressed surprise that this exercise had been so difficult, much more 
so than his usual practice o f designing and working from his own templates.
7.2.6 Pictures as problem-solving devices
‘Inspiration’ as I have termed it (following Peter’s quote at the beginning o f this 
section), is not limited to the beginning of a project, but neither does it seem to 
continue unabated throughout. It is interspersed with other periods of work o f a 
more routine nature, in a way that could (somewhat fancifully perhaps) be 
compared to periods o f ‘normal science’ as opposed to ‘revolutionary science’ 
(Kuhn 1962). Fresh sources of ideas may be used at various stages during the 
execution of a piece, for example in instances where problems are encountered. 
The following example of Peter’s bull’s head carving demonstrates this use of 
pictures to solve a problem (or provide fresh ideas) in a situation where stalemate 
had been reached. At a client’s request, he was attempting to copy a 3D model of 
a bull’s head to the same scale. This initial attempt did not work. Other sources 
were required, even though by this time the work was well underway.
Peter: ‘The shaping process was not going right, and I  was having great 
difficulty. Then I  was given some photos from a book, ofseveral different bulls, 
not very good photos, no great detail but enough to give me an idea as to the true 
shape o f  a bull‘s head I  also have a great deal o f  experience with bovines 
personally. This has given me a certain mental record o f  what cattle look like. I
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then proceeded with carving, not really using the 3D model, but the photos and 
my own mental images only, not copying one o f  the animals, but getting clues 
from all o f  them as to the shape o f  the bovine head. The result was a far more 
technically accurate representation than the carved head that I  originally started 
to copy. I  still used the model in a way; it must have been bull-like in a way, to 
capture the character, but I  could now see where it wasn 7 accurate. Its 
proportions gave it its character, but not its detail. The detail got in the way o f  
my copying the proportions. Its hard to explain. I  can't explain the reason fo r  
this, or the difficulty that I  was having in copying the 3D figure... ’
This brings us on to dimensionality.
7.3 Mathematics in motion, or ‘seeing’ the third (or second? or fourth?) 
dimension...
In the above sequence, Peter was discussing the difficulty that he had experienced 
in his attempts to copy a three dimensional object directly to scale. We have 
already seen from John’s example that copying anything is not a straightforward 
matter. In fact, respondents seemed to find copying far more difficult than 
following their own designs, which seems contrary to what might be assumed. 
Perhaps therefore copyists and forgers in the art world possess more talent than 
they, and others give them credit for, though the skills involved may be rather 
different ones!
It is certainly the case that Peter was not enjoying the constraints that trying to 
make a direct copy involved. In fact, he found the process somewhat frustrating, 
and in the end rejected it because it did not work, and turned instead to other 
strategies. Interestingly, the carving that he eventually produced turned out to be 
far superior to the one he had originally attempted to copy. The above passage is 
particularly interesting because Peter explicitly referred to his own mental images, 
describing how he used them alongside various physical ones. Again, it appears 
that he had superimposed numbers of physical and mental images and ideas, as 
Christine had done in the case of the wedding dress. Like other participants at 
various times, Peter also referred to the difficulty that he was experiencing in 
talking about these matters.
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I observed Barbara whilst she also was attempting to copy a piece to scale, on this 
occasion a large stone sculpture. Again, this was at the request o f a client rather 
than of her own volition. She too, experienced great difficulty in doing so, and 
became very frustrated. She continually measured the original, and then her own 
attempt with a piece of string.
Barbara: ‘I t ’s harder than I  thought. I  have to change all the angles... ’
It would appear that mathematical concepts such as that of ‘angles’ play an 
important role in this type of work. Allusions to measurement and to geometry 
were frequently made by these respondents, even where they professed not to use 
such techniques. Peter, for example, denied it thus:
Peter: ‘No, I  never measure anything. I  do it all by eye. Now there‘s some 
people that carve and sculpt that have been taught the technical way i f  you like. 
I ’ve never been taught... some people that are taught in art school may have 
been taught mathematically by actually measuring so that i f  they were doing like 
a bust o f  someone, they would actually measure that person‘s dimensions down 
to the last millimetre’
Peter, I feel, was taking too limited a view of what ‘mathematics’ entails, seeing it 
as something that is learned in a formal situation, rather than as a particular way 
of thinking. This is reminiscent o f studies o f ‘unskilled’ workers’ performance o f 
similar tasks in the workplace and in the laboratory (Saxe 1992; Scribner 1997), 
which were discussed in chapter 2. These studies also incidentally involved 
‘mathematical’ tasks. Like Peter, the subjects of these studies were ‘experts’ at 
performing these tasks in context. However, they had considerable difficulty in 
doing so when the tasks were decontextualised in the laboratory.
Measurements can be calculated very precisely using specialised equipment, or 
alternatively they can be roughly estimated with a length of string, or even by eye 
alone. Sometimes measurement even appeared to be used as a sort o f internal 
sense (of proportion, or what is ‘right’?), and the respondent concerned did not 
seem to be consciously measuring at all. In all cases though, when things were 
going well, measurements seemed fluid and hypothetical in nature. Indeed it
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could be surmised that only novices (such as art-school students perhaps?) would 
use them like ‘rules’ in an algorithmic sense.
My ‘experts’ evidently preferred to use measurements more in the sense of 
heuristics. Perhaps this offers a clue as to why copying an object to scale is so 
very difficult. The process requires that constant attention be paid to 
measurement, and this apparently leaves little available for anything else. In the 
normal course of events for these artists (ie, when they were not attempting to 
make a direct copy), such measurements as they did make, if any, had to conform 
to their own approximation of what was ‘right’, otherwise they might be changed, 
redone, or even rejected totally if  they did not accord with other evidence or 
information available, or even just with the artist’s ‘feelings’ about it.
Where a situation called for precise measurement (for instance when trying to 
copy a 3D object to a similar scale), practitioners seemed constrained and 
inhibited by it. Their behaviour appeared to revert to that o f less skilled 
operatives. These observations (for at this stage this is all that they are) are 
interesting because experienced surgeons were later seen to use both the very 
precise measurements obtained from diagnostic equipment such as biochemistry 
analysers that measure minute quantities of substances such as enzymes present in 
the blood, and rough estimations such as those made in respect of the appropriate 
size of plate to fix a fracture in just the same sort of way - heuristically; to be 
rejected, changed, redone or just ignored if they did not fit in some way with 
whatever else was going on.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, geometry seems to be intimately bound up with issues 
related to dimensionality. Practitioners spoke in terms of geometry when 
describing how they work, and of the relationships that exist between different 
aspects of the objects that they were making. Peter, for example, continually 
spoke of planes and angles, (despite his vehement denial that he used 
mathematics). In the following quote he was responding to a question about how 
he transferred (or translated) a flat picture on a page to 3D. Peter spoke in 
particular of how he liked to use pictures of objects taken from different angles, 
and somehow marry them together in his new representation. He much preferred 
to use series of pictures, (even bad ones) as a model, rather than an actual 3D
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representation, as we saw in his account o f carving a bull’s head. He attempted to 
describe how he used pictures to ‘build up’ dimensions in the quote below:
Peter: ‘You start in stages. And your brain has to do a bit o f  interpretation so as 
to interpret the picture you *re seeing. You have to try and turn that into a 3D 
object, in your head. You have to try and view it as i f  it were 3D. And that’s when 
you have to use your imagination a bit to try and get the proportions right... You 
have to concentrate on the bit you are doing at the time. And i t ’s all about 
copying angles. And copying the relationships o f  the components with each 
other ’.
He continued by describing another piece of his work, a carving of a kestrel, 
which he had reportedly ‘copied’ from a picture in a book. As can be seen 
however, he had not really copied this picture at all, but again, apparently used it 
in conjunction with his own mental images and his personal knowledge about 
birds.
Peter: ‘The picture I  had in my mind was not that o f the bird in the book The 
picture in the book, look, the bird’s head is looking forward, but with the actual 
finished article here the head is to one side ’.
I continued: So the picture wasn’t all that much help? Peter’s answer was very 
interesting from the point of view of the psychological experiments that have 
been carried out relating to mental rotation (Shepard 1975,1978; Shepard and 
Cooper 1982; Shepard and Feng 1972; Shepard and Metzler 1971) which were 
discussed in chapter 3. As we see here, Peter reported that he had ‘rotated* the 
bird’s head (ie, from its position in the picture), mentally:
Peter: ‘It was, for getting some o f  the detail o f  the head. It doesn't matter if  the 
head is looking to the side, or straight ahead, you still need to look at it from a 
proportional viewpoint. Getting those proportions that I  keep on about... Doesn't 
matter which position the head is in, those things stay fixed The relationship 
between the head and the body isn ‘t fixed, so you can put it wherever you like.., 
because a bird can move its head As long as I  know the relationship between the 
head and the body I  can make it look over its shoulder.... its easy. You just turn its 
head, so it is looking over its shoulder.
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This did not sound at all easy to me, either to do, or as a concept. It presents an 
interesting parallel also with the Gruber-Sehl shadow box experiment reviewed in 
chapter 4, in which participants had to guess the identity of the hidden object in 
the box from the shadows that it cast In the original experiment, participants 
worked in pairs, each individual describing the particular aspect of the object that 
they saw to a partner who was seeing a different aspect. Together they had in this 
way to arrive at the identity o f the (three dimensional) object in the shadow box, 
from the different (two dimensional) images that they could see (for fuller 
discussion of the Gruber-Sehl experiment, see Gooding 1990). However, two 
successive groups of undergraduate students whom I have assisted with small 
research projects related to this, have presented the problem also to single 
subjects. These lone subjects had to look at first one (two dimensional) shadow, 
and then another, in a similar sort o f way to Peter’s description of making the 
kestrel. They were required to combine actual physical images of all available 
aspects of the hidden object, whereas Peter had available to him only one such 
physical image, the picture in the book. Others were supplied from his own 
mental repertoire. However, it would seem that he combined them in the same 
sort of way.
It could be surmised that my artist respondents, like the Gruber-Sehl participants, 
also worked two-dimensionally most o f the time, even though they were actually 
making (rather than merely trying to identify) three dimensional objects. Like 
Gruber’s participants, they seemed to have to concentrate on one aspect (or 
‘plane’) at a time - related to the part they were presently working upon - even 
though they somehow at the same time retained an awareness of the whole. They 
seemed toswitch between different ‘views’ or aspects of the object. As Barbara 
describing an almost-completed garden put it:
Barbara: ‘When you ‘ve got several bits nearly finished, you sense it is all 
connected, but I  can(t stand in the roof and see it all at once. Ilook from all 
round the house, round every window quickly, as a sort o f  a summary ...to  me, its 
all one thing, what’s it like to walk through it, it has to flow  smoothly andfreely 
link with the next bit... ’
This evidence seems important. What it seems to indicate is that, although we 
may ‘sense’ in two dimensions, we actually ‘perceive’ in three.
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7.4 Art as evolution?
Respondents frequently referred to processes by which their work ‘evolved’ over 
time. This ‘evolutionary’ process seemed to be driven by various combinations of 
ideas and images, and it is fair to say that the properties and behaviour of the 
materials used appeared to interact with these also. Respondents’ initial ideas 
were incomplete; they developed over time, becoming more complex, as well as 
changing (as in biological evolution). Like biological evolution, the more 
complex the object and the ideas, the more marked appeared to be the 
evolutionary process, and the longer it took.
This application of the metaphor of evolution in a situation where phenomena 
that are difficult to describe verbally are being alluded to, is suggestive of uses 
that may exist for metaphor and analogy in communicating some of the tacit 
dimensions of knowledge. Metaphor and (associated) analogy seems far more 
useful in this respect than propositional language, or narrative. Helen Haste’s 
observation that metaphor can provide a ‘bridge between the known and the 
unknown’(1993, p.26) may be extended to encompass ‘the verbalizable and the 
unverbalizable’, surely areas where the boundaries between what is ‘known’ and 
what remains ‘unknown’ become blurred, and merge together by the very fact of 
their mutual incommunicability. This is interesting in that surgical operations 
also ‘evolved’; initial plans and ideas were often adapted for example to account 
for anatomical variations, or variations in actual injuries which had not been 
apparent on radiographs, or when an attempted intervention simply did not work.
Over the course of hours of observation, I became conscious of distinct stages 
that seemed to occur during the ‘evolution’ of these artists’ work. They appeared 
to vary in length both temporally, and in respect of the progress that a particular 
stage may make towards the eventual completion of the piece. Fresh ideas or 
images (or combinations of them) seemed to be used, generated or incorporated at 
these transitional stages.
There may be a link between the individual ‘aspects’ of a piece of work to which 
the artists referred, and these transitional stages that seem to occur in the 
evolution of the work. Perhaps it is the case that a particular stage comes to a 
close once work has been completed (or at least, completed up to a point) in one
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of these aspects or planes. This may offer a clue as to why practitioners seemed to 
prefer to work from a number of 2D pictures rather than from an actual 3D object. 
It may be easier to visualise the planes in isolation from such pictures (ie, one 
picture equals one plane) rather than to break down a solid 3D object into its 
separate planes. It may also explain why practitioners seemed to have to 
concentrate far more upon precise measurements when working from, or trying to 
copy, a 3D model. If only one 2D picture (as opposed to a number showing 
different planes), is available, practitioners may have to experiment, as John’s 
experience with Lord Snowdon’s walking stick showed! Peter’s evidence relating 
to the bull’s head showed moreover that they may be able to fill in the ‘gaps’ in 
the available representations from their own experience (if o f course they are 
representing an object with which they have experience).
Respondents used three nouns (piece, aspect and dimension,) to refer to the 
dimensional sub-division in this respect of a piece of three-dimensional artwork. 
Although strictly speaking these are terms which can be defined differentially, 
they are used in this instance to refer, I think to the same thing (since respondents 
seemed to use them interchangeably). I thus consider that the single term 
‘dimension’ could be usefully substituted for any or all o f them. It would seem 
that, in carrying out 3D tasks, these artists worked in only two ‘dimensions’ at 
any one time. However, whilst doing so, they were apparently somehow able to 
switch their thinking between the part (in 2D) they were working on, and the (3D) 
whole, both in line with transitions between these stages, and also within them. It 
is also possible however that, despite what respondents said about what they did, 
they may nevertheless have been imaging in 3D, but articulating, verbalising 
about only two at a time.
I have attempted to convey a sense o f the complexity of balancing the idea of the 
whole (ie, of a piece of artwork) with that of the part that is presently being 
worked upon. The artist’s task can be seen as ‘swapping’ between part and whole 
as the work progresses. Perhaps this can best be described in terms of series of 
visualisations (except that they are not always necessarily ‘visual’ in nature). 
Perhaps, like Alan Rayner’s (1997) ‘dynamic boundaries’, the boundaries 
between these transitional stages, where the part is linked back to the whole, or to 
the next part of a piece, are in a sense the most important and useful ones in 
seeking an explanation for this process.
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7.5 Evolution, ideas and materials
Ultimately, what can eventually be accomplished is dependent to a great extent 
upon the properties of the materials that are used, and the ways in which they 
behave. When combinations of materials are used, their interactions are also a 
factor. Materials are not necessarily always a limiting factor however, since they 
can generate creativity, as well as constrain what can be achieved. As Peter put it:
Peter: 'Depends on what you got, depends on what you make \
Materials (as well as images) can be combined in novel ways to produce original 
results. Respondents stressed the need to work with the materials, rather than 
merely imposing form upon them. In this way, they too can be said to be ‘organic’ 
in the same sort of way as the process by which objects evolve. They take on a 
life o f their own, and become part of this evolution. The materials and the ideas 
merge together in the production (or evolution) process. This (not always 
expressed) knowledge about the materials that these artists used, brings us on to 
consider the part played by expertise in our unfolding story.
7.6 On expertise: the search for ‘Rightness’ lor visualization in action?)
‘Life ‘s the messy bit... art is where we have the chance o f  getting it right... * 
Jeanette Winterson, 2000
Like Winterson, my respondents frequently spoke of the importance of (and the 
difficulties involved in) getting things ‘right’. Considerable efforts were thus 
directed towards achieving ‘rightness’. In chapter 2, we saw Benner’s (1984) 
description o f how expert nurses would seem to know instinctively which course 
of action was the ‘right’ one to take in a given situation, without necessarily 
being able to explain either why it was ‘right’, or how they had known that it 
would be ‘right’. To artists, this preoccupation with (and sometimes, search for) 
‘rightness’ can be absorbing, and also frantic, frustrating, exciting; indeed it can 
be likened in some ways to experimentation (and can even involve thought or 
practical jexperimentation in a literal sense). In a conversation with John on (his 
favourite) topic of drystone walling, he described it thus:
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John: ‘...well, when you pick up a stone and you place it, it doesn7 mean to say 
its going to go there. And you can throw it to one side and pick up another one. 
And then after a bit the stone that yo u ’ve just thrown down will f i t  somewhere 
else
I elicited mild surprise at this comment, having assumed that drystone walling 
was merely a matter o f piling stones on top of one another. His emphatic response 
was:
John: ‘Oh, no, no... when you ‘re building a stone wall they ‘ve got to sort o f  sit 
right, they’ve got to cross over. You put them on top o f  one another, the next 
thing your wall will be falling down. Oh, its quite an art... but that’s how it is, 
each stone you pick up, it don 7 mean to say you can ju st go along putting it on, 
its not like that... Building a brick wall, you just slap some cement and every 
brick will fit, not like when you ‘re doing stone walling. Its got to... the stone‘s 
got to be right. I t ’s almost like a jigsaw puzzle... i t ’s no good trying to get that 
piece in there i f  it doesn't go... Yes, you see, you know. You think no, that doesnft 
look right there, and you can be... you know, but it just doesn't look right there... 
perhaps you just have to knock a little bit o ff o f it... to f i t  in... no, its got to be 
right’.
Rather like surgery, (or research), in fact! ‘Rightness’ in this sense is perhaps best 
described as chasing an evolving idea (or more likely ideas) as described above, 
rather than necessarily trying to make, or represent an object (although this is 
obviously happening as well on a more practical level). Barbara stressed the 
holistic nature of this feeling. For her, it was not explicitly concerned with the 
individual stages o f a project, but neither did it continue unchanged throughout. 
There was (as described earlier) a sense o f the importance o f the experience and 
familiarity of the artist o f the use of his or her materials, and the ways in which 
they behave, although o f course people experiment with new ones. It is important 
to know what will and will not work, and what to do if  it does not quite work, and 
much of this knowledge can only be gained by experimentation. Speaking of her 
youthful experimentation with various crafts, Barbara described the gaining of 
experience with a technique thus:
%139
Barbara: 7 remember when I  started out, I  remember working in a craft shop. It 
certainly wasn't ‘art’ at that stage. I  used to practice macrame, using finer and 
finer threads, working through the whole range o f  what you can do with a bit o f  
string. I  was searching for a special ingredient... One day, I  was making a 
lampshade using fleece, which didnft lend itself to a linear weave. I  stayed with 
this excitement, a breakthrough from having to use a formal structure.... moving 
on from the craft to the freedom to use it. .. '
This state of rightness it would seem is often although not exclusively related to 
the visual, or what ‘looks right’. Barbara stressed also a sense o f ‘internal 
balance’ that is more important to her than, and precedes, the visual. There seem 
to be many aspects involved in ‘rightness’. It is hard to express in words, and is 
related to expertise. Experts just ‘know’ what looks or feels ‘right’; they strive 
for, and recognise whether or not it has been achieved, even though they may not 
accurately be able to describe, or define it. Thus it can be very difficult to explain 
to others what is ‘right’. In the quote below, Christine was responding to a 
question about how she knew whether or not something was ‘right’ in her own 
field of costume design:
Christine: ‘By the shape, reference to historic style. Emotional style, the feelings 
that something gives you; the colours, tone, texture, what feels right. Colour, like 
djjferent shades in the same colour range. I  can't describe it verbally, not 
accurately. You can only do it by eye, because people would have different ideas. 
When I  used to do my handspun jumpers, I  got Susan to do some o f  the knitting 
up for me. But it didn't work It wasn't her fault. I  couldn't describe to her how to 
put the colours together harmoniously. She got the wrong ones next to each other, 
and I  couldn't explain to her properly what was wrong.. ’
This is a topic which would be very interesting to investigate further in a future 
piece of work. I have not been able to interview novice sculptors for the present 
research, and indeed to have done so would have deviated too far I feel from its 
stated purpose. It is (I have found) very easy to get sidetracked, and to follow 
areas of interest that arise from fieldwork material. However, there comes a point 
where it is necessajy to recognise interesting observations o f this nature as 
precisely that, and relegate them to the realms of future research possibilities.
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7.7 Sculpture as practice: a general synthesis:
This small study is limited both in scope and in duration, and in many ways is 
merely speculative. It is also however very interesting, both for possible further 
investigation as a  future research topic, and in consideration of that of this 
research. Of especial interest is firstly, the various ways in which respondents 
used two-dimensional pictures to help them make complex, three-dimensional 
objects, and the problems that these entailed. Pictures were used by these 
respondents as sources o f ideas, as tools for thinking about aspects of the piece 
under construction at various stages, and as rhetorical devices to persuade clients 
to commission work, but not (apparently) in the sense o f plans or blueprints.
Their use as models for copying directly was also seen to be problematic. 
However, whether this is related to the fact that pictures are two dimensional, and 
‘sculptures’ three, as was apparently indicated by John’s attempts to ‘copy’ the 
walking stick carried by Lord Snowdon in his picture, or rather, as we saw with 
Peter’s and Barbara’s attempts to copy three dimensional objects, whether it is a 
problem with copying more generally, is open to debate.
Respondents preferred to use combinations of images rather than single ones.
This combination or superimposition o f images often took the form of a number 
of pictures used together, each contributing information about some or other 
aspect o f the subject in question. Pictures were also observed or reported 
however, to be used in combination with other types of images, such as three 
dimensional models or the artist’s own mental imagery.
Secondly, and related to this, the study is interesting in its consideration of the 
ways in which we deal with dimensionality and complexity. The idea is put 
forward that, when we are occupied with a complex three-dimensional task, we 
only work with two dimensions at a particular time. This may offer a clue as to 
why numbers of superimposed two dimensional pictures were apparently 
preferred by respondents to single three dimensional models. It would seem 
however that a major concern of respondents using series of superimposed two 
dimensional ‘models’, was with the uncertainty which surrounds the relationships 
(or perhaps as respondents called them at times, the ‘angles’) between these two 
dimensional aspects in respect of the construction o f a three dimensional object.
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The mathematical thinking that is apparently entailed in both this switch between 
dimensions, and the uses that artists made of measurements (and their inherent 
problems), elicited interesting parallels with some of the aspects of surgeons’ 
work reported in the following two chapters. Measurements, it would seem, can 
be used in a veiy precise manner (like an algorithm), or in a far more rough and 
ready fashion (more heuristically), by both ‘artists’ and ‘scientists’. Experienced 
practitioners demonstrated unwillingness to ‘believe’ the evidence of 
measurement if other evidence appeared to contradict this, even if, as we have 
seen here, the respondents had problems in elucidating exactly what this other 
evidence comprised.
This brings us to consideration more generally of things that are difficult to ‘put 
into words’, both in respect of respondents’ experiences, and for my own 
purposes here. David Gooding (1996a, p.92) mapped the complex 
electro-magnetic experiments of Michael Faraday onto matrices, in order to avoid 
to some extent, the constraints of narrative sequencing in communicating these 
complex ideas. Working from records (representations) of real-time processes, he 
claims that he can identify and represent ‘enhancement and consolidation’ 
processes, showing where movements have been made between dimensions, and 
also where abductive inferences to new phenomena have occurred by means o f 
this device. »
Attempting this with some of the present data however resulted in too many 
moves back and forth between dimensions, (reflective perhaps of the contrast 
between historical data and real time events). This resulted in messy, unclear and 
unsatisfactory representations. Faraday’s records (of real-time processes) would 
be expected over time (since they represented some years’ work), to have 
eliminated some of their original complexity, perhaps so that he could then use 
them as tools for further thought or experimentation. They were thus likely to be 
at a considerably more refined (or abstracted) stage of development than the data 
hastily assembled for this pilot study.
Professor Gooding was presumably now able to abstract on still further from 
Faraday’s own representations in the construction of his matrices. The present 
work (or at least this section of it) would require then, considerably more 
refinement and representation before I could produce diagrams of this type. I
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have neither the time nor the space for this here, although it remains an interesting 
possibility for a future piece of research. I would however like to propose the 
following diagram to represent (an initial) visual schema for sculpture:






Fig 2; Diagram proposing an initial schema for sculpture
This diagram is intended to represent the making of a piece of three-dimensional 
artwork from its initial conception to its completion. This is represented as a 
series of stages (by the vertical lines), to indicate the reported ‘evolving’ nature of 
the work. These lines vary in length from left to right to indicate the work’s
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progress towards completion. The diagram is an attempt to encapsulate and 
summarise the evidence about this process put forward by these four artists.
It is time now to turn to surgery.
144
TAKING THINGS APART: OVARIO HYSTERECTOMY - A STUDY OF
SOFT TISSUE SURGERY
‘Writing about work is a way ofgetting close to how people think’
Michael Ondaatje, 2000.
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter and the next, I examine examples from my fieldwork studies of 
veterinary surgery. I begin with observations of the ‘soft tissue* surgical 
procedure of ovario-hysterectomy, or ‘spaying*. These latter terms refer to the 
neutering or desexing of female domestic pets. Surgeons differentiate between 
such ‘soft tissue’ surgery and the orthopaedic operations described in Chapter 9, 
on the basis of the ‘more tactile’ nature of soft tissue surgery. This expression 
refers to the particular importance of touch sense (in addition to vision) in 
carrying out these procedures. I am indebted to US veterinarian and historian 
Susan D. Jones for pointing this out*. Research respondents also alluded to this 
distinction; frequent references were made for instance to the importance of the 
‘feel’ of the organs and tissues during these procedures. My reading and my own 
observations have led me to this conclusion as well. However, Dr Jones put it 
more succinctly than either they or I.
I have used this distinction as the basis for dividing this chapter from the one 
which follows, although as usual, other possible criteria for division or 
categorisation exist. For example, operations can be classified according to the 
location within the body where the procedure is performed (such as thoracic or 
abdominal surgery), or alternatively with reference to particular organs (cardiac or 
hepatic surgery). Surgeons in human medicine specialise along just such lines. 
Veterinary surgeons however rarely specialise in the same sort of way, or to the 
same extent. Another method of categorising different types of surgical 
operations was contributed by BM, a veterinary surgeon research respondent. He 
grouped them according to the circumstances under which they are carried out:
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BM: ‘There are basically two different types o f  procedures. Firstly when you 
have an animal booked in, for example, fo r the removal o f  a mammary tumour. 
You will have done a general health check, discussed the possible implications 
and benefits o f the surgery with the owner, and may well also have carried out a 
precautionary blood profile, chest x-rays and so on. You know more or less what 
you are dealing with. The second type o f  situation is where the animal presents as 
an emergency... You have to start from scratch, take a history, do a physical 
examination, blood tests, x-rays and so on, all in a situation o f  some urgency.... ’
BM was alluding here in the first instance to situations in which any necessary 
diagnostic ‘detective work’ has been done in advance, and the surgeon is in the 
position of carrying out a pre-planned procedure whose outcome is likely to be to 
a large extent predictable. I have termed this ‘Type ‘A’ surgery’. In the second 
instance, he referred to high risk ‘emergency’ situations where surgeons do not 
really know what they are up against, and have to start from scratch. I have 
termed this ‘Type ‘B’ surgery. In such cases, immediate first aid treatment to 
preserve life or relieve pain is often imperative. Only after such measures have 
been carried out will the surgeon try to ascertain the cause of the problem, and 
make decisions based upon this about suitable treatment regimens.
Despite the considerable problems that I experienced with categorising, and 
thereby ordering the topics discussed in my literature review, I nevertheless found 
that categorisation is useful - up to a point - as an analytical tool. I subsequently 
however found it necessary to revise my original attempt, as shown in the 
following matrices (Figs 3 and 4). I initially devised the first matrix (shown in 
Fig 3), based upon both BM’s and Susan D. Jones’ methods o f classifying 
surgical operations. I did this because the indications are that such distinctions 
affect the ways in which surgeons think about the operations they carry out, and 
therefore possibly their bodymapping strategies. For this reason, it would be 
useful to be able to categorise individual surgical procedures quite precisely as 
part of my analysis. I initially considered that all of the procedures discussed 
could potentially fit into one of four categories as shown in Fig 3.
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Eg, surgery to 
repair a broken 
limb
Fig 3; A preliminary matrix for classifying individual surgical operations, 
based upon information provided by two veterinary surgeons (examples of 
surgery given in boxes).
A possible snag with this as a means of categorisation however (which 
incidentally only became obvious once I tried to actually ‘use’ this matrix as a 
tool for classifying individual operations), is that there are a number of variations 
that can be said to exist in relation to what constitutes an ‘emergency’. Currently 
popular UK television documentaries about veterinary surgeons and veterinary 
practice quite frequently feature cases that seem to accord quite precisely with 
BM’s second category (Type B surgery), where animals present requiring 
immediate treatment (often involving surgery) in order to save their lives, for 
example due to injuries sustained in accidents. This mirrors to a certain extent 
popular fictional TV dramas about hospitals and medics^. We could give this 
‘first order’ type of emergency a more specific label of its own. Let us call it a 
‘Type B1 emergency’. However, such cases are comparatively rare; I have never
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actually witnessed one first hand, either during ‘official’ fieldwork periods, or at 
any other time, although I have heard verbal reports from respondents and others 
about these ‘interesting’ cases. I have frequently observed situations where 
animals present with serious, potentially crippling (though not immediately 
life-threatening) injuries, but is this quite what BM meant by ‘emergency’? In 
these ‘second order’ emergency situations, once appropriate first aid measures 
have been carried out, time can usually be taken to decide on the best course of 
action, which may include referral. Let us call these ‘Type B2 emergencies’.
A further difficulty in relation to ‘emergencies’ is that such situations do not 
always arise (or at least they are not necessarily recognised as such) prior to 
surgery. Unexpected complications can manifest themselves at any time, for 
example during the course of the operation itself, or after its completion. This 
third type of emergency’ can occur quite unexpectedly, even in cases where the 
animal concerned has undergone extensive pre-operative investigations, and 
where there was no indication beforehand that difficulties would arise. Such a 
procedure could therefore quite conceivably start out as a Type A case according 
to BM’s classification, but change into a Type B one part way through, which 
would cause obvious difficulties in relation to the matrix. Let us call this a ‘Type 
B3 emergency’. Thus ‘emergencies’ too, are subject to classification!
Each of these different situations would presumably demand from surgeons a 
slightly different response. It might be useful therefore, i f ‘emergency’ situations 
which arise in relation to surgery could be categorised more precisely. I have 
therefore modified the matrix as previously shown in Fig 3 in respect of this, and 
this modification is shown in Fig 4 below:
148
Type A TypeBI Type B2 Type B3
1 2 3 4
More tactile Eg.
emergency Eg.
Eg. spay in the Eg. haemorr
Spay. case of Surgery -hage
male pyometritis for some during
neuter, etc etc types of oper­
cancer ation




Fig 4: A revised matrix for classifying surgical operations, with some
All of the procedures discussed in this chapter and the next will fit quite precisely 
into one or other of the boxes in this revised Fig 4 matrix. The first and second 
examples to be discussed here will thus fit into Box 1, as shown in Fig 5 below. 
The third operation too, started out as a routine Box 1 operation, but due to 
anatomical abnormalities, unforeseen difficulties were encountered. It can 
therefore be reclassified as a Box 4 situation. Of course, it is quite conceivable 
that there are other surgical operations which would not fit easily into this matrix 
either, although it is quite satisfactory for our purposes here. Such is the nature of 
classification! We will revisit the classification of operations, and the matrices in 
chapters 9 and 10, though it is clear that this is not a straightforward matter.
Bowker and Star (1999) found moreover that this uncertainty is a feature of 
‘medical’ classification more generally (even ‘official’ classifications such as the 
International Classification of Diseases as used by the WHO), rather than one that 
is peculiar to my own ‘unofficial’ attempts here. They described the ICD as a
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‘pragmatic’ classification, in that it is evolving, and needs to allow for future 
developments and new discoveries (p.68-69). ‘Pragmatic’ presumably, in the 
same sort of way as my own modest, but evolving attempt!
Type A TypeBI Type B2 Type B3
1 2 3 4
More tactile XX* Eg. x-emergency
Eg. spay in the Eg. Eg.
Spay, case of Surgery haemorr
male pyometritis for some -hage
neuter, etc etc types of during
cancer surgery
Less tactile 5 6 7 8
Eg. Eg.removal of cruciate
dew daw repair
Key: XX* = Operations 1 and 2 X~ = Operation 3
Fig 5: Diagram to show classification of operations 1.2 and 3 within the 
revised matrk
It is time now to leave classification for a while, and think in more detail about 
the ovario-hysterectomy operation itself, and precisely what it involves.
8.2 Ovario-hysterectomv
Ovario-hysterectomy, or ‘spaying’, is a procedure that is routinely carried out 
upon female domestic cats and dogs, principally to avoid unwanted breeding, but 
also (more rarely) to prevent and treat certain serious diseases of the reproductive 
system. It involves the surgical removal of the ovaries, fallopian tubes and uterus, 
through an incision along the ventral midline (usual in bitches) or the flank (usual
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in cats). According to textbook accounts^, this incision should extend (in 
bitches), from the umbilicus (navel) to the pubic symphysis, but as we will see, its 
actual length in practice is subject to some variation. In all o f the operations 
discussed here, these conventional routes of entry were used. I have however 
observed instances where alternatives have been chosen, due either to the 
preference of the surgeon, or a complication in relation to a specific case. For 
example, the respondent BM whom we have already encountered, preferred to 
use the lateral route (ie, via the flank) for spaying both dogs and cats, and some 
surgeons likewise favour the ventral route for both species.
Once the incision is made, the cranial^ part of the reproductive system, (the 
ovaries and fallopian tubes), are first located, then the ovarian ligaments which 
hold these organs tightly in place within the body, along with their associated 
major blood vessels are loosened by pulling, then clamped and ligated (tightly 
tied off with suture material or ligatures to avoid haemorrhage), prior to their 
excision. Then the lower, caudal end of the system (the uterus) is similarly 
located, clamped, and ligated before it is excised above the cervix. After this the 
wound is closed, and the operation is completed. See Fig 6 below which shows 
the canine female reproductive system
In general it takes an experienced surgeon about about fifteen minutes to spay a 
young cat and slightly longer for a bitch puppy. Some half-jokingly pride 
themselves upon how quickly they can cany out these routine procedures^. Less 
experienced surgeons however will take rather longer, and as we will see, even 
experienced ones take more time in the case of older animals, or in other 
situations which are for some reason complicated.
8.3 Preparing for surgery: The production of ‘disciplined* animal-bodies 
and surgeon-bodies.
Before an animal can be spayed, or for that matter, undergo any surgical 
operation, it is necessary that certain, preparatory procedures are first carried out. 
Obviously, the animal requires to be anaesthetised, rendering it immobile and 
unable to feel pain. However, this is only one part of the preparatory process. 
Hirschauer (1991) claimed that, in order for (human) patients’ bodies to be made 












Fig 6: Diagram to. 
view). Reproduced from An Introduction to Veterinary Anatomy and 
Physiology* by A,Rt Michell and PJE, W atkins (1989), with permission of 
BSAVA.
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themselves, be ‘disciplined’ in certain ways. Some of the methods by which this 
is accomplished are outlined below.
Pre-operative preparatory procedures tend to be explained by surgeons in terms of 
their role in maintaining sterility and preventing infection. However, Katz (1981) 
and Hirschauer (1991) proposed a number of possible additional (or alternative) 
roles for these preparations. O f particular interest here, are Pearl Katz’s proposal 
that these behaviours play a role in enabling action to be taken in situations of 
uncertainty, and Hirschauer’s (1991, p.279) observation that anatomical visibility 
is ‘created’ (or constructed) by surgeons by means of these (and other) 
interventions. The self-preparation procedures undertaken by surgeons, such as 
scrubbing-up and gowning, and the pre-operative preparations of animal 
‘patients’ are similar in many respects to those described by Katz and Hirschauer 
for ‘human’ surgery, (or at least, their ‘textbook’ descriptions are; as we will see, 
in actual practice things may be somewhat different).
Large differences were observed for instance, in the extent to which my 
veterinary surgeon respondents prepared themselves to operate. Hirschauer (1991) 
described in great detail the preparations that ‘human’ surgeons undertake, such 
as the ritualized hand washing movements involved in ‘scrubbing up’ (which are 
very different from those involved in everyday hand washing), and also the 
particular ways in which gowns, masks and gloves are put on, which again, are 
not at all the same as donning everyday clothing. These activities form part o f a 
process which he referred to as ‘the disciplining of the surgeon-body’. For 
Hirschauer, surgical operations provided a stage for encounters between two such 
‘disciplined bodies’, that o f the patient and the ‘body of surgeons’ themselves. In 
veterinary surgery however, it would appear that the amount o f disciplining 
required both for surgeons’ bodies (and as shown below, the patients’ bodies 
also) is subject to some degree o f variation.
In everyday practice for example, experienced surgeons rarely observed the strict 
‘scrubbing up’ and ‘gowning’ rituals described in detail by Hirschauer for routine 
operations, and surgical masks and gloves were not consistently worn. Several of 
the surgeons observed wore the same clothing that they had previously worn to 
carry out consultations or other duties prior to surgery, perhaps with the addition 
of a plastic apron. Hand-washing too was in most cases much more perfunctory
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than the ‘ritualised’ scrubbing up movements described by Katz and Hirschauer 
despite the fact that ‘textbook’ descriptions o f  the procedures are similar for  
veterinary surgery to its human counterpart.
As far as preparation of the animal patients is concerned, the anaesthetised animal 
is placed upon the operating table in such a position that the operative site is most 
accessible and visible, its body held in place by items o f equipment intended for 
this purpose. Some or all of the limbs may be tied to the operating table with 
cords, to keep them out of the way, and also to help keep the skin taut, (the skin 
of dogs and cats, particularly young ones, tends to be looser and more mobile than 
that of humans). This precaution ensures that the incision is not inadvertently 
made in the wrong place due to this mobility. Such measures assist in the 
surgeon’s ability to relate the internal anatomy to the external. In addition, 
operating tables may be raised or lowered, and also tilted to allow better access 
and visibility. I have termed these prim ary enhancement procedures.
In the next stage, the entire body of the anaesthetised patient is customarily 
covered with cloths, or ‘drapes’, except for the immediate area where the incision 
is to be made. These drapes normally take the form of rectangular pieces of fabric 
joined with towel clips to effectively create a small ‘window’ through which the 
surgeon will operate. In animal patients, the incision site is shaved, which has the 
effect of further demarcating it from the remainder of the body. The site may be 
further marked by painting it with antiseptic, or even drawing the line of the 
intended incision. I have termed these reduction procedures, since their result is 
that the field o f view, and thus the area of concern, is effectively reduced by their 
application.
I have adapted these terms from Gooding’s (1996a p.80-95) description (and 
depiction) of how representations in science develop by a process of dimensional 
enhancement. This process involves first of all the reduction o f an observed 
phenomenon in the world to a 2D representation. The resulting image is then 
enhanced by the addition o f dimensions, to create first o f  all a 3D structure and 
finally (where causal explanations are sought) a 4D real-time process model. The 
result is a complex mental model that can then be applied to new phenomena.
This application involves in its turn the removal of dimensions, in order to
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generate new representations, or to disseminate observations in the form, say, of 
printed diagrams or photographs in scientific papers.
The processes discussed here are similar in two important ways. Firstly, that a 
complex whole is reduced to a less complex part which is the subject of the 
operation (in this case a surgical operation). The gross anatomy is thus effectively 
‘reduced’ by the means described, to the immediate area of concern. Rather than 
initial reduction however, primary enhancement is required (by means of 
positioning) so that the abdomen (in the case of ovario-hysterectomy) for example 
becomes the most apparent anatomical area. Only by means of this enhancement, 
is the body effectively reduced to the most salient part. This abdomen is in turn 
reduced to the smaller area (by means of shaving, draping etc) which will become 
the incision site. Once the incision is made, the mass of internal organs may in 
turn be ‘reduced’ by various means, to only those of relevance to the procedure in 
hand.
Thus the body is subjected to continuous and alternating processes o f 
enhancement and reduction. Hirschauer (1991 p.299) chose a different metaphor, 
referring to these pre-operative procedures in terms of a process o f ‘targeting’ 
which is later continued by ‘instrumental means’. After the operation is closed 
(literally, with the closing o f the incision by suture, as well as closure being 
achieved in a more cerebral sense at the conclusion of the operation), the 
instruments o f reduction and enhancement are removed one by one, and the 
‘whole’ body restored. Once again, Hirschauer (1991) chose a military metaphor 
for this latter process, that o f ‘retreat’.
A second similarity is that complex process models o f particular surgical 
operation are constructed, and these can later be ‘applied’ to others (one 
respondent referred specifically to ‘a sort o f  library o f cases ' that she had built 
up). They may also lead to the dissemination of images and verbal descriptions o f 
them, for example in the books and journal articles that surgeons circulate and 
use. These similarities may indicate that the phenomenon to which Professor 
Gooding referred is not necessarily limited to innovative scientific discovery, but 
occurs also in more commonplace activities. This idea will be revisited in the 
final chapter.
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Of major interest here is the extent to which these enhancement and reduction 
practices varied between surgeons and between operations, and the identification 
of factors which may help to influence this variation. I examine firstly the roles 
that pre-operative procedures may play apart from the commonly stated one of 
infection prevention. Secondly, I show how vets use what one respondent called 
‘visual aids’ in order to map the internal body, to varying extents depending upon 
their previous personal experience of carrying out the procedure. Thirdly I show 
an instance of how one experienced individual proceeded in a situation of 
uncertainty, in relation to variations that occur in the body’s organs. I do so 
through detailed analyses o f three ovario-hysterectomy operations, carried out by 
two different veterinary surgeons. I am also informed by additional comments 
elicited from two others via interviews. As I pointed out in chapter 6 however, 
these analyses are also based around many additional hours of observation, of 
both these and other soft tissue procedures.
In contrast to the cases from ‘human’ surgery described by Katz and Hirschauer 
(which invariably followed the ‘textbook’ pattern above), I have observed a great 
deal of variation in veterinary practice, in the extent to which pre-operative 
preparations of both patient and surgeon were carried out, in the performance of
j
routine operations such as ovario-hysterectomy. Moreover, as a general rule, such 
variations seemed to occur in line with the amount of actual experience that 
surgeons had accrued in carrying out this procedure. A training video produced 
for student veterinary surgeons and nurses (GDBA 1996), and the principal 
textbook used by trainee veterinary nurses (Lane and Cooper 1994), both show 
pre-operative preparations carried out in line with what I have termed the 
‘idealised’ model similar to that used for ‘human’ surgery, represented in Fig 7. In 
observations o f actual veterinary surgical practice however, it tended to be the 
case that, the more experienced the surgeon, the less time and trouble he or she 
would take over these preparations. Conversely, recently qualified vets performed 
the procedures in a way much closer to this idealised, ‘textbook’ method.
With experienced surgeons, draping was frequently observed to be somewhat 
haphazard. 1 observed its total omission in some soft-tissue operations (though 
not in the case o f spays). I also saw on at least one occasion, the same drapes used 
for successive spay patients, rather than a newly sterile one each time. The 
operating table itself, instead of being thoroughly sterilised to prevent possible
156
cross-infection, was often given the merest cursory wipe between patients. These 
last two points rather challenge the ‘received wisdom’ that these pre-operative 
preparations are essential for purposes of infection prevention.
When questioned about these procedures, respondents nearly always explained 
them in such terms. I would argue however that on occasion, some of the 
measures as they were actually carried out may have increased rather than 
decreased the risk o f post-operative infection caused by the invasion o f the 
wound by micro-organisms, and that, either in addition to or instead of this 
professed purpose, they are used for quite another reason. Despite the apparent 
skimping of these avowedly essential anti-infection procedures, I have seen little 
evidence of post-operative infection. Any problems that did occur tended rather to 
be related to either anaesthesia, to the abnormal or unfamiliar anatomy of 
individual animals, or to disruption of sutures. According to Katz (1981 
pp. 135-136), these purportedly infection-preventing measures were not in any 
case particularly effective in containing the risk of post-operative infection in 
human patients.
Interestingly, I observed that the use of instrumentation too, varied along the 
same lines. Considerably fewer clamps, retractors and so on were used by more 
experienced surgeons for routine surgery than by those with less experience. Fig 
7 below shows what I have called an ‘idealised model’ of pre-operative 
preparations, adapted from information in a textbook for trainee veterinary nurses 
(Lane and Cooper 1994), and a training video aimed at student veterinary 
surgeons and nurses (GDBA 1996), as they could be applied to these soft-tissue 
operations.
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procettiaes Reduction procadur os
Fig 7; Diagram to show an ‘idealised’ model of primary enhancement .and 
reduction procedures used prior to soft tissue surgery.
This purpose of this diagram is to illustrate the use of primary enhancement and 
reduction procedures in an ovario-hysterectomy operation, (from the beginning, 
taken to be the induction of anaesthesia, to the conclusion where the reproductive 
system is successfully removed, and the wound closed), as performed in the 
accepted ‘textbook’ manner. As discussed previously, this model is somewhat 
‘idealised’ in routine veterinary surgical practice, (in that it is taught to novices, 
but not always adhered to by experienced practitioners, hence the title that I have 
given to the diagram). The lines on the left of the diagram are intended to show 
the ‘Primary Enhancement’ procedures relating to positioning, which effectively 
increase or expand the field of view of the site where the operation is to be 
performed. Towards the right of the diagram, this field of view is shown to be 
gradually diminished (indicated by the shortening length of the vertical lines), by 
‘Reduction’ procedures which visually ‘Reduce’ the patient’s body to the portion
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relevant to a specific surgical procedure (in this case, the reproductive system and 
the external area via which it is to be accessed).
I next move on to analyse three instances of ovario-hysterectomy, one of which 
(operation 1) was carried out by a recently qualified surgeon, and the other two 
(operations 2 and 3) by another who had amassed a considerable amount of 
experience. I use observations of these three operations, plus contributions from 
interviews with two other surgeons, to illustrate first of all a proposed alternative 
role that pre-operative procedures may play, apart from the stated one of infection 
prevention; that of providing ‘visual aids’ to help map the body. Secondly I show 
how vets tended to use these aids to varying extents according to their previous 
experience of the procedure. Thirdly, I describe an instance in which one 
experienced individual was confronted with a situation of uncertainty in relation 
to variations that occur in the body’s organs, and show the strategy that he used to 
deal with this
8.4 Operation 1: Using ‘visual aids’
The following is an extract from my field notes, quoted verbatim, though 
annotated as necessary:
26 February 1999:
James operating; Australian, young a bit nervous (of being observed). Doesn 't 
talk much, but will answer questions. Felt slightly reluctant to ask too many, for  
fear o f  unduly distracting him. Tanya, vet nurse, more forthcoming
Bitch spay/ umbilical hernia repair, young Jack Russell bitch.
Bitch anaesthetised, then nurse shaved ventral area, swabbed with antiseptic
n
solution. Animal placed in dorsal recumbency in a special *cradle * (or support), 
hind legs tied to operating table to allow access to operative site. Patient then 
carefully draped, leaving only operative site visible. James scrubbing up 
fastidiously whilst all this is happening, put on gown, gloves, mask, cap. Tanya 
asked to help with fastenings - difficult, since she was occupied already with 
preparing the patient.
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Incision using scalpel, scissors, forceps, umbilicus to pubic symphysis. First 
exposes hernia (small), pushes back Isolates and ligates right uterine horn, 
fallopian tube, ovary, excises craniallyfi. Nurse offers to tilt table ‘to get rid o f  
that spleen ’ which is partially obscuring the reproductive organs. Offer accepted, 
does so. Spleen slides upwards away from operative site. At this point, various 
tissues, skin layers etc held apart by forceps, retractors, etc. Wound held open.
Vet inserts gauze into wound, isolating. Explains when asked that it is to ‘hold the 
intestines down, more a visual aid than anything else’. Ligates left hand part o f  
repro system, detaches from blood vessels etc cranially.
James then moves gauze, using it to effectively close wound, uterine horns etc 
held by instruments outside incision, still attached caudallyP. Uterine body then 
clamped, tied o ff excised Gauze pad then removed. Prepares to close incision, 
inner layers first. Tissue held clear o f  internal organs by means offorceps..
Closes upper layers, cleans seeping blood o ff area around wound in order to see 
better. Woundfinally closed, legs untied, clips and drapes removed’
This procedure is similar to that which follows (operation 2), in that it is a 
category 1 operation as related to the revised matrix shown in Fig 4. However, 
whilst it is similar in many respects (in that it proceeds in an uncomplicated 
fashion, no difficulties being encountered with the anaesthetic, the 
instrumentation or the anatomy), it will become clear that there are nevertheless 
differences also between the two procedures. For example, operation 1 was 
considerably longer in duration than operation 2, and as the above excerpt clearly 
shows, the pre-operative sterility procedures, as related to both the animal’s body 
and the surgeon’s body (Hirschauer 1991) were carried out in a particularly 
thorough ‘textbook’ manner here, although there was nothing at all to suggest that 
this case posed a particularly high risk with regard to infection, or was other than 
routine in every respect.
Such thoroughness on James’ part in fact caused a small problem, for unlike 
‘human’ surgeons, vets do not usually have large teams of nurses and junior 
surgeons to assist them. As a rule there is just one surgeon who carries out the 
actual operation, and one assisting nurse, who is responsible for preparing the 
patient, monitoring the anaesthetic and performing any other tasks required. This 
was the case here. However, one assistant can only do one thing at a time, and
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there was an awkward moment when Tanya was asked to assist James with his 
gown whilst she was already occupied with preparing the animal for surgery. She 
had to temporarily abandon this task in order to tie the gown and help James to 
put on his ‘sterile’ gloves. This would clearly have compromised the sterility of 
the gloves and thus that of James, since Tanya had not previously scrubbed up 
herself, and had in addition been engaged in performing ‘dirty’ tasks such as 
shaving the operative site.
These elaborate preparations may be due to the fact that James had completed 
his training only relatively recently, and aspects of it were still fresh in his 
mind. Related to this, it could indicate that, as a ‘competent’ performer who 
had yet to achieve a significant measure of ‘proficiency’ or ‘expertise’ in 
relation to this procedure, he still had to remember ‘the rules’ for carrying it out 
(Dreyfus 1986; Benner 1984). However, there appears to be more to this than 
mere ‘rule following’ behaviour, since in addition to the standard ‘primary 
enhancement and reduction procedures’ of positioning, shaving, draping and so 
forth, James added a ‘further enhancement procedure9 of his own. He used 
swabs to cover and thereby to some extent conceal those internal organs that he 
was not directly concerned with for the purposes of this operation. This 
creative, constructive act, shown illustrated in Fig 8 below, draws an interesting 
parallel with the ways in which illustrations in anatomical atlases are 
constructed, where organs which are not ‘part’ of the particular system that is 
the subject o f the illustration are not shown in the illustration, even i f  this 
requires that they are dissected out from the cadaver prior to the photographs 
being taken
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Fig 8: Diagram to show James’ addition of a ‘further enhancement 
procedure’JshownJowards the right of the diagr am), in this case, the 
covering of organs unrelated ti) the procedure in hand (termed by 
respondent as a ‘visual aid’)*
Hirschauer (1991) referred to ways in which actual bodies are made to resemble 
(and thus ‘merge with’) the pictures in anatomical atlases from which ‘they’ are 
learned, and this appears to be related to what James was doing in this instance. 
When I asked him about this use of swabs, James replied that it was ‘more a 
visual aid than anything else It appears that it may have been one of his own 
devising. I have since asked several vets whether they have ever done this, or seen 
anyone else doing it, maybe in a practical class at university. None had. One 
informant, JH, replied particularly vehemently to the contrary:
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JH: ‘No, not gauze, I ’ve never heard o f  that. I ’d be concerned that using gauze 
swabs in that way would cause the wound to dry out too much, that it might be 
harmful, cause adhesions. Anyway, once you ‘ve got the uterus exteriorised, you 
can just see it... can ‘tyou? ’
It might be useful to examine other examples at this point, in*order to effect a 
comparison between James’ approach to this task, and that of others.
8.5 ‘Bodymapping for beginners*: learning the trade
Experienced vet JH spoke here about learning new procedures:
JH: ‘You have to start with the basic anatomy, and what the procedure actually 
is, like a textbook description o f  how its done and so on. You need to watch a  
procedure 2 or 3 times; there are people who will dive straight in, but I  would 
always want to watch someone else do at least one..., then do it. Maybe i f  you ‘re 
lucky you can assist first... ’
When asked specifically about spays, she added:
JH: ‘You need to have watched, felt things like the tension on the ovarian 
ligaments when assisting. And when you do the first one, its good to have 
someone there to advise i f  you get stuck. ’
JH’s insistence on the importance of ‘feeling’ as well as ‘watching’ suggests the 
importance of eyes and hands in performing these ‘tactile’ procedures. Her 
comment also shows the importance o f social, or enculturational aspects of 
learning, as well as the ‘algorithmic’ ones. It is probably impossible to describe 
exactly in a textbook account (or even to represent visually in some other way, for 
example by drawing) exactly how the ovarian ligaments feel, even though it is 
perfectly feasible to describe the mechanics o f the procedure verbally, and to 
draw the structure and paths of the ligaments themselves. This latter point calls to 
mind Collins’ (1974) account of scientists’ inability to build a working laser of a 
certain type without recourse to personal interaction with a community of laser 
builders, and may help explain JH’s emphasis on the importance to her of
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‘watching’ and ‘assisting’ another surgeon prior to carrying out an unfamiliar 
procedure herself.
Another respondent (RH) reported how, many years previously, shortly after he 
had started his first job, he had been shown by his practice principal how to judge 
exactly where to make the incision for a cat spay by drawing an imaginary 
triangle from the hip to the top of the femur. The third point of the triangle is 
where the incision is made. I asked JH if she was familiar with this, or any other 
rules for relating the inside of the body to aspects of it that can be seen or 
palpated externally, and if  such rules form part of the formal surgical education 
that vets undergo, or alternatively whether they are passed on more informally 
between colleagues. JH replied:
JH: 7 haven 7 heard that one, but there are others; you don‘t use the hip, you feel 
the top o f the tuber ischiae, and you use the distance between the joints in your 
thumb to just judge the right place
Her answer ‘there are others ’, plus the necessarily approximate technique 
described, of using the distance between the joints in one’s thumb (such a 
distance being variable presumably, with the vaiying size of practitioners’ 
thumbs), to judge the point of entry seemed to indicate that such heuristics are 
part of the informal body o f knowledge of veterinary surgery, rather than being 
inscribed in formal terms. Of course, these are not absolute categories; ‘formal’ 
textbook knowledge must after all contain implicit, informal elements, or it would 
not be possible to apply it in actual practice. Likewise, informal’ knowledge (or at 
least some elements of it) may be inscribed in formal terms, for example by 
writing it down (Pinch et al 1996).
Whilst she was speaking, JH was looking intently at the surface of the table, and 
making movements upon a very small area of it with the point of a pencil. She 
continued:
JH: ‘ You need to remember how moveable the skin is, and that what is 
underneath it doesn 7 necessarily move. I  remember being taught, I  don 7 
remember whether it was at college or in practice, you have to pull the legs back 
and tie them to the table to keep the skin taut, stop it from moving about ’
164
JH was reminiscing, in part, about her training days. However, ‘book’ learning 
merges over time with one’s own experience knowledge (presumably in a similar 
sort of way to that in which actual bodies come to merge with anatomical pictures 
in the course of surgical operations), and it becomes therefore difficult to see or to 
remember where the boundaries between formal and informal knowledge lie. Her 
movements with the pencil point upon the surface of the desk as she spoke 
seemed to indicate the difficulty of talking, or even thinking about these matters 
outside of actually performing them. Knowledge may be inscribed in skilled 
practice itself.
Formal and informal training and learning do not cease upon gaining initial 
qualifications, or license to practise. Learning new techniques is after all a 
continuous process, even for those persons who already have some degree o f 
‘expertise’ like JH. It is important to take on board that ‘expertise’ is specific, to 
specific procedures and contexts. Certain elements of it may be transferable 
directly (Pinch, Collins and Carbone 1996). However, there is scope for 
considerable further research in order to determine more precisely the nature of 
these elements.
JH went on to describe a specialist training course in which she had recently 
participated:
JH: ‘You can use mock-ups for some tkings; like I  went on a coarse the other 
week on laparoscopic techniques for horses, like fo r  colics and so on. We 
practised using the endoscope with a plastic box with holes cut in it to represent 
the horse ‘s abdomen; looking around with the endoscope, and practising 
manipulating instruments. Sometimes you can practise new techniques on dead 
animals... ’
In common with other professionals, such as ‘human’ medics, nurses and 
teachers, veterinary surgeons are required to participate in continuing professional 
development (CPD) programmes. This becomes especially important in respect o f 
technology such as endoscopes whose use is relatively new in general veterinary 
medicine. JH’s account mirrors (though obviously in a rather less sophisticated 
way), the use o f virtual reality simulators to teach complex new procedures to 
surgeons in ‘human’ medicine, thus avoiding the need to practice on actual
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patients (Taffinder 2000)^. This is an example of a formal learning situation; 
outside of this, considerable informal learning and instruction goes on. Events 
such as conferences, local association meetings and other social gatherings 
provide the opportunity for interaction, and therefore also opportunities for 
knowledge to be passed between colleagues. Other ‘informal’ learning goes on 
inside veterinary practices themselves. Accounts of such learning are shown in 
chapter 9.
In the following short excerpt, I refer to the reported experiences o f a novice 
surgeon. Richard, a fourth year veterinary student was on placement from 
university during one of my observation periods, ‘seeing practice’ (as it is 
termed) with one of my collaborators. He described how, although he had not 
‘done anatomy’ at college for two years, he still ‘practised’ on his family’s pet 
dog at home, identifying the anatomical structures that can be palpated from the 
exterior, and also the various incision sites for particular operations. He 
described how he and his fellow students used this method as an aid to revision 
for examinations and practical assessments, often in conjunction with a textbook. 
In my own teaching, of anatomy to veterinary nurses, I have also used live 
animals as ‘visual aids’ (although ‘visual’ is probably an inadequate term to 
describe something which is both ‘visual’ and ‘tactile’ in this way), for example 
encouraging the students to identify the individual bones in a diagram of the 
skeleton by gently feeling those of a tame live animal.
Discussing anatomy, Richard outlined his own problem as a beginner with far 
less experience than James:
Richard: I t looks totally different in books... when you actually come to an op, 
i t ’s hard to tell what is what, even though lean actually sit and draw the paths 
o f the major blood vessels and soon ...’
Richard’s remarks illustrate the initial difficulty that novices experience in 
relating their ‘book learning’ to actual practice; the crucial differences that exist 
between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ (Polanyi 1958). Hirschauer (1991) 
referred to this question of how surgeons learn anatomy, and how patients’ 
bodies are related to, (or become merged with), anatomical representations o f it. 
It would appear that they learn the discipline of anatomy by rote, from books,
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pictures and other representations of it. Actual bodies however are related to such 
representations in practice, perhaps by similar methods to the simple one 
described above. It would seem that it is necessary that patients’ (and surgeons) 
bodies themselves be disciplined (Hirschauer 1991) in order to achieve this. 
Richard’s comments, and also those of JH indicate that much o f a surgeon’s 
skills are acquired outside of what counts as ‘formal’ training, even through the 
actual practice of operating itself.
8.6 Operation 2: From novice to expert
It may be useful at this point to consider the procedure as it is carried out by a 
practitioner who is something of an ‘expert’, (this is my designation, not his 
own). RH is a veterinary surgeon ‘q f  some thirty years experience ’ (on his own 
estimation). I was able to watch RH perform this operation on some twenty 
occasions, and it is probably fair to say that this procedure, together with male 
neutering and dental work made up the bulk of the surgical operations that he 
carried out during the observation period. As a rule, RH’s spay operations were 
of very short duration, as shown in the following extract:
Bitch spay, French bulldog. Anaesthetic by injection, endotracheal tube also
17inserted due to breathing difficulties that brachycephalic breeds often have... 
Shavedforelimb. Vein a bit harder to find  than normal, as skin b lack^ ,but no 
problem. Placed in dorsal recumbency, in cradle, shaved, swabbed, draped, one 
hindlimb tied to table. Incision: scalpel first, through skin, then scissors ‘There‘s 
that spleen again RH again pointed out danger o f  nicking spleen i f  not careful. 
Found uterine horn straight away, pulled to break ligament, clamped, ligated, 
excised cranial to ovary, repeat other side. Then body o f  the uterus, clamped, 
ligated cranial to cervix, excised. Stitched two layers. Very quick RH: 75 
minutes, that's not bad'.
For RH, pre-operative procedures, as related to both the patient and to his own 
person, were fairly perfunctory for spay and other routine operations. Apart from 
this, other major differences in his performance as compared to that of James 
related to the amount of time taken to complete the procedure (much quicker), the 
number and type of instruments used (fewer), and the size of the incision 
(smaller). RH habitually used an incision barely half the size o f the one made by
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James, and incidentally recommended in the training video. A consequence of 
this is a smaller wound, from which the animal would recover far more quickly, 
and in addition, fewer stitches to cause problems in the immediate post operative 
period.
Instead of the usual rectangular drapes joined with towel clips, which effectively 
close off the field o f view except for the rectangular ‘window* through which the 
operation takes place, RH used what he called ‘spay cloths’, squares or rectangles 
of green cotton fabric of varying sizes, with a small slit carefully cut out and 
hemmed round in the centre. RH’s field of view was therefore correspondingly 
much smaller than James’s, (limited that is to what could be seen through the slit 
in the fabric), presumably to account for his smaller incision. It was so small in 
fact, that I seriously doubt whether the internal organs were rendered anything 
like fully visible at all, though this seemed to matter little to RH. The following 
excerpt (taken from observation notes relating to a cat spay) illustrates this quite 
nicely:
RH: .see, that's the ovaries... i f  you can find  them, there, the rest o f  it is easy... * 
Self: ‘But you can’t see. How do you know i f  you are fishing out the right bit? I  
mean, you could have intestines or something. . '
RH: But you can see... it looks different.., you just go in between the two.... This 
fa t is very solid at the top, and the other is very sort o f loose, omental fa t at the 
bottom. You just go in between these two.... and it looks different, it ys got very big 
blood vessels and very thin.., and that looks completely different^...
RH was missing my point entirely here. I know very well the difference between 
ovarian ligaments and intestines - once I see them - but I do not know if I would 
see them through a very small cut (in length not much more than the diameter of a 
2p coin) in the side of a cat. I would surmise that RH worked as much by memory 
and by touch sense as by vision. Although he insisted that he could ‘see’, I am not 
at all sure that he meant this in any literal sense relating to visual perception. The 
phrase ‘I see’ can after all mean far more than this. Also, he often alluded to the 
use of other senses; for example the ‘feel’ of the tension of the ovarian ligaments, 
and the ‘click* sound that you listen for in order to ascertain whether this ligament 
has broken as required. It would seem that, for RH, perceptual data as relating to
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spay operations were in some respects merged together, and merged also with 
other information encoded in memory.
RH generally used ‘spay cloths’ of different sizes for cats and for dogs, although 
sometimes he ran out of one sort, and indiscriminately used the other. On one 
occasion, he used the same cloth for a number of spays carried out on both cats 
and dogs, one after the other. When asked about the importance of drapes, RH 
was quite insistent that they are essential Vo keep hair out o f  the wound and 
prevent infection He appeared not to notice however that on this particular 
occasion, the operation was almost completed before the nurse had produced the 
requested cloth.
This differential use o f what (after Gooding 1996a)l have termed ‘enhancement 
and reduction procedures’ by the relatively inexperienced vet, and by an 
experienced surgeon seems to indicate that these procedures may play some role 
in mediating uncertainty. James appeared to need to use visual aids in order to see 
the various internal organs ‘as’ intestines, ovarian ligaments and uterus (Miller 
1996). Whilst RH ostensibly paid little attention to this ‘problem’ of identifying 
and differentiating individual organs, (which was generally so unproblematic for 
him that he, despite his willingness to discuss any aspect of his work, or for that 
matter anything else, seemed to find it difficult to talk much about this topic at 
all), he nevertheless placed great emphasis upon the possible hazards that the 
operation might hold for the animal.
For example, he ‘saw that’ (Miller 1996) there was a need to avoid inadvertently 
nicking the spleen with a sharp instrument. The spleen is a large, red organ full o f 
blood, which is responsible among other things for the manufacture of many of 
the types o f blood cells present in the circulation. Such an accident might well 
prove fated to the animal patient, since it would be very difficult, perhaps 
impossible to arrest a haemorrhage from this organ during surgery. On several 
occasions he (and also other respondents) mentioned this concern. RH avoided 
the use o f the scalpel as much as possible for this procedure on account of this 
perceived risk, preferring to use scissors and / or his fingers (as he termed it 
‘blunt dissection’). In James’ case however, it had apparently been necessary for 
the (experienced) nurse to gently remind him of this hazard by offering to tilt the 
table ‘to get rid o f  that spleen \
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Another important concern with this procedure is the need to check the stumps of 
the tied off ovarian ligaments (and their associated blood vessels) for bleeding, 
and the security of the ligature:
RH: ‘Always need to check the stumps, make sure they ’re not bleeding before I  let 
go, because once I  let them go they disappear right up around the kidneys, I  
wouldn't fin d  them again. Some vets will actually tag them before they let them 
go...'
RH was seemingly able to concentrate his attention upon the real hazards entailed 
in this routine procedure, because he no longer needed to devote mental resources 
to imposing sense and order upon the internal anatomy during this surgery. For 
RH, it would appear that this had passed into the realms of the tacit. His response 
to my question about the possibility o f mistaking lengths of intestine for ovarian 
ligaments indicated this; it was not an issue, so not worthy of mention, or 
presumably even thinking about. James, in contrast, seemed to have to bring 
virtually all o f his resources to bear upon this problem of organ location and 
identification, apparently leaving little available for other considerations. The 
respondent JH spoke of the way in which she had built up a sort of ‘personal 
library’ of cases over time. Presumably, the more comprehensive is a particular 
section in one’s personal library, the less attention need be paid to elementary 
texts!
The ‘enhancement and reduction’ procedures described in the examples above, 
appear to be one means by which bodymapping is accomplished, and it would 
seem that, the less experienced the surgeon, the more necessary (and the more 
elaborate) are these procedures. Another potential ‘aid’ is the use of language. 
Pinch et al (1996) showed how their surgeon respondents talked their way 
through the processes of identifying various organs and tissues in situations of 
uncertainty. I too have observed this, and describe such a situation in the account 
of operation 3 below. A problem which may precipitate this behaviour relates to 
variations that can occur in the size, and even the position of internal organs. As 
JH put it:
JH: *There is a lot o f variation in dogs, like the different breeds and sizes. I f  you 
do a German Shepherd the first time, it won‘t be much like the Yorkshire terrier
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you get next! And there‘s a lot o f variation in cats, too. The size o f  the uterus will 
vary, it might be in season and so forth... ’
AndRH:
RH: Tn dogs there‘s a huge variation; it depends on the size or breed o f  the dog 
and the fatness o f the dog. This one, because she‘s young and quite skinny, 
they're quite small'
Apart from these ‘normal’, or expected variations that occur along the lines o f 
breed, size and reproductive cycles, are other, rarer ones, related to abnormalities 
in individual anatomy, as shown in the next section.
8.7 Operation 3: When things go wrong - ‘words speak louder than actions’,, 
or the use of verbalisation in making sense of perceptual experiences
Skilled ‘operators’ in this sense, as in others, often seem able to perform a 
familiar procedure almost without thinking about it; the skill has passed into the 
realms of the tacit. Only when things do not go as expected, or the surgeon 
encounters something unfamiliar, does the skill regain visibility. RH habitually 
chatted about unrelated matters; his family, sport, films, music, TV programmes 
and other cases to give a few examples, as he daily performed these routine 
operations. He positively welcomed conversation and company whilst he was 
operating. He would chat to anyone present - myself, a veterinary student, the 
nurse, even (on one occasion) the owner of an animal upon which he was 
operating, about all sorts of topics. Off-task talk is of interest here because the 
indications are that no actual bodymapping is going on whilst surgeons are 
discussing other matters, or making casual social conversation. Only at certain 
points did RH appear to have to really concentrate upon the task in hand. The 
parts of the operation requiring particular focus of attention was the incision, then 
the location and ligation of the ovarian ligaments (as reported by the respondent). 
At these points, off-task talk would generally cease. This followed a pattern that 
was also observed when other experienced surgeons carried out the procedure’
When the situation demanded it, RH immediately switched back to task. In the 
following exerpt, he was observed to cease off-task chat and switch to an
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alternative use of language, as a sort of personal ‘bodymapping aid’. Present on 
this occasion were RH himself, Ella (an overseas veterinary student), a veterinary 
nurse (VN) and myself. I have highlighted the bodymapping language in bold 
type.
G S D ^  spay with mammary tumour removal Intravenous induction; animal
17difficult to restrain. Once induced , dorsal recumbency in cradle, hindlimbs tied 
to table. VN started to shave area, and dog started to wake up, ‘went really 
light RH gave more anaesthetic, and in tu b a te d E l la  swabbed area with 
yellow antiseptic... Incision, scalpel, then tore with fingers (RH couldn (t fin d  
scissors, and does so worry about ‘that spleen ). Fat anim alR H  felt deep inside 
fo r  ovaries ‘very deep down near the back9. Feeling. ‘Can 9t get the ovaries 
out... very tight.,, 9 (enlarged incision slightly)... *Is that a lump there... or just 
fa t9? RH finds ovary, ligates. Chatting about the next case at this point. 
Exteriorized one side o f  repro system, cleaning site with a swab.
Back on task again, other ovary also difficult to get out. ‘Try and get this other 
ovary out, won ‘t come out... very welL.9
VN.~ ‘Is that because its so deep? ’
RH: ‘Yeah, and its so tight... doesn *t feel very good... doesn ‘t feel right..,
attached in an odd way; I 9ll do the body (of the uterus) and then go back to it...
Clamped body, ligated Lots o f  clamps in place, lots o f  bleeding leaky vessels, 
swabbing site.
RH: ‘Just this nasty ovary now... afraid to pull too much, in case it tears off... 
oh goodness, it doesn 7 feel nice...
VN: Does it have cancer or something?
RH: No I don 7 think so, but its very friable underneath. Normally there9s a 
distinct ligament that you can break.... that9s alright I  think I 9ve got it .(more 
swabbing) ‘...big cyst on this ovary, but its a real big area altogether. Its a 
rather unusual shape., try to tie it off without too much fa t in it..when you9ve 
got too much fat, it tends to slip... ‘ (more clamps, more swabbing) ‘better tie all 
this fa t off as well.9
Ella moves drape aside to enable RH to see better. He excises the repro system, 
separates from body. Sticks odd bits o f  fa t back into the wound. Suturing ‘not 
bleeding, that9s fine....9 Carried on suturing lower layers, then skin layer. Moved
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table to a higher position. Back hurts, long tense procedure. 7  like to do the op 
really low, and then the stitching higher. Its hard to get right in i f  its high Now 
suturing... Last stitch. Quite a long op, hard work, (RHneeded to concentrate 
more than usual,~first time I ’ve heard him tbodymapping, out loud) Still doing 
it;
*Had a very odd ovary, very peculiar, thought it would bleed.... unless you open 
it all up this big, you can *t do it all inside,.., very cystic, no proper ligament... *
RH, who routinely chatted about varied (and often unrelated) topics during 
surgery, found it necessary to map the body almost in a similar sort o f way to 
James on this occasion where a ‘routine’ operation revealed itself to be anything 
but. Some of RH’s talk seemed to be in response to the questions of the veterinary 
nurse and the veterinary student who were also present, but bodymapping talk is 
not necessarily directed at another person. Hirschauer (1991) described how 
surgeons sometimes explain surgical problems to others present in order to 
develop their own thoughts, and referred to a German surgical textbook which 
expressly stated the usefulness of such ‘thinking out loud’^ .
This particular procedure had started out as a ‘routine’ operation for which 
pre-operative examinations had been carried out (Type A surgery according to the 
respondent BM, fitting into Box 1 of the matrix in Fig 3). However, as it 
progressed, it became clear that it was in reality a Type B situation (Box 4 
according to Fig 3). It is possible that RH may have had some prior misgivings 
about how this particular operation would proceed. He had often expressed 
anxiety about performing the operation (or indeed, any operation) upon fat 
animals such as the one in question, and had referred more than once 
to the fatness of this particular animal both prior to, and during the procedure.
RH’s uncharacteristic verbal bodymapping behaviour was due (I would surmise) 
to the unfamiliar and ambiguous nature of the anatomy. Instead of relying upon 
‘visual aids’, (it was too late to apply or reapply the visual enhancement and 
reduction procedures previously described - which had as usual been perfunctory 
in RH’s case - since the problem occurred only once the operation was under 
way), he made use of language, bodymapping talk. Perhaps also, visual aids are 
not especially effective in instances such as this where the problem is to tiy to 
relate encountered ‘abnormal’ anatomy to the learned ‘normal’ anatomy of
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textbooks. In any event, RH talked his way through the procedure in this situation 
where he encountered an anatomical variation that was unfamiliar to him. He 
was apparently using language by way of a ‘further enhancement procedure’.
There are parallels here also with the student Richard’s painstaking comparisons 
of ‘textbook anatomy’ with the ‘actual anatomy’ of his pet dog, when revising for 
examinations. Hirschauer (1991 p.279) wrote o f ‘the relation of experience to 
representation’, in the sense of ‘how patients bodies come to embody the 
properties of anatomical pictures’. RH had by this point long ago lost any need to 
use physical images such as anatomical pictures (at least in relation to this 
particular procedure). He had internalised canine and feline reproductive 
anatomy, to such an extent that for most of the time, it seemed hardly worthy of 
mention. It had become part of the personal ‘mental library’ (as spoken of by JH), 
which is available for experienced practitioners to draw upon. What RH may have 
been doing though, was ‘adding to’ this library; merging this new variation with 
the mental anatomical representations available to him of reproductive anatomy, 
in the light of this new experience.
RH’s verbal bodymapping ceased once initial problems were resolved (in locating 
the first ovaiy), when he reverted to his customary off-task chat. However, he 
returned to bodymapping talk again when further difficulties were encountered in 
finding and dealing with the second ovary. This switching between off- and on- 
task talk as occasion demanded it was observed on several occasions and in 
different respondents. Interestingly, these surgeons all had considerable 
experience in carrying out the procedures involved. Inexperienced respondents 
such as James used very little off-task language, and neither were they observed 
to ‘bodymap’ out loud. Obviously, so few observations cannot be generalised, but 
it would appear that for these respondents at least, language was more likely to be 
used as a bodymapping strategy by those who used correspondingly fewer visual 
aids. I have modelled RH’s use of language alongside visual enhancement and 
reduction procedures in Fig 9 below.
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Primary enhancement Further enhancementReduction procedures
Fig 9; Tq show the use of primary-enhancement and reduction procedures, 
further enhancement procedures (in this case, the use of language) in.an 
ambiguous situation (operation 3), by the respondeat RH,
This diagram shows how RH’s strategy for dealing with an uncertain situation 
both resembled, and differed from both that of James, and also that shown in the 
‘idealised model’ (Fig 7). The primary enhancement, and especially the reduction 
procedures, were less stringently applied (as indicated by the shorter length of the 
relevant lines in comparison with Figs 7 and 8). However, in this complicated 
situation, RH (like James in the routine one recounted earlier) used a further 
enhancement procedure (although in this case language, rather than a ‘visual aid’) 
to assist in dealing with it. Further enhancement procedures are discussed more 
fully in the next chapter.
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The importance o f touch-sense in addition to vision is particularly well illustrated 
in this episode. RH expressed concern on more than one occasion that the 
animal’s reproductive organs did not ‘feel right’. Although he had enlarged the 
incision, it was still not possible for him to actually see the troublesome ovary, 
due both to the still relatively small size of the incision, and the abnormalities in 
the shape, size and position of the ovary.
Another interesting point arising from this observation, is the way in which RH 
temporarily abandoned one aspect of the task that he was having trouble with (the 
second ovary), and turned instead to another aspect (removing the caudal part of 
the reproductive system). Once this was successfully accomplished, he then 
returned to the problematic area, and successfully completed this aspect also. 
David Klahr (2000) showed similar occurrences in relation to experiments where 
subjects were asked to solve computer programming problems. When 
investigating a confusing aspect of an experimental solution, his participants 
momentarily deferred this investigation, and switched instead to exploring a 
different aspect. Klahr described this behaviour in terms of what he called the 
PUSH (put up on stack) heuristic, and proposed that its use allows the generation 
and activation of novel ideas and solutions in ‘experimental’ situations. This 
situation could indeed be thought about as ‘experimental’ for RH, in that it was 
not the same as any he had previously encountered, and for a short while at least, 
he could not predict the outcome with any degree of certainty.
8.8 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter I have discussed some of the ways in which surgical operations are 
categorised or classified by surgeons. I have devised (and revised) a matrix to 
enable individual procedures to be categorised in relation to two methods of 
classification that were suggested by veterinary surgeon respondents. This may be 
important because ways in which practitioners themselves classify or categorise 
the tasks they cany out, may yield some insight into differences in the ways they 
think about, and approach them. As we have previously seen however, difficulties 
occur in instances where categories (any categories) are applied too stringently. 
The respondent BM’s classification o f surgical cases into emergencies and 
non-emergencies for example is unhelpful i f  attempts are made to apply it
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absolutely, due to different understandings that are possible in relation to the term 
‘emergency’.
O f course, its application in this manner was never envisaged nor intended by 
BM. His emergency / non-emergency distinction was a spur-of the-moment one, 
made in the course of a brief telephone conversation. It was a rule of thumb, an 
heuristic. Most of the time it works, but there will be some instances where it 
does not. Such heuristics are used by experts within a form-of-life in precisely 
this way, as a means by which uncertainty can be quickly be mediated, thereby 
allowing effective (and immediate) action to be taken.
Heuristics also aid in the communication of knowledge within a form-of-life. RH 
and JH also contributed their own heuristics, relating to where the incision should 
be made for a cat spay operation via the flank. They are not absolute rules; they 
cannot be, since RH and JH each contributed different ones. JH explicitly termed 
them ‘rules of thumb’, and stated that others exist. Such rules are only of limited 
use to novices such as Richard, and even competent performers like James still 
for much of the time require rules which are much more hard and fast - 
algorithms - context-free rules which can be successfully applied in all situations. 
In ‘normal’ situations, where ‘the rules’ (algorithmic rules) are followed, 
procedures can thereby be successfully carried out by those with limited 
experience. Of course, it takes a long time to abide by ‘the rules’, and one is 
thrown in situations where aspects of the world (or in this case, aspects of 
anatomy) fail to do likewise.
What I have done in my attempts to classify surgical operations, is to show what 
happens when ‘the rules’ are applied rigidly, in the manner for example of 
Richard or James at the time of these observations. For example, the matrix 
could be thought about as an algorithm, or context-free rule that would work in 
every situation (as in Fig 3 perhaps). Difficulties soon arose however when I 
attempted to apply it to actual cases, particularly ambiguous ones, such as RH’s 
second operation. In this situation, although the procedure started out as seeming 
to fit perfectly well into a category, it quite quickly became obvious that it did 
not. If thought about in this way, the matrix (particularly the first version, shown 
in Fig 3) is misleading, or a failure in respect o f the classification of surgical 
operations. However, the matrix could equally well be considered heuristically,
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which is what I have attempted to do in Fig 4. This device is more flexible and 
inclusive, at least in respect of the meaning of the term ‘emergency’.
Like this, it can be thought about as a rule of thumb that will work for most cases 
(indeed all o f those considered here), but not necessarily for all possible cases. As 
I pointed out earlier, it is perfectly conceivable that there are other operations 
which would not fit into any of the eight categories of the revised matrix in Fig 4. 
However, this version allows for more variation, and can still work even for 
operation 3, allowing as it does that a procedure may change from one type to 
another during its actual course. If thought about in this way, the matrix provides 
a useful aid to analysis, allowing progress. Classification is useful, it would 
appear, if  applied flexibly. Perhaps this is expressed badly, since even novices’ 
rigid rules are after all useful to them. They are useful only for a short while 
though. As Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) pointed out, they have eventually to be 
put aside, or perhaps revised in the light of experience (a bit like my matrix) in 
order to allow progress.
I have described in some detail the preparatory procedures as related to both 
surgeons and their patients which take place prior to routine veterinary surgery. I 
have used diagrammatic models alongside my text to show where differences 
exist between the idealised ‘methods’ o f textbooks, and the actual methods that 
are used in practice. These differences call into question the received wisdom 
which states that the sole or main purpose of these procedures is to maintain 
sterility and prevent the occurrence of post-operative infection. I have identified 
an alternative role for the procedures, that of visual aids, or enhancement and 
reduction tools for the purpose of mapping the body; locating and differentiating 
internal organs, and relating the internal anatomy to the external.
In examining three ovario-hysterectomy operations, and taking into account also 
comments from other practitioners in relation to this procedure (and in relation to 
other procedures by means of the classification matrices), I have begun to show 
the ways in which these strategies may be differentially used by surgeons with 
differing levels of experience. Enhancement and reduction procedures are 
considered in relation to ways in which actual bodies are made to relate to, or 
merge with, anatomical representations o f them. For the ‘expert’, this feat has 
already been largely accomplished; they no longer need to devote much in the
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way of mental resources to bodymapping, but can concentrate instead more upon 
what they see as the real problems and hazards of the procedure. This evidence 
supports the stage models of skill acquisition that were discussed in chapter 2.
One respondent described this ‘coming to terms’ with anatomy, in respect of a 
‘mental library’ of cases that she had built up over the years. JH’s ‘mental library’ 
could be thought about quite literally as a pattern matching exercise. Each new 
case is compared with all of the previous cases that she has encountered, a match 
is made, and she deals with this instance in the same sort of way to a previous, 
similar instance. This would however take quite a long time; pattern matching 
makes considerable demands upon working memory (which is one reason why 
computers tend to be better at it than humans). I have never noticed expert 
subjects pausing prior to engaging with a task whilst all this processing is going 
on, and neither is there any evidence o f this in the literature. Also, if  
pattern-matching were sufficient explanation, in cases where no match were 
found, surely our ‘expert’ would be unable to proceed? Pattern-matching cannot 
account for innovation, and accounts only poorly for learning. JH’s perception of 
similarities between this case and another does not depend upon memory alone, 
but upon experience and the meaning that her experiences hold for her. As 
Merleau-Ponty (1962 p.2) pointed out, ’Toperceive is not to experience... 
impressions accompanied by memories capable o f  clinching them; it is to see, 
standing forth from a cluster o f  data, an immanent significance without which no 
appeal to memory is possible. To perceive is not to remember ’.
It is far more likely that JH stores her ‘library’ of cases as a complex and abstract
mental model which can be instantiated in various ways, and immediately as
required. Neither does it matter if  a particular instance is not exactly the same as a
previous one; there will be similarities, some aspects of it will be the same. The
respondent RH was observed to demonstrate the ability to instantiate his mental
model of a situation, and still successfully carry out a task even though it did not
equate perfectly with this mental model, and JH and BM showed indications of
such ability also. They can use aspects of their mental model, and abduce from
these, to a satisfactory solution to the problem or variation encountered. This is
not a logical process, so cannot be accounted for by deductive or inductive modes 
91of inference . In the course of this abductive process, it is likely that a 
respondent’s mental model of a particular procedure undergoes some form of
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modification. On future occasions if similar situations were encountered to that 
dealt with in operation 3 ,1 would surmise that RH would in time deal with them 
in his customary manner, apparently without veiy much thought at all.
Shelley (1996) described instances where, in archaeological research, a leap may 
be made from apparently insignificant facts which can be observed, to a complex 
reality which cannot. These facts can be ordered into a sequence, or narrative, as a 
means of forming a tentative explanation of what is perceived (we have already 
established that perception should not necessarily be thought about merely in 
terms of the visual, since the full range of sensory modalities may be used). Such 
a narrative enables a course of action. Narrative is a linguistic form, and it seems 
only reasonable to assume that it might be accompanied by language use. In RH’s 
second operation, he used talk as a bodymapping aid in just such a way, verbally 
identifying what he observed in relation to the abnormalities in the reproductive 
system, and possible strategies for dealing with it; he was, in effect, ‘telling the 
story’ of this particular operation as it unfolded.
I have categorised this language use as a ‘further enhancement procedure’, and 
will discuss this in relation to others used in a similar way, in the next chapter, 
where I continue with discussions of these and similar matters, but in relation this 
time to procedures which are in no sense routine. Via observations of orthopaedic 
operations, I will show further instances of bodymapping by surgeons, both the 
operating surgeons themselves, and by others who are ‘merely’ observing.
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MOTES
* I met Dr Jones as a fellow presenter at a conference at the University of East 
Anglia, entitled ‘Animals, Vets and Vermin in Medical History’ (28-29 April 
2000).
Eg, Animal Hospital and Vets in Practice shown on BBC TV.
^ Eg, Casualty and Holby City shown on BBC TV.
^ ‘Textbook’ method as demonstrated in GDBA (1996) training video
The term ‘cranial’ is an aid in anatomical direction-finding; it means ‘towards 
the animal’s head.’ See Fig 1.1.
^ RH spoke of how a colleague had laughed at him for taking as long as 10 
minutes to do a cat spay. This recalls references to the ‘masculine society of 
surgeons’ described by Cassell (1987 p. 231).
7 When an animal is placed in ‘dorsal recumbency’ it is positioned on its back 
with its chest and abdomen facing uppermost.
8 ‘Cranially’ means ‘towards the animal’s head’. See Fig 1-1.
^ ‘Caudally’ means ‘towards the animal’s tail’. See Fig 1-1.
^  An example that I have used in conference presentations is to be found in 
Boyd (1991, p.218). Unfortunately it has not been possible to obtain 
permission to reproduce this here.
* * Hands On Virtual Reality Simulation presented by Dr Nick Taffinder at the
Imperial College of Science, Technology and medicine as part o f the British 
Association Festival of Science (9 September 2000).
^  ‘Brachycephalic’ is a term used in animal anatomy to describe the skull shape
181
of short-nosed dog breeds.
^  In animals with pigmented skin, it is harder to locate the subcutaneous blood 
vessels via which anaesthetic agents and other drugs are injected.
14 Another example of an heuristic or rule of thumb. This information would be 
o f little value to those who were not familiar with the appearance and 
consistency of different types of body fat.
15 See Appendix 1 for the format used to record uses o f off-task and on-task talk.
^  German shepherd dog; a popular breed also know as Aisation.
^  O f anaesthetic.
^  Of anaesthetic.
^  To indicate the insertion of an endotracheal tube.
2® Hirschauer (1991). See note 21, p.316. Kirk R.M. (1978) Chirurgische 
Techniken. Stuttgart and New York: Thieme.
21 The model of abduction to which I refer (which was developed by Gooding, 
eg 1996) shows how inductive and deductive processes fit into a larger 
abductive ‘cycle.’ Induction and deduction are logical processes (see chapter 
4). Abduction can account for those aspects or parts of activities which do 
not fit this model. Thanks to Professor Gooding for pointing this out.
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CHAPTER 9: PUTTING THINGS (BACK1 TOGETHER: EXAMPLES 
FROM ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY
1Marty but not all vets would prefer to refer this sort o f op to a specialist, but 
some prefer to do it themselves, or the owners want them to fo r  reasons o f cost 
and so on. There are so many ways o f doing it, I  guess because there isn ’t a 
definite way that will work in every situation. Sometimes it just doesn’t work Its a 
procedure that is fraught with complications. But i f  someone is doing several a 
day or a week, they ‘re bound to have more idea than someone else who maybe 
does one every couple o f  months or so 
JH.
Orthopaedics, in veterinaiy science as in medicine, is that branch of surgery 
which is concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of injuries, deformities and 
diseases of the bones, joints, ligaments and muscles, and the nerve supply to 
them. In the above exerpt, JH was discussing ‘cruciate operations’- surgery 
carried out to repair the stifle (knee) joint after disruption of the cruciate 
ligaments* by trauma. As her comments suggest, orthopaedic operations (and the 
ways in which vets think about them) are very different from spays in a number of 
important respects, quite apart from the obvious one of their concern with 
different body-parts. Firstly, orthopaedic procedures are generally neither routine, 
nor elective. All of the operations described here for instance, were carried out in 
attempts to repair serious injuries sustained as a result o f accidents.
Secondly, and linked to this, these operations are acknowledged to be ‘harder 
than many of the other types of surgery carried out in veterinaiy practice. Such 
‘second-order’ knowledge (Pinch, Collins and Carbone 1996; 1997) about 
surgical operations directly influences whether or not an individual surgeon will 
attempt them. As JH’s comments indicate, many will not, preferring to refer such 
cases to a specialist. However, as the example of operation 5 (correction of a 
disunited hard palate in the cat) shows, even relatively inexperienced surgeons 
may attempt ‘difficult’ procedures in situations where there are more experienced 
colleagues on hand to offer advice and assistance.
That they are ‘harder’ to accomplish successfully does not imply that the 
equipment used to cany out these procedures is necessarily more sophisticated
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than that used for the routine operations encountered previously. Although greater 
numbers of instruments tend to be used, orthopaedics employs carpenters’ tools; 
drills, screws, and implements that look very much like hammers and chisels (and 
are used in very much the same sort of way), alongside the usual scalpels, clamps, 
scissors and sutures. Although these operations undoubtedly require considerable 
manual dexterity and frequently also some degree of physical strength, it is likely 
that the main reason why they are considered so difficult is because they are 
relatively infrequently carried out, and as a result most surgeons get little 
opportunity to attain any level of proficiency or expertise in their 
accomplishment. Also, as JH pointed out, there is seldom one, definitive method 
of carrying out these procedures, but a number of possible alternatives. It is often 
therefore a matter of some dispute as to which of these is the ‘best’. From 
observations of these operations, and from verbal evidence provided by the 
‘expert’ referral surgeon, it can be surmised that skilled judgement is required to 
ascertain which particular method is most appropriate for any one individual 
operation.
Thirdly, the orthopaedic operations discussed here are considered to be ‘less 
tactile’ than soft-tissue procedures such as spays. They can therefore be situated 
in Box 7 in the bottom row of our revised matrix (see Fig 10 below). The ‘less 
tactile’ nature of orthopaedic operations indicates that they may be at the same 
time perhaps ‘more visual’. Certainly, bones are easier to differentiate visually 
than abdominal organs, (or at least they are from the point of view of an 
observing bystander), and surgeons themselves attach great importance to the use 
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Fig 10; Diagram to show the position within the revised classification matrix 
of operations 4t5,6T7 and 8
Despite these important differences there are similarities too, that exist between 
these operations and the others discussed previously. The pre-operative 
preparatory procedures for example are identical, (or at least their textbook 
descriptions are), and orthopaedic operations follow the same general pattern as 
spay operations, progressing through the same stages from induction of 
anaesthesia to closure, although some of these stages tend to last rather longer. It 
is worth remembering though, that the length of time taken to perform an 
operation depends not only upon the nature of the operation itself (eg, how ‘hard’ 
it is), but also upon the amount of experience that the operating surgeon has in
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carrying out the procedure in question. For example in terms of actual duration, 
IM (orthopaedic specialist respondent) took hardly any longer to carry out a 
cruciate repair than did recently-qualified James (encountered in operation 1), to 
carry out a routine spay operation.
In operations 1 and 2 in the previous chapter, I showed how (ostensibly 
standardised) pre-operative preparations were differentially applied in the case of 
routine operations. I proposed that these procedures might therefore have another 
purpose quite apart from their stated one of infection prevention, that of 
enhancement and reduction tools to assist with the bodymapping process. It was 
argued that their differential application may be linked to differences in the 
amount of experience that surgeons had accrued in relation to this operation, and 
consequent variation in the necessity for visual aids to bodymapping. As we will 
see however, for all o f the procedures discussed in this chapter except for 
operation 5, considerable care was taken by all surgeons (including the ‘expert’ 
referral surgeon) over this initial preparation of the patient-body.
The use of language for bodymapping purposes (in respect of surgeons actually 
talking their way through the identification of the various organs and tissues they 
encountered), was discussed in relation to operation 3. It was proposed that this 
use of language provided a further enhancement procedure in uncertain 
situations. The newly qualified surgeon James whom we met in operation 1, used 
instead o f language, what he termed a ‘visual aid’ (his explanation for his use of 
swabs to cover ‘unwanted’ organs, and so presumably enable him to concentrate 
his attention more keenly upon relevant ones) for further enhancement purposes. 
Lynch and Woolgar (1990 p.vii) argued that scientists construct and use 
representations, or ‘inscriptions’ in *contextually organised and contextually 
sensitive ways'*. They included ‘verbal accounts’ (ibid p.4) along with objects 
such as ‘core extracts, tissue cultures and residues impressed within graphic 
matrices, ordered, shaped and filtered samples, carefully aligned photographic 
traces and chart recordings, as well as ‘pictures o f  natural objects ’ in their 
generic term ‘inscriptions’. It is contended here that surgeons’ enhancement and 
reduction procedures, in all of their guises, are used after the manner o f 
inscriptions, as scientists use the above, and other, similar representations; to 
‘simplify’ objects in the real world, thus allowing them to be known, and 
manipulated.
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In this chapter, the notion of further enhancement procedures (both ‘visual’ and 
‘verbal’) will be explored in the context of non-routine operations. The use of 
these procedures by both experienced and less experienced surgeons will be 
discussed, and linked to this, the differences that exist between textbook accounts 
and actual practice. A further point of interest is the role played by other surgeons 
present (ie, apart from the operating surgeon(s) in relation to the operation 
presently being performed, and visual and verbal representations of it.
This chapter is divided into three sections, each relating to a different procedure. 
The first section (operation 4) concerns the repair of a compound fracture o f the 
forelimb. The second (operation 5) relates to the repair of a cat’s hard palate^ 
which had been damaged as a result of a road traffic accident. In both of these 
sections, only one instance of the procedure in question is discussed. In the third 
section, I compare three separate instances of the repair o f  the cruciate ligaments 
which stabilise the knee joint (operations 6 ,7  and 8). Operations 6 and 7 were 
carried out by an orthopaedic specialist, and operation 8 by an experienced 
general surgeon.
9.1: The compound fracture - operation 4
‘Compound fractures are those in which the skin is injured, so that a direct or 
indirect communication between the fracture and the outside air exists. The 
broken end o f  the bone very often penetrates through the skin and is found  
exposed. Bleeding is apt to be severe; infection o f the ends o f the bones with 
pathogenic organisms may occur7.
(Black’s Veterinary Dictionary).
This example is interesting in that it shows how an experienced general surgeon 
(as opposed for instance, to the relatively inexperienced Alison, or the 
orthopaedic specialist IM whom we meet further on), and also his colleagues, 
made use of a range of ‘visual aids’ during the course of a difficult and lengthy 
operation. The surgery was carried out upon a dog which had been injured as a 
result o f a road traffic accident. The x-rays clearly showed that both the radius 
and the ulna (the long bones of the lower forelimb) had been broken and were 
totally disunited. Jagged ends of bone were visibly protruding from an open 
wound in the lower part o f the limb. This type of injury is known as a compound
187
fracture. The following is lifted almost in its entirety from my field notes. 
Audio-taping had unfortunately not been possible in this instance. Therefore, I 
show verbatim quotes in inverted commas. Other verbalisations are 
approximations which were constructed as accurately as possible soon afterwards, 
from written notes and from memory. WW is the operating surgeon, and VN the 
assisting nurse. Other participants are introduced in the fieldnotes.
X-rays were up on the viewer (2 views again), and the break was clearly visible. 
There was also a textbook open on the operating table, showing text and line 
diagrams. WW positioned the dog in lateral recumbency, * with the unaffected 
forelimb tied to the table, across its face, enabling access to the medial (inside) 
aspect o f  the other forelimb. The limb had already been shaved, but WW carefully 
draped the patient himself using rectangular cloths and towel clips. There was 
also a little drawstring bag thing over the foot. The VN assisting turned the book 
so that WW could see it from where he was standing /  sitting. It was a 
particularly tricky procedure ‘because o f  a big vessel ’ (cephalic vein) crossing 
the radius just about where the break was, and the necessity therefore to place 
the plate and screws in position under this vessel without damaging it. The paths 
o f  the blood vessels were visible under the shaved skin.
WW started o ff (sitting) to make the incision, but then stood ‘to see better ’, 
incising carefully and slowly. He started with the scalpel, but then used forceps 
and pointed scissors. The radio was playing quietly in the background. WW 
continued, sometimes using the point o f  the scissors like a scalpel. A second vet 
arrived, glanced at what his colleague was doing, made some remark (which I  
did not catch), and started to consult the textbook on the operating table on 
another matter. WW clamped leaking blood vessels, again ‘in order to see better 
and was continually swabbing away blood from the wound. Gradually he became 
able to realign the two ends o f  the radius bone. This was quite hard physical 
work, from the effort that WW seemed to be expending. He clamped another 
vessel, there was still a lot o f  blood, and he kept mopping at the wound whilst 
waiting for the nurse to bring from somewhere else a plate o f  the right size to 
stabilize the bone. He sent the VN for a larger plate again, after trying the 
initial one she brought against the bone for size. It took a long time to place the 
plate. It was necessary to make the incision bigger, which involved more mopping 
o f blood and clamping o f vessels. There was a pool o f blood and a number o f
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used swabs and towels on the floor by this point. Difficult because o f position o f  
the cephalic vein, the plate needed to be placed beneath it, and the bone needed to 
be drilled so that screws could be inserted to hold it in place. Caught a glimpse o f  
the title page o f the textbook: A Guide to Canine and Feline Orthopaedic 
Surgery.
Someone entered the room to enquire about a bill. WW replied briefly and tersely, 
fumbling for the required tools. WW was (uncharacteristically, as I  hadfound out 
by now) quiet for most o f  the time. Tried to drill bone. Inserted screw, but hole 
not big enough, needed a bigger drill bit. Measured drill against screw again, 
very carefully this time. Drilled again, mopped up more blood. Screw started to 
go in this time, finished o ff with a second screw driver. ‘The aim is, a nice 
straight leg ’ not sure whether WW meant this remarkfor me, for himself fo r  the 
nurse? More mopping. Second vet came back in (BMc). WW asked him to scrub 
up, then changed his mind. ‘Oh don 7 worry, I've done it now BMc did so 
anyway. Others came in to see what is going on, to consult the textbook, the xrays 
on viewer, talk about what they saw in the pictures, on the plates and on the 
table. Someone remarked ‘At least its well clear o f the jo in t’ Someone else agreed 
‘Good place to break it, plenty o f  room to get a plate in ’ WW obviously finding it 
more difficult than their remarks would indicate.
BMc started to drill whilst WW held the limb and watched closely, giving 
instructions. Seemed to be easier and quicker with another pair o f hands and 
eyes. Drill bent. WW straightened it with forceps, tried again. More problems, 
lots o f  blood. Someone said ‘there‘s the cephalic vein. ’ I  don 7 think they 
breached it though, not enough bloodfor that. More drilling, mopping, screwing, 
still having trouble with the cephalic vein. Short, terse comments only passed 
between the colleagues. Plate now screwed in place, limb indeed looked much 
straighter. BMc now holding artery forceps, tied o ff vessel causing the trouble. 
Vets glanced at the xrays now and again. Book largely ignored (but WW had 
looked at it prior to starting the procedure). WW still giving instructions to BMc.
Now suturing, vets started to talk about unrelated matters. Then BMc left. Not 
needed anymore. Suturing all the layers took a long time. I  asked about the break 
in the ulna (only the radius has been repaired). WW replied that there is need
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only to repair the radius, and the ulna is thereby pulled back into the correct 
position and would knit together on its own. Still suturing layers
Administrator returned, ‘Can I  speak to you now'? WW assented. Talk about 
VAT, new car for practice, etc. Suturing top layer now. I  asked i f  WW would need 
to re-xray the leg now the plate was in place. WW replied not; he is quite happy 
with it now.
This account is noteworthy in three respects. Firstly, in relation to the meticulous 
attention paid by experienced surgeon WW to the primaiy enhancement and 
reduction procedures of positioning and draping the patient. Secondly, the social 
interactions that were going on throughout. Thirdly, and linked to this, in respect 
of the uses made (by all o f the surgeons present), of the radiographs and the 
surgical text.
9.1.1: Positioning and draping; creating a window into a world...
Although WW’s preparation of his own ‘surgeon’s body’ (Hirschauer 1991) was 
fairly perfunctory in that it was limited to washing his hands and putting on a 
gown and a plastic apron over his everyday clothing, (he wore no head covering, 
mask or gloves), his preparation of the patient’s body was very thorough. He 
carefully positioned and draped the anaesthetised patient himself, rather than (as 
often happens) instructing a nurse to do so.
WW first o f all ‘tried out’ a number of different positions on the inert body o f the 
animal before fixing upon the one he eventually used, which he felt allowed the 
best view of, and access to the site of the fracture. Using rectangular drapes and 
towel clips, he then visually ‘cut ofF the injured leg (which had already been 
shaved and swabbed with antiseptic solution by the nurse) from the rest of the 
animal’s body. Even the foot of the injured leg was covered, with something 
resembling a small drawstring bag. This effectively created a ‘window’ through 
which he would work, and all that was visible through this window was the 
injured portion of the leg.
WW was silent during these preparations, intent upon what he was doing. It can 
be surmised that draping the animal himself, rather than having the nurse do so,
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may have allowed him to focus mentally (as well as physically via the drapes 
themselves) upon the injured area, effectively reducing the animal’s body to a 
single, shaved forelimb from shoulder joint to carpus.^ This observation of a 
rather ‘specialised’ method of looking at something (ie, ‘looking at it’ for a very 
specific purpose) accords with Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) argument that we focus 
our attention in normal, everyday vision upon a particular object by reducing our 
attention to those surrounding it. This supports the view discussed in the previous 
chapter, that a primary purpose of draping is as a ‘visual aid’ to bodymapping in 
surgery; an important ‘reduction procedure’ which reduces the animal’s gross 
anatomy to the particular area of immediate concern.
9.1.2 Language and social interaction
I had initially assumed that surgeons’ bodymapping strategies would be largely 
visual in nature, but the data points also to the importance of language and social 
interaction for this purpose (allowing that the term ‘language’ encompasses both 
speech and text, and that ‘social interaction’ is something more than ‘talking’ 
alone). Perhaps the apparent importance of pictures and language together as 
bodymapping aids is not unduly surprising if  we consider first o f all the historical 
development of anatomical texts which was touched upon in chapter 3. These 
texts throughout their history have consisted of both pictures and language; 
anatomical illustrations and written text which are intended for use together. This 
format moreover is not limited to anatomical or surgical texts. On the contrary, it 
is general to works of this kind, which are intended to provide demonstration or 
instruction in relation to the performance of skilled practical activities. Numerous 
other examples, both historical and present-day can be drawn upon, from Hooke’s 
Micrographia through to modem engineering manuals.
Secondly, the importance of social interaction in constructing scientific 
knowledge was discussed in chapter 2, and it is hardly surprising in the light of 
this that it seems to play an important part in the construction of the applied 
scientific knowledge of surgery also. I refer here to both the ‘body of surgical 
knowledge’ in general, and to the specific body of ‘personal’ knowledge that is 
accrued by individual surgeons. I therefore consider the use of language alongside 
visual images as it relates to bodymapping, and social interaction as a strategy 
whereby complex activities such as mapping the body become possible.
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The operations discussed in the previous chapter were all carried out by a single 
surgeon, assisted by a nurse. This allowed only very limited opportunities for 
social interaction, which were not on the whole particularly interesting from the 
point of view of this topic. In this instance however, not only were there two 
surgeons directly involved in carrying out the procedure, but several others were 
also present on the peripheiy of what was going on, for varying lengths of time. 
Language use was therefore both more varied and more complex than that 
encountered previously, and also of considerable interest in relation to 
bodymapping. It is to be noted for example that there were two ‘sets’ of social 
interactions going on during this episode; those in which operating surgeon WW 
was involved, and those that were going on peripherally, in which, although he 
was present throughout, and the topic was the surgery that he was performing, he 
took no part.
For WW, this was both a difficult and a physically exhausting operation. For most 
of the time, he remained silent, uttering only occasional terse comments and 
instructions to the nurse, and later to the surgeon BMc who assisted him. This 
was no time for off-task talk. He spoke very shortly to the administrator who 
came in to ask his advice about an unrelated matter, making it quite plain that he 
was not to be interrupted. However, once the procedure was almost completed 
and he had reached the suturing stage, he visibly relaxed. At this point, he and 
BMc started to talk about unrelated matters, and he consented to deal with the 
administrator’s query. He also indicated to me his willingness to answer any 
questions.
WW’s sparse and somewhat abrupt interactions with his colleague BMc during 
these difficult manipulations were significant in that he appeared merely to use 
this other experienced surgeon as an ‘extra pair of hands’. There was no 
discussion between the two surgeons about the fracture, or appropriate strategies 
for repairing it. Rather than it being a fully collaborative effort, by which I mean 
the exchange of discussion and suggestions between the surgeons, as well as 
assistance provided with physical manipulations, (which I had expected, and 
which as we will see, did actually happen in operation 5), WW simply issued 
instructions, and BMc simply followed them. However, perhaps this was all that 
was required. These two men had been working together for some years, and it 
could be that all that needed to be said between them on this subject had long
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since passed, a result of their familiarity with their craft, with each other, and with 
their respective ways of working.
Despite its difficult nature, at no stage during this procedure did WW engage in 
bodymapping talk as RH had done in operation 3. This could be because the 
difficulties involved were not related to the location or differentiation of organs, 
abnormal or otherwise. In this instance (at least for WW), the necessary 
bodymapping had already been done. This seems in any case to be visually less 
complex than for abdominal surgery (despite the fact that the operation itself is 
considered ‘harder’). There is after all very little that is immediately visible 
within a forelimb other than bone, muscle and major blood vessels. After his 
careful initial preparations, WW had made the incision in such a way that the 
bones and other tissues involved could clearly be seen and identified (although 
they periodically became obscured by large quantities of blood that had to be 
mopped away). The difficulties seemed instead to lie in the actual manipulation of 
the bones and instruments, and the position of the large blood vessel clearly 
visible directly across the point at which the plate had to be secured to fix the 
broken bone in place.
Although WW spoke little during this procedure, the same cannot be said for the 
other practice vets. Whilst WW was operating (both before and after BMc arrived 
on the scene to assist), other colleagues gathered round, passing evaluative 
comments upon the injury, the operation, and especially the images, both the 
radiographs and the textbook illustrations. It appeared in fact that they paid 
considerably more attention to the pictures than to what was taking place on the 
operating table. Here was plenty of bodymapping talk, though it appeared to be 
related more to the ‘anatomical body’ of the pictures than to the actual body of 
the patient. Some of the comments that were made seemed to be connected only 
tenuously with the operation that was actually taking place (although they 
undoubtedly related to some incidence of compound fracture repair, perhaps to 
the ‘idealised operation’ shown in the neat line diagrams of the textbook). The 
comment made by one observer in relation to the injury that it was a ‘Goodplace 
to break it, plenty o f  room to get a plate in ’ for instance, seemed to be made 
entirely in respect of these visual images, since it totally belied the problems that 
WW was having, (even with the added use of BMc’s obedient hands) in 
manipulating the bones, the instruments and in trying to navigate carefully around
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the troublesome blood vessel, all of which were obscured by the presence of 
considerable quantities of blood. WW completely ignored this peripheral 
discussion, as did BMc during the time he was assisting, to such a point in fact, 
that they seemed to be quite unaware of it.
9.1.3: Uses of visual images
In a similar manner to the different ways in which talk was used by the operating 
surgeons, and by those on the periphery, there were different uses also made of 
the available visual images. Both groups used them for bodymapping purposes, 
although it would appear that they may have been engaged in mapping different 
‘bodies’. WW’s concern was the body of the patient on the operating table in 
front of him, or at least that area of it between the shoulder and the wrist of one 
forelimb. The other surgeons however appeared to be more concerned with 
mapping the ‘anatomical body’ as it appeared in the radiographs and textbook 
illustrations.
Ethnographic studies of laboratories (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Latour 1990) 
have noted scientists’ tendency to ‘drift from watching confusing 3D objects to 
inspecting 2D images that have been made less confusing’ (Latour 1990 p.39). 
WW’s colleagues too, appeared to be interacting here, neither with him nor with 
the difficult procedure that he was engaged in, but with simplified, idealised 
representations of it. Neither were they concentrating on one particular 
representation, but upon the fu ll range available, the radiographs, (as usual, taken 
from two different views), together with the pictures in the surgical manual. Like 
Latour’ s scientists, they too, manipulated, superimposed and combined these 
‘inscriptions’ (Latour and Woolgar 1979). The images, and the surgeons’ use of 
them provide examples of the ‘visual language’ (Rudwick 1976) of surgery. The 
only persons present who were not involved in these peripheral interactions (apart 
from the assisting nurse and myself) were WW himself (who seemed to ignore 
them), and BMc once he had started to assist, that is, once he had become 
involved in the performance of the ‘actual’ operation.
In contrast, WW’s own use of these images (modelled in Fig 11 below) was very 
different. That he did in fact use them along the lines of ‘further enhancement 
procedures’ at the commencement of the operation can be in little doubt. The
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radiographs were displayed on the viewer next to him, and he had taken the 
trouble to look for the surgical text amongst the collection of books owned by the 
practice, and had taken it with him to the operating table. However, having 
initially consulted the textbook, he then largely ignored it once the operation was 
under way. The x-ray images too, were examined carefully at the outset, but only 
glanced at casually every now and again after this. This could be because, since 
the operative site was frequently obscured by blood, the pictures were only of 
limited use for purposes of visual comparison. As a consequence, experienced 
surgeon WW would have had to rely largely upon another resource; the 
internalised ‘anatomical body’ that he had developed through his training and 
experience. Perhaps he was engaged in making mental comparisons of this with 
the actual injury, and making adjustments (both mental and actual) to bring the 
damaged reality in line with his mental model of the intact forelimb.
This collection of images was therefore used in different ways by two groups of 
surgeons. WW (and later BMc) used them as ‘visual aids’ (or further 
enhancement tools) for operating, the textbook initially (chiefly in respect, I 
would surmise, of the path of the obstructing cephalic vein), and the x-rays for 
reference intermittently. The other surgeons used them as a focus for discussion 
and also perhaps for reflection and comparison in relation to quite another 
‘operation’. Such an ‘imagined’ procedure has obvious links with actual 
procedures; the one going on at the time, obviously, but perhaps also ones in 
which the surgeons had participated previously, or that they had observed, heard 
or read about, or possibly ones that they would perform themselves in the future.
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Fig. 11: Diagram to show WW’s use of visual images as ‘further 
enhancement procedures’ when carrying out a compound fracture repair
This ‘virtual’ operation that was taking place alongside the observed ‘actual’ one 
calls to mind the links which exist between actual acts and situations, and mental 
simulations of them. Alongside the biological advantages of mental simulations, 
which avoid the costly necessity of having to try things out for real each time, 
there exist others. Gooding (1990) drew links between the roles of thought 
experimentation and real experiments in science. According to his analysis, 
thought experiments are ‘distillations’ of actual practice in the real world, which 
‘idealize’ the key components of real experiments, including the skills necessary 
to carry them out. What WW’s colleagues appeared to be participating in, was the 
‘idealized’ repair of a compound fracture, like that inscribed in the surgical text, 
yet with links also to the shattered and bleeding reality on the operating table with
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which WW wrestled and against which he made approximate and imperfect 
measurements. I would therefore argue that such ‘virtual’ operations, like 
‘actual’ ones, provide a context within which surgeons learn to become skilled 
‘operators’.
In the next excerpt, another example of surgery involving two groups of surgeons 
is shown. The operating surgeon on this occasion was Alison, a young vet who 
had not carried out this particular procedure before. Alison was assisted by Ben, a 
more experienced colleague. This operation was ‘properly’ collaborative in that 
the assistance rendered this time took the form of overt verbal discussion, 
instruction and encouragement as well as practical assistance.
9.2 The case of the separated hard palate -operation 5
‘Severe injury to the hard palate is not uncommonly seen in cats that have fallen 
from a height, and suturing may be required’
(Black’s Veterinary Dictionary).
Self: Can I  ask i f  you use pictures, for example, at one o f the C... practices, I
saw complex orthopaedic procedures being carried out, and there were books 
open on the table, and radiographs on the viewer, and people seemed to be using 
all o f them together?
JH: Yes, I  use anatomy books, especially i f  the procedure is an unfamiliar
one. There are surgical texts too, showing the operation at various stages. I f  it 
were a complicated orthopaedic thing I  would use a radiological text too, these 
are books showing radiographs o f  normal anatomy, and indicating how disease 
processes can cause what you see to deviate from that. Its difficult though, there 
is such a broad range o f  ‘normal forms, its difficult sometimes to distinguish 
between a normal variant and a pathological condition. I  might also ask 
colleagues, especially more experienced ones, or even send it away to someone 
for a second opinion i f  I  was really unsure.
JH’s remarks above were particularly interesting in two respects. Firstly, in 
relation to the notion of ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ anatomy, and the difficulties 
that can arise in distinguishing between the two. What is and is not ‘normal’ in 
relation to bodies is not the simple matter that it would at first appear to be, but
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rather subject to a good deal of uncertainty and contention. For virtually all bodily 
parameters, there exists not one single ‘normal’ model, but a ‘normal range’ 
within which some degree o f variation occurs. The extent of this ‘normal range’ 
is in many instances a source of difficulty and debate among veterinary surgeons, 
as indeed it is among medics. I discuss this more fully below.
SJULIbeJnpimalLaj d the ‘pathological’
Respondent JH referred to this tension in respect of orthopaedic structures. There 
is generally speaking no one single ‘normal’ model, but a number of ‘normal 
variants’ that exist. Some o f these variants are very similar to so-called 
pathologies, which are by definition ‘abnormal’. Moreover, these categories are 
not static, but change as scientific research into animal disease throws up more 
knowledge, or alternative explanations for phenomena. Thus the boundaries 
between the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ are ‘dynamic’ ones (Rayner 1997), 
and as such a potential minefield for the inexperienced.
As well as anatomy (which term relates to the structures of the body), physiology 
(the functions of the body) is similarly subject to variation. Instead o f relying 
upon physical appearance, many physiological characteristics can be measured in 
a seemingly more ‘objective’ way. Again however, these measurements are not 
absolute, but are considered in relation to a ‘reference range’ or ‘normal range o f 
values’ for a species, which is often quite wide. Measurements that fall outside o f  
this range are thus deemed to indicate some or other ‘pathology’. This 
incidentally counts for our own species also! Problems arise in relation to this in a 
number o f respects.
Firstly, different versions exist of what any given ‘normal range’ comprises. For 
example, from my own experience o f  veterinary laboratory work, different 
sources give slight differences in what counts as the normal range. By way of 
illustration, the reference range for blood albumin (a protein contained in the 
blood plasma whose level may be raised as a result of certain liver or kidney 
conditions) in the dog, is given in one of the texts that I have on hand, as 2.5 - 4.2 
g /dl. (Sirois 1995). In another text, (Bloxham 1994), it is quoted as 25-37 g /1. 
Not only is the range itself slightly different, but the information is encoded in 
different units, which is also a frequent cause o f initial confusion to students. In
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yet another text (Pratt 1992), my own ‘lab handbook’ of choice, as opposed to the 
teaching texts cited previously, the author omits to give a range at all, due to 
geographical variations that exist in physiological parameters, and also variations 
in the procedures and instrumentation used in different laboratories!
This brings us to consideration of actual procedures and instrumentation. 
Differences in the types o f instruments used, or in their calibration, will yield 
different results. More problematic still, blood is an inherently unstable 
substance. The way a sample is taken, and its treatment afterwards, for example 
the length of time between sampling and testing, or the temperature at which a 
sample is stored prior to testing, can and does affect the results quite dramatically. 
This too is a cause o f great concern and uncertainty to novices, who need to be 
able to ‘believe’ in their results. Tests are often repeated in order to lessen this 
uncertainty. Still further uncertainty however originates from what Collins (1986 
p.2) called ‘experimenter’s regress’. Collins defined this as ‘a paradox which 
arises fo r  those who want to use replication as a test o f  the truth o f  scientific 
knowledge claims\ Since scientific experimentation (like measuring blood 
parameters) involves skill, it is never certain whether a second experiment (or 
test) has been done skilfully enough to count as a check on the first one, and so 
on.
This I feel is linked to uncertainties about measurement more generally. In quite 
another context, my observations of sculptors in chapter 7 showed how, on 
occasions where any precise degree of measurement was required, their 
performance appeared less skilled, and more hesitant and prone to mistakes. The 
performance o f these quite experienced practitioners appeared in fact to revert to 
that of novices in these instances. What is more, they knew this, seeming to 
dislike situations where such precise measurement is called for, such as copying 
(or attempting to copy; as we have seen, such activities were by no means always 
successful) a three-dimensional object to scale.
The problem that there respondents were experiencing I feel, is related to the use 
of measurements as algorithms. Copying others’ work entails precise 
measurement, as opposed to the much more fluid approach to measurement taken 
as they went about their ‘ordinary’, original work. Like experienced vets and 
veterinary technicians, experienced sculptors tend not to take measurements
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algorithmically, but rather more in the sense of heuristics, that is, if  relevant 
measurements fit in with other information that is available, they are usually 
accepted. If not, they may be rejected, or repeated. When however these 
practitioners are forced to do so for some reason, whether this reason is a client’s 
request for a copy of something, or being confronted with an ambiguous and 
unfamiliar bodily parameter, their behaviour reverts to something more 
approaching that of a novice practitioner.
The second issue arising from JH’s remarks was related to those occasions where 
she found it necessary (or beneficial) to use numbers of representations as visual 
aids (or further enhancement procedures) for surgery. In the example below, the 
respondent Alison is seen doing this, for a difficult and unfamiliar operation. She 
also ‘used’ the experience of a colleague (as opposed to merely using his hands as 
* WW had used those of BMc in the first sequence). On this occasion at least, this 
experience proved to be of greater value than the images to the successful 
accomplishment of this procedure whose purpose was to re-align and secure in 
place the two parts of the hard palate of a cat which had suffered facial injuries 
when it had been struck by a car. In this case the injury requiring orthopaedic 
surgery was only one of several sustained, and the condition of the animal upon 
initial presentation had been extremely poor. Orthopaedic repairs are rarely 
attempted until the patient’s condition is stabilised and they are physically able to 
withstand what may be a long and arduous operation. For this reason, this 
operation had been delayed for several days after the patient’s admission.
Again, there were two groups of surgeons at work here, and effectively two 
operations taking place; Alison and Ben performed the actual surgery, but others 
were involved in performing its virtual counterpart. As before, actual 
verbalisations are recorded in inverted commas in this sequence. Others are 
approximated, from field notes and from memory.
Alison now looking at another book, and discussing it (and the ‘case ’ out on the 
table) with the VN assisting her. Cat with a separated hard palate, rta^, brought 
in on Sunday, but kept on a drip till today due to poor condition. Book title The 
Skull and Spine, pictures and text showing a method o f  repairing such an injury;
\going to try to wire it back together ’. Need to drill either between or through 
roots o f  carnassial teeth on both sides, cross over wires and tighten so that the
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hard palate is pulled back together. First problem; drill bits available too big. To 
me; ‘we ‘re going to do this...’ Discusses different methods, (from different 
books) with BMc, who advises her ‘Ifyou follow this back further.. ‘ (with regard 
to finding the right place to drill), jabbing at the book with a forefinger. Alison 
tries to use a needle in place o f  a drill bit, in the brace. The wire needs to go 
behind the carnassials. Uncertain. Ben (other vet) comes in. She checks with him 
the site where the wire should go between the roots o f  the teeth. He looks at the 
book, and recalls his own previous experiences (has done op before in his native 
Australia). Admin lady comes in, starts to ask Alison about an insurance form, 
not a good time, but Alice much less assertive than WW! Perhaps once the site o f  
the ‘hole fo r  the wire is found it is less fraught?
Then a receptionist, with another query. Then someone else. Alison says to nurse 
assisting her: ‘Can we go somewhere quiet ’ Then to receptionist ‘No! Go away!’ 
(laughter). The wire is too thick, and pulls out. Now quiet, trying to concentrate. 
Then Ben comes back ‘Ben, this just pulls straight through... ’
Ben intervenes to help. ‘It might be better i f  it was on its back: Turns cat from  
lateral to dorsal recumbency. Alison: ‘but now it’ll be the wrong way up... it 
actually is a bit better... ’ Ben uses a syringe barrel to hold the mouth agape. He 
holds the mouth o f  the cat in position, advising Alison, telling her how to position 
the wire. ‘Simple principle, but practically speaking its a different kettle offish ’ 
(of wiring cats ‘jaws).
The two vets continue to discuss the cat, standing close together, Ben holding the 
animal in position, and instructing, the younger vet following his advice whilst 
actually doing the procedure. BMc comes back in. Alison says to him ‘Ben’s 
doing very well, telling me what to do ’ Ben continues to tell her how the wire 
should be tightened, describing how it will feel when it is sufficiently tightened but 
before it reaches breaking point. Ben talking all the time, about the position o f  
the wire, the position o f  the bones, what problems might arise in the next six 
weeks while the injury heals, the feel o f  the wire again. The book is still open, but 
nobody is looking at it except fo r another young vet who has come in to watch.
Ben still instructing, wire has to cross over to hold the two sides o f the hard 
palate together, going through the gums and between the roots o f the teeth. 
Discussion now o f break in lower jaw. Ben and other young vet go to find the
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xrays, Alison left to continue. The two men find  the xrccys, and discussion ensues. 
Lisa, older female vet comes in. Alison shows her what she and Ben have done, 
discusses difficulty o f  drilling through the roots o f  the teeth. ‘Why didn 7 you use 
such and such... ’ Discussion continues.
The two male vets think that the cat has also broken its lower jaw  near the hinge 
joint. Lisa joins in the discussion. ‘The muscles there will act as a natural splint, 
can 7 really plate it there ’. They go back to the book at this point, Lisa uses the 
book to support her point o f  view. Alison is trying to put an NG tube down the 
cat, but is having trouble, because o f  swelling to the throat caused by the injury.
7 can 7 quite see.... ’ Gets a small torch, peers down the cat’s throat. Then 
measures the tube against the outside o f  the cat, to gauge where the entrance to 
the stomach will be. Places the tube, but unsure whether it has gone down the 
oesophagus as required, or whether it has ended up down the trachea. Checks. I  
have just noticed another book open on the table, this one having photographs 
and reproductions o f  xray images, rather than diagrams as in the other one. 
Alison and her colleagues had been using both, in conjunction with the xray 
images from the patient.
This sequence is noteworthy in a number of respects. First of all, in the surgeons’ 
use of numbers of illustrations, or as Latour termed them ‘cascades of 
representations’; a single picture it would seem, is not sufficient if others are also 
available. Secondly, in relation to the notion of ‘enculturational learning’. Here, 
we see a direct example of such learning in action. Alison could not perform the 
operation using only the surgical manual, the anatomical atlas, the radiological 
atlas and (presumably) the radiographs. There were aspects of the procedure 
which could not be communicated by means of these words and pictures unaided. 
Ben’s experience however enabled her to successfully cany out the operation. 
Thirdly, alongside the actual operation, its virtual counterpart was performed by 
surgeons who were seemingly peripheral to the procedure.
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9.2.2 ‘Cascades of representations’—
During this operation, the anaesthetised animal was not draped at all, and neither 
was any hair removed from its head or face. It could be that this was considered 
unnecessary due to the fact that there was no incision involved. However, there 
was a good deal of drilling into bone going on, and if infection prevention is the 
expressed purpose, then pathogens can be introduced via this route equally as 
well as through an open wound. Another possible explanation might be that, since 
the area of concern was the interior of the animal’s mouth, it was already 
sufficiently well delineated as a consequence of normal anatomy, rendering it 
unnecessary to further mark the area out from the rest of the body. The use of 
primary enhancement and reduction procedures for bodymapping purposes was 
therefore nonessential in this instance.
This was not the case however as far as further enhancement procedures were 
concerned. Alison consulted both a surgical manual and a  radiological atlas, 
visually and verbally comparing the animal’s injuries with those depicted in the 
textbooks. She had presumably also consulted the radiographs that had been taken 
of the cat’s skull, although I did not see her do so, and neither were they available 
in the room at this point. This would seem to indicate that she had not found them 
particularly helpful, perhaps preferring to compare the actual injury (rather than 
the radiographic images of it) with textbook pictures which represented ‘normal’ 
anatomy (the ‘goal state’), and others which showed methods by which the ‘actual 
state’ o f the injured mouth could be manipulated so that it more closely 
resembled them.
Alison fixed on a method of effecting the repair with the aid of the textbooks, and 
after consultation with senior vet BMc. She was discussing her intentions with 
anyone available at this point, including myself and the nurse. She positioned the 
cat in lateral recumbency, so that it accorded with the direction from which the 
diagrams in the surgical text were drawn, and began her attempts at manipulating 
the bones into the correct position. However, although the procedure had looked 
fairly straightforward in the book, it quickly became obvious that this was not the 
case at all. It is evidently by no means as easy to judge the position of the roots of 
the camassial teeth when they are embedded in the gum for instance, as a 
sectional drawing of the jaw would indicate. Neither was BMc’s advice much
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help on this occasion, since his remarks had ostensibly been directed at the 
pictures, rather than to the actual injury.
9.2.3 Enculturational learning in action
Another problem was the comparatively large size of the available drill bits, 
which were intended for drilling into bones, rather than between the very small 
roots of a cat’s teeth. Alison discarded them, and attempted to improvise using a 
needle instead. Ben’s initial response, like that of BMc, to Alison’s request for 
help was to look at the book. However, he soon rejected the method shown there, 
recalling instead an earlier, similar case (which may have been ‘actual’, or 
‘virtual’) in which he had participated. He considered the (technically quite 
difficult) procedure to be a ‘different kettle of fish’ to the relatively 
straightforward account of it that was given in the textbook. Following Alison’s 
initial failure to place the wire, Ben repositioned the cat so that it was lying on its 
back. Alison was disconcerted by this at first, since the pictures in the book 
clearly showed a cat laid upon its side. Even though Alison was following Ben’s 
suggested adaptations to the method shown in the book, she still seemed to be 
dependent upon it at this stage.
Ben’s manipulation of the animal proved to be helpful however, despite the fact 
that the cat’s mouth was now viewed face-on, rather than in profile. At this point 
Alison apparently left the book, and concentrated instead upon the cat. Now she 
had abandoned the virtual operation, and with Ben’s help (which took the form of 
both verbal advice and practical manipulations) she proceeded to perform the 
actual one, successfully wiring the jaw.
Alison’s own use of language during this sequence was totally directed towards 
bodymapping and the practical considerations of carrying out the procedure. Like 
WW she was intolerant of interruptions, although as a young woman still in her
n
twenties, her intolerance manifested itself rather differently'. Neither did she 
engage in off-task talk. Many of her verbalisations, certainly initially, were 
directed at anyone who would listen. There was a sense that she was using others 
present as a ‘sounding board’ to try out her ideas. This behaviour ceased however 
once she had turned from the book and its representations of an idealized 
jaw-wiring procedure to the actual case in hand.
204
9.2.4 Actual surgery and virtual surgery
As the procedure drew to a close, other surgeons (presumably in between 
operations of their own) wandered into the room, and just as we saw happening in 
operation 4, began to verbally rehearse possible alternative methods that Alison 
and Ben could have used to repair the fracture. Again, the pictures, rather than the 
injured cat itself (the injury, situated inside the small space of a cat’s mouth, was 
after all visible only to Alison and Ben with some difficulty, and not at all to 
bystanders), were central to these discussions. This time however, both Alison 
and Ben involved themselves to some or other extent in these deliberations, 
explicitly justifying the method that they had chosen to use over the one shown in 
the book.
Alison, still occupied with the surgery, contented herself with showing the other 
female vet Lisa what she had done, and recounting to her the difficulties involved. 
Ben however carried these rhetorical processes further. Once the most difficult 
stage of the operation was over and Alison no longer required his assistance, he 
retrieved the radiographs o f the cat’s skull, which he then ‘laid out’ alongside the 
other pictorial representations of cats’ jaws in the textbooks, justifying the (after 
all successful) method that he had chosen. These discussions continued with little 
further reference to Alison, who continued with the treatment of the cat.
Ben’s use of both the visual representations o f the cat’s actual injured jaw, plus 
others o f cats’ jaws more generally in justifying his chosen method of repair, calls 
to mind Latour’s (1986 pp 20-22) account of the advantages o f what he termed 
inscriptions (or various types o f simplified representations, including visual 
images) over and above the actual objects that they represent, for purposes of 
persuasion, or as he termed it, ‘to mobilise allies’. According to Latour, such 
images are persuasive because they are mobile, immutable, presentable, readable 
and combinable with others (ibid p.7), unlike most objects in the natural world. 
Ben was observed to use them thus to demonstrate and to convince his colleagues 
of the effectiveness of his method. Like the artist respondents encountered in 
chapter 7, Ben used pictures for rhetorical, or persuasive purposes, although the 
persuasion here was to get others to see and accept his point of view, rather than 
to persuade clients to commission work.
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9.3 Cruciate repair - operations 6 ,7  and 8.
‘Ruptured cranial cruciate ligaments in 66 dogs and 2 cats were replaced with 
mulhfilament polyester (Terylene) prostheses. The polyester was anchored 
distally through a hole in the tibial tuberosity and either passed ‘over the top ’ o f  
the lateral femoral condyle, or through combinedfemoral and tibial tunnels, or 
through a single tibial tunnel and ‘over the top ’ o f  the lateral femoral condyle.
The two ‘over the top ’ methods gave better results, 64-70% o f  the joints 
becoming sound, whereas o f  the 25 joints treated by the other method, only 36% 
became sound.
Stead, A.C., Amis, A.A. and Campbell, J.R. (1991). Journal o f  Small Animal 
Practice 32,448.
The cruciate ligaments cross over (hence their name) at the stifle (knee) joint, and 
hold together the bones of the upper and lower hindlimb thus preventing 
over-extension of the joint. The disruption of these ligaments gives rise to 
instability o f the joint and hence severe lameness. This type of injury can arise as 
a result of strenuous exercise (just as in humans, where such disruption is a 
common sports injury), and although not life-threatening, is certainly crippling, 
rendering the affected limb useless unless the joint can be stabilised. Fig 12 below 
shows the stifle joint, and gives some idea of the delicate nature o f this operation, 
especially in very small animals such as cats and small dog breeds. This section 
consists of three passages o f field notes, (one fairly long, the other two shorter), 
which detail three instances of cruciate repair. Operations 6 and 7 were carried 
out on the same morning, one directly after the other by orthopaedic specialist IM. 
In the third example, the same procedure was carried out on another day by BMc, 
an experienced general practitioner.
IM’s status as a ‘specialist’ is a formal one among his peers. Apart from the 
standard veterinaiy science degree, he had undertaken additional, advanced level 
training in orthopaedic surgery, and is officially listed as a referral surgeon for
O  Q
such cases by the BVA° and the RCVS . By his own reckoning, IM carries out 
‘80-100 times’ more of these operations than would a vet in general practice. All 
three operations were carried out using different methods. Interestingly, that 
chosen by BMc appears to be far less straightforward than either of those used by 












Fig. 12; Diagram to show the stifle jo in t, lateral (profile) view. Reproduced 
from An Introductim to Veterinary Anatomy andPhysiology, byA.R. Mich ell 
and P,E, Watkins (1989), with permission of BSAVA.
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exist between ‘expert’ practitioners, and those who are merely ‘proficient’ or 
‘competent’ as regards the task under consideration, and also in relation to the use 
of enhancement and reduction procedures in complex surgery.
93.1 IM’s first operation of the morning:
This operation (carried out upon a cat) was incidentally the first cruciate repair I 
observed, and at this point it was by no means obvious to me just how ‘difficult’ 
the procedure is considered to be. To operating surgeon IM, it was evidently a 
fairly routine, everyday operation. His colleagues showed little interest in the 
procedure, in stark contrast to the other surgeons present in the previous two 
sequences. It appeared that no-one at this practice bothered any longer to go in to 
watch IM’s cruciate repair operations. They had presumably seen the procedure 
so many times before that, to them, it was no longer anything out of the ordinary. 
As one respondent put it, IM was merely ‘seeing his referrals’. It is interesting 
that there were apparently no ‘virtual’ operations performed alongside ‘expert’ 
IM’s.
Later that week, IM however did have a spectator for one of these operations 
(apart that is, from myself and a nurse). This visitor was the general practitioner 
who had referred this particular patient to him. Unlike the veterinary surgeon 
spectators observed elsewhere, this surgeon did not look for pictures of the 
operation. This was just as well, since IM only used radiographs. Neither did she 
verbally rehearse alternative methods of performing the surgery (although it is 
possible that she may have done so later, in conversation with colleagues 
elsewhere). She merely watched quietly, except for asking the occasional 
question, apparently content to learn from watching the specialist at work. This 
may have been linked to the fact o f her being ‘alone’ at the scene, apart from the 
nurse and myself (who were not part o f the form-of-life o f veterinary surgeons), 
and IM himself.
Like RH whom we met previously, IM appeared to enjoy (rather than merely 
tolerate) the company of others whilst he was operating. He chatted about general 
matters as he scrubbed up. He was the only surgeon observed (apart from James) 
who both meticulously observed the ‘scrubbing up’ ritual, and also wore special, 
designated clothing for operating, including a cap, mask and gloves. He seemed
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however much more at home in this garb than had James. Goffman (1961) 
discussed the ‘presentation of self by surgeons, and following on from this 
analysis, it could be surmised that, while James appeared eager to present himself 
as part of a ‘body’ of qualified and competent surgeons, in IM’s case these 
practices served quite a different purpose. Since most of the time experienced 
surgeons paid scant attention to these preparations, their unqualified observance 
functioned to set him apart in some respects from this ‘body’, and in doing so, to 
mark him out as someone outside o f this ‘normal’, or ‘ordinary’ experienced 
veterinary foim-of-life. It is interesting incidentally, that this was also the only 
occasion on which /  was asked to put on a surgical gown over my street clothes 
‘because orthopaedic operations pose a risk o f  serious infection I was not 
however asked to do this when observing other surgeons performing orthopaedic 
surgery.
IM draped the cat’s small body carefully, leaving just the stifle joint visible, 
creating a tiny window through which he would operate. He then prepared his 
instruments, continuing to chat whilst he did so. The nurse (Alice) occupied 
herself with monitoring the anaesthetic and various other tasks, occasionally 
joining in the conversation. Still chatting, IM then examined the damaged leg. At 
this point there were a number o f interruptions. About 15-20 minutes elapsed. 
IM’s surgery was characterised by frequent interruptions, which (in contrast to the 
surgeons featured earlier) he dealt with unfazed. On each occasion, once the 
enquirer had left, he immediately returned to task, behaving for all the world as if 
the interruption had simply not happened.
7  think we may be in luck, that it may be just the cruciates that have gone... but 
they ‘ve gone in a bad way... and it really is just a question ofjust getting in there 
and seeing what we ‘ve got... but sometimes we ‘ve got these collaterals that go 
into the bargain.., cats are very fond  o f  disrupting as many as they can at one 
time ’ (makes first incision at this point). ‘Is everything OK Alice? (to nurse). 
‘Another problem is, that they go climbing somewhere, they fall and get the foot 
caught in holes in fences and things like that, and all the weight lands on that 
stfle, and it just rips... ’
At this point, the nurse asked which needle he wanted, and someone else came in 
with another query. This happened on some three more occasions. In between
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times, he continued to talk, among other things, such as the organisation o f  his 
business, how he could improve efficiency, and research methods in social 
science and veterinary science respectively! In the middle o f  asking whether I  had 
to ‘abandon all preconceptions beforehand ’, he returned to task. ‘What have you 
done pussycat ? That*s just a blood clot.... ’ He then proceeded to talk about the 
prognosis fo r  this cat, and cats in general:
1Cats heal incredibly well, from all sorts o f  things. There is a joke in veterinary 
orthopaedic circles that i f  you take two halves o f  a broken cat and leave them 
lying about in the same room, they will jo in  up again.... You have to hope that it 
will cope with the lifestyle that a ca t’s going to give it...and, err, thaVs intact but 
slack (collateral ligament).., but the cruciate *s obviously gone. I f  you can only 
hold it in place, usually they recover quite well. Alison, I  want a PDS suture, and 
a 19 gauge needle....’ IM  was preparing to stitch over the top o f  the stifle joint to 
hold it in place. A t this point, I  asked IM whether it was possible to simply stitch 
the cruciate ligaments back together again. He replied:
‘No, i t ’s detached and it‘s frayed, it ju s t sort o f  disintegrates really... very, very 
occasionally, but to be quite honest I ’ve never come across it yet., .just 
occasionally I ’m told you actually get one that pulls o ff with a lump o f  bone... 
then you simply screw that lump o f bone back I t ’s in all the books, but I ’ve never 
seen it... Theoretically, i t ’s possible to put an implant in, in the middle o f  the joint, 
but by the time you ‘ve done that... ’
Self: ‘So you just sort o f  stitch through the joint ’?
IM: ‘What I  actually do now... there are a  variety o f techniques. ..at last count 
about 160 different ways o f repairing cruciates...which is basically a way o f  
saying that maybe nobody has got it right yet... Once anybody’s got a firm, 
guaranteed technique, we ‘11 er, do that! Umm, so I  think what we ‘re rapidly 
coming to is at the moment the techniques we have, basically you go and you stir 
the joint up, and when the dust settles and the scar tissue settles down, it will be 
stable... and how much we actually... as we try and get more scientjfic about it, as 
you get increasingly complicated techniques o f repair and so on... are we really 
doing more than just jiggering the jo int up and waiting for the scar tissue to take 
over? I  was talking to somebody yesterday, there‘s an American who did a 
subject evaluation o f different cruciate repair techniques, I  mean ten over the 
tops, and ten extra-capsulars, and in ten controls, he ju st opened up the joint and
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stitched it up again. And those ten did better than anything. So you know, 
arguably, all w e4re doing is opening it up to make meniscal damage, stitch it up 
and the fibrosis will take care o f  it. ..so I've tended to back o ff a little and go for  
less invasive surgeries.., they seem to give me just as good a result, they *re 
quicker, and you know, the less you muck about in there, the less risk o f  infection 
and so forth. .,Right then, that feels more like a jo in t 1 think w ell stitch that 
up. I f  I  were doing this op in dogs, I  would use stainless steel (wire to stabilise 
the joint) but err, the wire that is equivalent for cats is really thin, it would just 
fracture as soon as you started to tighten it up.... we know that the wire will 
break; what you hope fo r  is that it will provide adequate support for long 
enough... before it breaks. I f  a dog keeps hold o f it for three months, by which 
time it should heal... But I  would like to consider... I  don V know i f I  would dare 
try it... using a heavy gauge version o f  this (suture) instead o f  wire in dogs, so 
that it would dissolve and be gone... the difficulty is making sure you can get it tight 
enough. The advantage o f  wire is that you can just give it a little turn, a little 
turn, and i f  you need to, turn it a bit more.... *
During this ‘difficult’ operation, IM apparently switched effortlessly between 
on-task and off-task talk, tolerating numerous interruptions in a good-natured 
fashion. All the indications were that, for him, this procedure was not especially 
‘hard’ at all, any more so than was a normal spay operation for RH whom we met 
in chapter 8. Even the strictly on-task talk (ie that about cruciate repair in cats) 
was not confined to this particular operation, but rather tended to range around 
the topic of cruciate operations (and cats’ propensity for injuring themselves in 
this way) in general.
I have highlighted three very short instances of IM’s ‘bodymapping’ talk in bold
type. The first two are related to the identification o f abnormalities or otherwise 
in the tissues concerned (ie, the presence of the blood clot, which he removed, 
and his estimation o f the condition o f the intact collateral and damaged cruciate 
ligaments). The third instance refers to his satisfaction with the result. Because
the joint had been successfully stabilised, the leg now felt ‘normal’. The goal state
had been achieved. For IM, it would appear that the cat’s actual skeletal anatomy 
had become ‘merged’ with representations of the ‘normal’ feline skeleton 
(Hirschauer 1991).
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Other interesting features in relation to this exerpt were firstly IM’ s reference to 
the use o f humour in the veterinary orthopaedic form-of-life, secondly the way in 
which he (like Ben whom we encountered earlier), referred to differences that 
exist between ‘textbook accounts’ and actual incidences of injuries and 
operations, and thirdly the way in which he was observed to ‘think aloud’ about 
alternative methods of cruciate repair, apparently prompted by my question.
93.1.1 Use of humour
IM referred to the existence of ‘a joke in veterinary orthopaedic circles’ 
concerning the ability of cats to recover from serious injury. ‘Veterinary 
orthopaedic circles’ implies membership of a different form-of-life from that of 
‘ordinary’ veterinary surgeons. Referral surgeons such as IM are acknowledged 
by their peers to be experts in their field, and to work at the very forefront o f what 
can be accomplished in veterinary medicine. In respect o f their specialism, and 
the accompanying ‘specialist’ status, it can be surmised that they bear more 
resemblance than other vets to consultant surgeons in ‘human’ medicine. The use 
of humour by surgeons has been discussed elsewhere (eg, Wilson 1954; Goffman 
1961; Katz 1981). It is argued here that such strategies function both to help 
relieve tension implicit in working at the forefront of one one’s discipline 
(Wilson 1954; Katz 1981), and also in relation to Goffman’s (1961, p.109) 
contention that such behaviour formed part of the ‘presentation of self of the 
chief surgeons that he observed, a display o f their ‘role distance’ from their 
subordinates, and a subtle means of reinforcing this.
Links could be drawn here with the particular attention paid by IM to 
self-preparation prior to surgery. IM, like novice surgeon James (but unlike other 
experienced surgeons observed), prepared himself in the approved ‘textbook’ 
manner for operating. I suggested that this may have served in part to distinguish 
him, as a specialist, from the ‘body’ o f  ordinary veterinary surgeons. His remarks 
above also set him apart in a sense, from this other group.
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93.1.2 ‘I t’s in all the books, but Vve never seen it...9
IM, like Ben previously, referred to the differences and discrepancies that exist 
between the ‘idealised’ injuries and operations depicted and described in 
textbooks, and his actual, personal experiences o f these injuries and operations. I 
did not see IM use a textbook whilst he was operating. However, there was no 
evidence that he scorned such literature; on the contrary, he was very well read on 
his subject, and had himself contributed articles to veterinary journals. His 
comment above hints at these differences that exist between ‘book knowledge’ 
and ‘experience knowledge’, or ‘knowing that’ something is (at least 
theoretically) possible, and ‘knowing how’ to do it in actual practice.
There are a number of possible reasons for the existence of these differences. For 
example, we have seen that not all aspects of either complex tasks, or their skilled 
performance can be stated. Also, as Lucy Suchman (1987) argued, every action is 
a situated action’. Following on from this, there is no such thing as a ‘general’ 
context in which such an action takes place. Each operation for example, forms a 
specific context which, whilst it has similarities to other operations of the same 
type, also retains certain, unique features not present in any other incidence, and 
so ‘hidden’ in the generalisation that inevitably accompanies written accounts.
9 3 .1 3  ‘Thinking aloud*
IM, like the surgeons who were observing the compound fracture and hard palate 
repairs discussed earlier in this chapter (as opposed to those who were actually 
performing these procedures), verbally rehearsed possible alternative methods to 
that used, (in this instance the use o f alternative materials to stabilise the joint). In 
IM’s case however, he himself was the operating surgeon, rather than being 
peripheral to the procedure. This too I feel, is linked to the fact that he works at 
the forefront of his discipline. Some of the operations that he carries out are 
therefore ‘experimental’ or ‘hypothetical’ in nature, in the sense that they may not 
previously have been performed (or at least performed in quite that way), either 
by himself, or by anyone else.
Incidentally, in later conversations about cruciate operations, experienced 
surgeons RH and BMc expressed surprise at IM’s customary use of stainless steel
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wire for cruciate repair in dogs. This indicates that this method (which was 
routinely used by IM as shown below) was probably not a standard ‘textbook’ 
method for carrying out this procedure. Therefore, just as ‘ordinary’ vets may 
verbally ‘tiy out’ or enact virtually procedures that are new to them, expert 
practitioners such as IM may similarly enact those which are new to veterinary 
science itself.
93.2: IM’s second operation of the morning (operation 7).
On commencing this operation (which was carried out upon a dog this time), IM 
had spoken of his intention to use the same ‘over the top’ technique as he had 
used for the previous operation, (except for the use of a different material to 
stabilize the joint). However, once he had opened up the joint, it became evident 
that this patient had disrupted the collateral ligament in addition to the cruciates. 
The collateral ligament (which runs down the lateral aspect of the joint) was not 
broken however, but had become detached with a fragment of bone. IM quickly 
reattached the bone fragment (with the ligament attached) to the periosteum with 
a small screw. He then proceeded (in between the usual interruptions) to effect 
the cmciate repair. I noticed at this point that he was using a different suturing 
technique, stitching through the joint from one side to the other instead of over 
the top o f the knee. When I asked him why he had decided to do this, he replied 
that he didn’t want to follow the normal procedure because of the complication to 
the case caused by the detached collateral ligament. He spoke of having to make 
decisions like this on the spur o f the moment:
‘There‘s a world o f  difference between what you see in the classroom and what 
you see on the table.... narrowing down the list ofpossibilities when you actually have 
to make a decision, committing yourself. I t ’s one o f the difficult things to learn, 
decision making.... ’
IM had made the decision to use an alternative technique because of the necessity 
to repair the disruption to the collateral, as well as the cruciate ligaments As a 
consequence o f this unforeseen injury (literally unforeseen, since ligaments show 
up only poorly if at all on radiographs), the necessary repair to the collateral 
ligament would have ‘got in the way’ had he used his standard technique. He did 
so apparently automatically, without remark, and in the midst o f the interruptions
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that characteristically accompanied his work. When I asked him about it, he again 
reflected upon the differences that exist between ‘book knowledge’ and actual 
experience. He highlighted the difficulties inherent in learning to make decisions 
based upon what is actually present, rather than theoretical representations of 
what might be there. Again, this reflects characteristics o f ‘expert’ practitioners 
already discussed.
IM’s reference to the difficulties of learning to make decisions in surgery calls to 
mind a remark made by one of Cassell‘s (1987) surgeon respondents, that there is 
a permanent need for decision making during operations, which can be compared 
to a cyclist’s need to keep in motion. For IM it would appear that this decision 
making ability apparently developed alongside (and drew upon) his surgeon’s 
experience knowledge. Blois (1980) addressed questions relating to how much of 
clinical judgement is computable, and whether thought itself is governed by rules. 
Like computers, novice practitioners seem to need to follow sets o f specified rules 
to order their conduct in a given situation. As an individual gains in experience 
however, these rules are put aside in favour of other strategies. IM provides an 
example of an ‘expert’ who has abandoned ‘the rules’ (such as those encoded in 
textbook accounts o f  orthopaedic surgical procedures), allowing creative 
solutions; innovation!
9 3 3  An example from a non-specialist (operation 8)
This final example was observed some fifteen months after my first period of 
observation which had taken place at the orthopaedic referral practice, and it was 
in fact the first time since then that I had seen this procedure carried out. During 
the whole of the intervening period, I had been spending at least two or three days 
per week in veterinary practices, observing surgery, and had not again seen this 
procedure. This gives some idea of the unusual nature o f this operation, and how 
singular was the situation in my first placement, where I had seen ten or more o f 
these operations carried out over a two week period. They had seemed in fact to 
make up the bulk of the referral surgery carried out by IM, in the same sort of way 
as spays made up the bulk of the operations carried out by experienced general 
surgeon RH during the observation period. In this instance BMc was the 
operating surgeon.
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BMc operating on a cruciate case in the other room. The dog is in a cradle in dorsal 
recumbency, the leg shaved, and tied to the table. BMc uses a different method to 
IM  and it takes much longer, and seems to be more difficult (or perhaps it is just 
that he hasn ‘t done so many?). The animal is draped so that only the site o f the 
stifle joint is visible. Says to one o f  the other vets that he is going to do ‘an 
over-the -top ’. I am interested, because I  had seen IM do this procedure. But this 
method is different. BMc explains that he is using a bit o f  fascia tissue from the 
side o f  the animal's knee, ‘sort ofpulling it through the path where the ligament 
goes ’. This tissue is attached to suture material, to aid this pulling through 
process, which is fiddly. IM ’s drilling and wiring is a lot quicker. But eventually 
he finishes the procedure, starts to suture. I  ask about when it is necessary to 
concentrate, and when it doesn *t matter so much when interruptions happen. He 
spoke o f ‘critical stages ’ during an op, (more problematic i f  interruptions happen 
then) when you sometimes switch o ff  the radio, and close the door to shut out 
some o f  the hubbub.
BMc used a much more complicated ‘textbook’ cruciate repair method, and 
perhaps as a consequence of this, took more than twice as long to carry out the 
operation than had IM. He had the textbook concerned on hand, and also the 
radiographs of the damaged leg. As WW had done previously, he initially 
consulted the book, and then largely seemed to ignore it. He did however consult 
the radiographs at frequent intervals, probably to reassure himself of the path of 
the cruciate ligaments, about which he expressed concern. IM, by way of contrast, 
ignored this path, passing his suture through the joint at whichever point seemed 
appropriate in the light of the injury encountered. IM avoided the use o f the slimy 
and difficult to handle fascia tissue that BMc dissected from another part of the 
dog’s leg for securing the joint, choosing instead stainless steel wire that was 
much easier to manipulate and allowed a great deal of control in relation to 
tension.
This seems to be the major difference between the experienced and less 
experienced surgeons encountered in this study, that with greater experience, far 
less attention is paid to certain details that seem very important to beginners. 
Experts seemingly possess the ability to simplify complex procedures in such a 
way as to make them appear far less complex. This simplification is encoded not 
only in their attitude towards the procedure (which obviously becomes less
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fraught with increasing experience), but also in the actual methods chosen to 
carry it out. When experts make a procedure look easy this is not merely an 
artefact of their more practised manipulations, but also o f  their choosing more 
straightforward methods in the first place, and being able to make short cuts, 
bypassing some of the more difficult manoeuvres altogether.
Although he did not cany out cruciate repair operations often, this was certainly 
not the first time that BMc had done so. He was an experienced practitioner who 
had a local reputation amongst other vets and animal owners as a ‘good surgeon’ 
who could successfully carry out most procedures, including those regarded as 
‘difficult’ by peers. However, in comparison with IM, be proceeded on this 
occasion in the rule-bound fashion characteristic of practitioners at much lower 
skill levels.
9.4 Discussion and conclusions
Main concerns raised in this chapter include further enhancement procedures 
(which may be visual or verbal, direct or indirect, although as usual these are by 
no means exclusive categories), and their use by different groups of surgeons in 
performing actual and virtual operations. Continuing on from matters addressed 
in chapter 8, the differences that exist in novices* and experts’ approaches to a 
task, and between textbook accounts and actual practice are further highlighted. I 
began by outlining ways in which the orthopaedic operations described here differ 
from the more routine spays discussed in the previous chapter, whilst at the same 
time retaining certain common characteristics. For example, the pre-operative 
preparations undertaken are similar (or at least their textbook descriptions are), 
and the operations proceed through the same stages from beginning to end, as 
described in the chapter 1.
In chapter 8, considerable attention was paid to surgeons’ uses of what I have 
called prim ary enhancement and reduction procedures - pre-operative 
positioning, shaving, draping and so on - for the initial mapping of the internal 
body. A good deal o f variation was found in the extent to which these procedures 
were applied in the case of routine spay operations, and this variation led me to 
speculate that they served this other purpose, quite apart from their stated one of
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infection prevention. For the ‘harder’ orthopaedic operations described here 
however, considerably less variation in primary enhancement and reduction 
measures was encountered. For these operations it would seem, these procedures 
were for some or other reason of some importance to all surgeons concerned. All 
of the orthopaedic patients observed except for the hard-paiate repair cat were 
prepared conscientiously, and in addition this preparation was often done either in 
part or wholly by the surgeon him- or her-self, rather than by an assisting nurse.
For orthopaedic operations (in contrast with spays), the acknowledged ‘expert’ 
was just as scrupulous in these preparations as less experienced surgeons. The 
particular vulnerability of orthopaedic operations to infection is not disputed.
Both the veterinary text quoted at the beginning of the section devoted to 
compound fractures, and the testimony of the orthopaedic specialist provide 
evidence for this. However, I feel that, although the extra risk of infection is 
certainly an issue here, this neither negates the conclusions of chapter 8, nor 
precludes the possibility o f yet another possible, additional purpose for these 
preparations.
A possible clue lies in the differential preparations of the surgeons* own bodies, 
linked by Hirschauer (1991) with the preparation of patient-bodies as important in 
initially making possible the mapping of the body. Orthopaedic consultant IM 
prepared himself just as assiduously (though, it must be said, less 
self-consciously) as had newly qualified James. In contrast to these two examples, 
the personal preparations o f the other surgeons encountered were scarcely any 
more thorough for orthopaedic surgery than for a routine spay operation. It is 
argued here however that these self-preparation rituals as performed by James and 
by IM, served quite different (indeed opposite) purposes. For James, enacting the 
rituals into which he had recently been initiated may have served also to 
characterise him as a now fully-fledged member of the veterinary surgeon 
form-of-life. In IM’s case however, (for whom this was obviously unnecessary), it 
perhaps served rather to distinguish him from the body of ‘ordinary’ experienced 
practitioners, who seemed to trouble themselves far less with these preparations.
It is possible therefore that the scrupulous preparations of the patient functioned 
to distinguish these ‘difficult’ operations (which tended to be carried out by 
experienced, senior surgeons), from more mundane procedures such as might be 
performed by any qualified vet, however inexperienced.
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Notwithstanding the importance of primary enhancement and reduction 
procedures for whichever purpose, a major focus here is on further enhancement 
procedures, defined as those procedures enacted for the purpose o f further 
elucidating and differentiating internal body organs and tissues (ie, once surgery 
is underway, rather than prior to its commencement). As we saw in operation 1, 
further enhancement procedures can take a direct form, that is, applied directly to 
the patient-body. This was demonstrated by James’ use of gauze swabs to conceal 
abdominal organs not o f immediate interest to the spay operation upon which he 
was engaged, thereby presumably ‘enhancing’ for him those of immediate 
concern.
Such procedures can also be indirect, that is, not applied to the patient-body itself, 
but used more in the sense of aiding the surgeon’s thinking about it. RH used 
language as a further enhancement procedure, talking his way through the 
identification and differentiation of abnormal organs in operation 3. Pinch et al 
(1996, 1997) also observed a similar use of language in respect of veterinary 
surgery, and we see here yet another example in relation to expert orthopaedic 
surgeon IM, who switched between off-task talk and verbal bodymapping as he 
carried out cruciate repair operations. In operation 5, the young vet Alison was 
seen to use language in combination with visual representations in her initial 
deliberations as to the most effective method o f repairing the cat’s hard palate, 
using others present (including non-vets) as a ‘sounding board’ to rehearse her 
ideas.
This brings us to discussion of ‘indirect’ further enhancement procedures of a 
visual nature. I include within this blanket term radiographs, and also illustrations 
in surgical manuals, anatomical atlases and radiological atlases. These images 
were seen to be used not only by those surgeons directly concerned with the 
operation that was being carried out, but also by others who were peripheral to the 
procedure, but were in effect participating in the operation vicariously. It is 
argued here that this participation in ‘virtual’ operations which takes place 
alongside ‘actual’ ones, is not a trivial matter, but crucially important in the 
development of surgical expertise. As well as ‘collaborating’ in the performance 
of virtual operations, surgeons were observed to do so in actual ones. In this way, 
further enhancement procedures of a verbal and a visual nature were seen to be 
used together.
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When for some reason a vet required assistance, whether of an advisory nature, or 
purely manipulative, they would if possible co-opt another to help. Social 
interaction thereby allowed difficult tasks to be more readily successfully 
performed, as well as being critical for learning. It would appear that surgeons’ 
learning is accomplished by means of collaborating with others in actual and 
virtual operations. Such collaborations therefore appear to be a strategy whereby 
bodymapping becomes possible for surgeons.
It is time now to draw together the threads of inference that have been extracted 
from all of these observations.
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NOTES
The cruciate ligaments cross over behind the knee joint, holding the long 
bones of the upper and lower hindlimb together. See Fig 12.
^ ‘Harder’ as in ‘more difficult’.
^ The bones of the roof o f the mouth.
^ Lying on its side.
^  The wrist, as it is known in humans.
^ Road traffic accident.
^ Alison expressed her intolerance o f interruptions by means of humour and 
laughter, passing it off as a joke. Compare this with the terse reaction of (the 
normally genial) senior vet WW. It is contended here that as a young woman, 
Alison would see (and quite possibly, others would see also) such a  reaction as 
inappropriate. See Hunter (2000) for discussion of women and power.
^ British Veterinary Association
^ Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons
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CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
‘Thus, the practice o f  operating appears to be a versatile craft. It resembles 
building or carpentry in the way bones are sawed, drilled, chiselled and screwed 
together; tailoring where skin and tissue o f  different consistency are cut apart 
and sewn together; the work o f  sailors, when various knots are tied; and a 
butcher‘s trade, when muscles and innards are carved up... *
Stefan Hirschauer 1991, p.300.
10.1 Introduction
We have now reached the point where it is necessary to tie together loose ends (of 
which there are several), identify the weaknesses and inadequacies of this study, 
(of which there are also several), and notwithstanding these, address more or less 
directly the aims and research question stated earlier. It is also necessary that I 
highlight other points of interest that have arisen from the data, and make 
suggestions for further research. Finally, I consider ways in which the issues 
raised by this study may be more widely applicable.
The research question itself, ‘How do surgeons map the body during operations?’ 
is on closer inspection seen to be composed of a number of smaller, related 
questions, concerned with the uses that surgeons make of 2D representations of 
their patients’ 3D bodies, the ways in which they relate their actual experience of 
bodies to textbook accounts and representations of them, the ways they mediate 
uncertainty, and the ways in which all of these things change as they gain in 
experience. I will examine these ‘sub-questions’ in turn, mainly in respect of 
fieldwork data relating to surgeons, but drawing upon sculpture data too, where 
this can contribute some small insights. I begin however, by discussing the 
themes of narrativity and (linked to this) categorisation, and problems that have 
arisen in relation to them. I next move on to consider some of the major criticisms 
that could be made of this study, notably in relation to methodology and 
objectivity.
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10.2 Absolute categories or fuzzy boundaries?
I expressed early on a desire and intention to avoid the constraints that narrative 
imposes, via the use of alternative notational forms (alternative that is, to the use 
of text alone). I speculated that using graphics alongside text, in the tradition of 
‘visual languages’ (Rudwick 1976) would help to overcome these constraints. 
However, since I have experienced anyway a great deal of difficulty with the 
narrative ordering of this thesis, (which was necessary however because otherwise 
it would not be a thesis, but something else instead), I suspect that I have not 
entirely succeeded in this aim. We have seen how the narratives that we construct 
in order to make sense of, and communicate our experiences, tend to render some 
aspects of them tacit. This is due to the necessity to impose a linear sequence on 
to complex events and topics which do not necessarily occur in a linear way, one 
part following another in an orderly fashion. This however is how narrative 
constructs them. Writing a PhD thesis, like performing a surgical operation or 
carving a sculpture, is one such complex activity, (ie, making a report of complex 
activities), and much of the complexity tends to disappear in the telling, resulting 
in what I feel is a somewhat superficial account that lacks fine detail. This counts 
not only for the processes of operating, or carving, but also for that of writing 
about these activities. This line of thinking can only eventually result in infinite 
regress. It is however, the key to the differences that have been found to exist 
between actual practice, and textbook accounts of it, and is an issue that has 
proved problematic also in such fields as Expert Systems research, where experts 
have similarly been unable to specify all parts of their knowledge.
The associated necessity to categorise, categories themselves, and the boundaries 
that exist between them, are also seemingly inescapable. The ‘knowing’ and 
‘seeing’, and ‘seeing a s’ and ‘seeing that' categories are particularly salient to this 
research, and were the cause of initial problems encountered in organising the 
topics of the literature review into separate sections and chapters. Many of these 
topics would not sit easily under either ‘knowing’ or ‘seeing’ headings, but 
seemed to be relevant to both. This made writing these sections much more 
difficult than I had anticipated; so much so, in fact, that I am surprised that I have 
so infrequently come across any reference to this problem in other accounts. This 
it would appear, is one of the aspects that remain ‘hidden’ in many accounts. I 
have attempted to ‘open it up’ for discussion by recourse to a reflexive approach.
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Splitting ‘knowing’ from ‘seeing’, or for that matter ‘seeing as’ from 
‘seeing that’ not only seems arbitrary, but appears to connive at dualism even in 
the very act of questioning it. As a result many items were moved from one 
chapter to another, in some cases several times. Even now, I feel that there are 
topics that sit uncomfortably where they are, not necessarily because they do not 
‘belong there’, but because they also belong in several other places!
Immediately after the literature review was completed, new problems arose when 
it came to discussing my research methods. This I realise is because thinking 
about research methods (or for that matter about any activity which we have 
carried out in the past) is always problematic when we attempt to subsume what 
we have actually done or experienced into some sort of narrative order. Certain 
important aspects seem to be hidden by this process. For example, as I pointed 
out previously, the data collection, analysis and writing stages of this research 
were not easily separable; I found it very difficult to ‘list’ them in the order in 
which they occurred, for the simple reason that they often occurred together, all at 
the same time. I do not think that this state of affairs is peculiar to this work, but 
as Paul Atkinson (1990) has intimated, is probably common to all research, or 
certainly to all qualitative research.
The data collection phase for example, involved a good measure of elementary 
analysis, in selecting which events to observe (since it was not possible to observe 
everything), in judging which particular ‘aspects of these aspects’ to record, 
whom to engage in conversation, and what questions to ask them! It also involved 
the writing down of field notes, which was no small matter, since they would 
become the basis for the writing up of this final report. The analysis and writing 
stages likewise, each involved elements of both of the other phases. Analysis 
often (or perhaps usually) shows up gaps in the data, thus raising new questions, 
and in the early stages at least, this often sends the researcher back into the field 
to try to discover what she has missed. This stage, in my experience, is 
problematic because one is always being tempted back into the field to try to find 
out more. Thus fieldwork is seductive, and attempts at analysis render it more so. 
Writing too, is not an activity that is in reality easy to separate off from other 
research activities. As we saw above, it forms part of the work of data collection, 
but neither is it entirely separable from analysis. For me, much of the ‘real’ work
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of analysis took place through the actual writing itself, despite having spent 
several months attempting to order field notes into categories in the accepted 
tradition o f ‘qualitative analysis’! Thus we have travelled a tortuous route from 
data collection to analysis to writing and back again, often in a zig-zag sort of 
fashion.
Despite its inherent difficulties however, categorisation may, as Eleanor Rosch 
has stated, be essential for ordering our thinking. Evidence from veterinary 
surgeon respondents seemed to indicate this, by the ways in which they 
categorised the operations that they carried out. This seems important, since the 
way they classified these procedures appeared to affect the ways in which they 
thought about them, and approached them. However, as I soon discovered, 
categories themselves can be thought about in different ways, for example, as 
absolute, watertight entities, or rather more flexibly. Experienced surgeon BM 
referred to differences that exist for example between ‘emergency’ and 
‘non-emergency’ surgery. However, when I attempted to apply these categories 
rigidly, as headings for ‘analysis’ purposes, I became aware that this was not at all 
what BM intended. It became apparent that ‘emergencies’ are themselves subject 
to classification. Thus BM’s ‘emergency’ and ‘non-emergency’ categories were 
loose ones, heuristic in nature. For most purposes (his purposes) they worked 
perfectly well, as a tool for classifying surgical operations in the veterinary 
form-of-life.
In this instance (of my trying to use them algorithmically, as an analytical tool) 
though, they soon revealed themselves to be inadequate. By reworking these 
categories, essentially by subdividing the ‘emergencies’ category much more 
precisely, I was eventually able to make this classification work as a tool for 
analysis, at least for the examples encountered in this thesis. It is however almost 
inevitable that if  sufficient, further surgical operations were sampled, we would 
eventually come up against other examples which did not quite fit even into these 
newer, and more precise categories.
One explanation for this is that experts and novices appear to use categories 
rather differently. Novices seem to use them like algorithms, and experts to use 
them more heuristically. This in itself is an interesting ‘finding’, and may offer a 
clue as to why experts are often not the best teachers for novices, and also
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incidentally why many ‘expert systems’ have been shown to be of use only to 
other experts. To communicate complex information, it must be first broken 
down into less complex units, and this implies categorisation in some shape or 
form. If novices and experts use, and think about categories in different ways, it 
follows that experts’ explanations may lead to confusion for beginners. As a 
novice classifier of surgical operations, I attempted to apply a method of 
classification that had been suggested by an expert. Once I started to use it in 
attempts to classify surgery for my own purposes of analysis however, it soon 
became evident that it was inadequate because it was not sufficiently inclusive to 
work for every case described.
As we see from this simple example, categories can often be specified in a more 
inclusive way. With the benefit of this small amount of experience of operation- 
classifying, this is what I eventually did. Novices require that their categories be 
absolutely reliable and inclusive, and become confused when some object or 
occurrence fails for some or other reason to fit into them. With experience 
however, other factors come into consideration, and this rigidity becomes less 
important. This allows the practitioner (who may be a surgeon, or a researcher) to 
become more flexible in his or her approach. In fact, as Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) pointed out, this rigidity must be tempered, or progress to more advanced 
stages in the acquisition of the particular skill in question will not be possible. In 
my own case, early difficulties with assigning discussion of previous research 
under particular headings may simply have signified novice behaviour in relation 
to social research. An alternative explanation (since this research is 
‘unconventional’ in a number of respects) is that this uncertainty results from the 
fact that the research itself inhabits a ‘fuzzy boundary’ of its own, between what 
has been done before and what has not. Perhaps again, neither explanation is on 
its own sufficient, but both beg consideration. An uneasy alliance!
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10.3 *Subjects* and objectivity,,.
Apart from problems with narrative sequencing, and with the categorisation of 
objects and events that is necessary to form the narrative structure (as if this were 
not enough!), this work has other inherent problems. For example, it could quite 
justifiably be criticised for being overly ‘subjective’, (though I make no claim to 
‘objectivity’), Objectivity in research - any research - is in any case an 
unachievable ideal, and (I feel) an over-rated one. My methods, particularly in 
respect o f participant observation and dabbling with introspectionism, are 
particularly unsuited to such claims. I was unsure at the outset whether it was in 
fact possible to research this sort of topic at all, outside of the controlled 
conditions of the psychology laboratory.
Novel topics and research contexts are all very well, but they do require a certain 
amount of departure from ‘traditional’ ways of thinking about research, and from 
‘traditional’ methodologies too. I did not find this aspect at all easy, particularly 
since my early training was in the field of biology, which is rather rigid (at least 
as far as research methodology and the required style of writing is concerned). I 
experienced the feeling at times that I was experimenting at the boundaries of 
accepted methods, since all of the usual ones seemed unavailable, inadequate, or 
both. Quite apart from methods, mixing surgeons and sculptors as research 
participants is hardly indicative either of a conventional approach. There is 
undoubtedly some tension here, and plenty of room for criticism. However, one 
of the requirements of a PhD thesis, is that it is ‘original’. With a novel research 
context, a novel combination of respondents and novel methods, this is one aspect 
at least which is hard to criticise. To offer some degree of justification for an 
approach which I still consider was necessarily unconventional, it is time now to 
address the research question, to show the insights that this approach can 
contribute to our understanding of practical skills.
10.4 M apping surgeons* mapping the body...
As I pointed out earlier, my initial research question can usefully be broken down 
into a number of smaller ‘sub-questions’. I will therefore deal with these in turn, 
bearing in mind that all, as usual are linked, and this particular categorisation
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should be seen as heuristic in nature, rather than the following sub-sections be 
considered as exclusive, or algorithmic categories.
10.4.1 What uses do surgeons make of 2D representations of their patients’ 
3D bodies?
As we saw in chapter 7, sculptor respondents were observed to make certain uses 
of pictures (or reported these uses), in the construction of three-dimensional 
artefacts. They used them for example, as sources of ideas, for solving problems 
(particularly problems relating to dimensionality, where numbers of pictures, as 
opposed to single ones, were seen to be more useful), and as rhetorical devices. 
Certain other possible uses however were rejected, or shown to be problematic if  
they were used. Examples which fall into the latter category include their use 
(somewhat surprisingly, I felt) as ‘blueprints’ for planning work, or as models to 
copy directly. What then of surgeons? The data clearly show that surgeon 
respondents also used pictures (anatomical pictures and radiographs) as aids to 
surgery. But what were these uses however, and how do they compare with those 
of sculptors?
Firstly, the surgeons did not always use pictures. Arguably, neither do sculptors, 
although the limited data available at this point did indicate that four very 
different respondents all made some or other use of them on some occasions. 
However, I did not for example, observe a single surgeon use pictures during a 
routine spay operation (although several were observed to use other bodymapping 
aids which we will discuss later). During orthopaedic operations in contrast, all 
respondents involved used them, although the numbers and types used, and the 
extent to which they were used, were seen to vary along with the type of 
operation, the people present, and the amount of prior experience that the 
operating surgeon had accrued o f performing it.
Interestingly, surgeons’ uses of pictures did appear largely to mirror those of 
sculptors. They were likely to use them for sources of ideas, for example, for 
suitable surgical techniques to employ in a given case, for solving problems (in 
relation to anatomical ambiguities, or surgical techniques again), and for 
rhetorical purposes, in persuading other surgeons of the efficacy of their methods. 
They proved inadequate or problematic however, as ‘blueprints’ of the body (one
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reason for this being presumably because actual bodies tend to vary in ways that 
anatomical pictures of them do not). Also, and linked to this, it seemed to cause 
great problems if surgeons attempted to ‘copy’ exactly the operations shown in 
surgical manuals, as Alison found in her initial attempts to repair the cat’s 
disunited hard palate in operation 5. Again, like the sculptors, the surgeons 
appeared in general to prefer numbers of visual representations to single ones if  
they were available. They also selected pictures from a range of sources rather 
than from a single source where possible. This recalls the dynamic construction of 
representations by scientists described in Lynch and Woolgar (1990), and it is 
surmised that by this use of multiple 2D representations which they juxtaposed 
together, both sets of participants were able to ‘build up’ a composite picture 
which more approached the 3D reality with which they worked, but was at the 
same time simplified in important respects.
10.4.2 In what ways do surgeons relate their actual experience of bodies to 
textbook accounts and representations of them?
It cannot be denied that clear differences exist between textbook accounts of a 
practice and the actual practice itself. For example, following, or attempting to 
follow textbook instructions ‘to the letter’ when carrying out an unfamiliar 
procedure almost invariably leads to problems. It is therefore seen to be difficult 
to apply textbook knowledge unmodified to actual practice. This can be easily 
observed in commonplace situations, for example when children are learning to 
cook at home. Even where they seem to possess sufficient skills, for example to 
read the recipe and measure the required ingredients, they experience difficulty in 
following the instructions in recipes, and often need to call upon a parent or more 
experienced sibling to provide explanation of these, and sometimes practical 
demonstrations also. Thus certain ‘informal’ aspects of cookeiy-knowledge 
require to be conveyed to the novice cook by means other than recipes!
There are likewise ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ aspects to veterinary surgical 
knowledge. The informal ones may be difficult to express in words, and so tend 
to be left out of textbook accounts. Some informal aspects may be expressed as 
heuristics, or ‘rules of thumb’. These cannot however be guaranteed to work on 
every occasion, and there may be different ones in circulation for the same 
situation, which can lead to confusion, especially for novices. It is necessary
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therefore to think about other ways of conveying information apart from sets of 
propositional instructions, and informal (and sometimes unreliable) heuristics.
Unlike text or spoken language, images are not linear, but more synchronous, like 
a woven fabric (Paivio 1991), and using them would thus seem to avoid some of 
the snags to which language alone is prone. The visual language (Rudwick 1976) 
of surgery is one which has a long, complex history (much longer in fact than that 
of Rudwick* s own context of geology), and comprises various types of 
anatomical textbooks and atlases, specialist journal articles, surgical manuals, and 
for orthopaedic surgeons, radiological atlases also. In chapter 3 ,1 briefly outlined 
the history of anatomical illustration. This is important, because it is a history that 
is still being written, with the emergence of new techniques and technologies for 
visualising the body. It is important also because it appears that surgeons 
‘construct’ the actual body in much the same way as anatomical pictures of it are 
constructed. They reduce it to the immediate area of concern, for example, and 
then ‘enhance’ this area by the various means available to them. This 
enhancement may include the use of language (in that they sometimes ‘talk’ their 
way through the identification of the various bodily structures that they 
encounter), and pictures.
Hirschauer (1991) described this process as one in which the actual body 
becomes merged with the anatomical body encoded in these pictures. This is a 
protracted process, which involves skills that take a long time to acquire. We 
encountered this process at the outset, in the ways in which veterinary student 
Richard and his colleagues revised for their anatomy examinations not only with 
their textbooks, but with the living bodies of their pet animals also. We observed 
it also in the later stages, when experienced surgeons would pore over textbooks 
across the prone bodies of anaesthetised animals. As well as involving bodies, 
pictures and texts however, this process also entails social interaction. Knowledge 
about surgery is largely constructed and transferred as a result o f social processes. 
Initially, anatomy is learned by rote, from lecture notes and textbooks. Structures 
encoded in these notes and books may then be identified in relation to live 
animals at home or in the operating theatre, or to dead animals in dissection 
classes. Later, these processes continue through actual and vicarious participation 
in operations. However, I run ahead o f myself.
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I would like to call attention here to the roles of what I have called the 
‘enhancement and reduction procedures’* to which patients’ bodies are subjected 
prior to surgery, and of the ‘further enhancement procedures’ which may be 
applied during its actual course. The former procedures are ostensibly for the 
purpose of maintaining sterility, thus avoiding the possibility of post-operative 
infection. However, I have presented evidence that indicates that they are also 
used as bodymapping strategies. The patient’s gross anatomy is effectively 
‘reduced’ to the salient part for the particular operation in question; thus for spay 
operations, it is ‘reduced’ to the abdomen. This is done via the shaving of the 
operative site, draping and so on. At the same time it is ‘enhanced’, initially by 
means of positioning techniques and aids. All of these procedures function to help 
visually ‘reduce’ the gross body, ‘enhancing’ its salient areas, and thereby 
rendering it more like the content of 2D anatomical pictures. The actual body thus 
becomes ‘merged’ with the anatomical body initially acquired from such pictures. 
I have summarised these procedures in tabular form in Figl3 below.
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P r i m a r y  e n h a n c e m e n t
 p r o c e d u r e s  R e d u c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s
D i r e c t  f u r t h e r  
e n h a n c e m e n t  
p r o c e d u r e s
I n d i r e c t  f u r t h e r  
e n h a n c e m e n t  
p r o c e d u r e s
Use of positioning aids; 
support cradle, hind 
limbs tied to operating 
table to allow maximum 
access to site. (Op. 1 
section 8.4, Op. 2 
section 8.6, Op. 3 
section 8.7)
WW's ’trying out' of 
several positions before 
deciding on the one that 
offered maximum 
access to the medial 
aspect of the lower 
forelimb (Op. 4, section 
9.1)
Alison's positioning of 
'hard palate' cat to 
match the position of 
the one pictured in the 
textbook (Op. 5, section 
9.2)
Shaving of site, draping J 
(Op. 1 section 8.4)
Use of'spay cloth' with 
small slit cut in centre 
by RH, in case of very 
small incision (Ops. 2,
3, sections 8.6, 8.7)
Swabbing of site with 
coloured antiseptic (all 
except for Op. 5 
(section 9.2)
Careful draping by 
surgeon, Ops. 4, 6, 7, 8, 
(sections 9.1, 9.3.1, 
9.3.2, 9.3.3), using 
rectangles of fabric and 
towel clips to 
effectively 'cut off the 
affected limb from the 
rest of the body.
NB: NO draping of 
hard palate patient (Op. 
5, section 9.2)
BMc's covering of the 
foot of his cruciate 
patient with a 
drawstring bag (Op. 8, 
section 9.3.3)
ames' use of swabs as a 
'visual aid' to cover 
’unwanted' internal 
organs in Op. 1 (section 
8.4)
James' extensive use of 
instrumentation in Op. 1 
(section 8.4), use of 
forceps, retractors etc to 
separate organs and 
hold wound open.
Importance of 
staunching blood flow 
to maximise visibility, 
even small 'oozes' that 
can be of no danger to 
the patient. (All ops)
Change of position of 
'hard palate' cat, from 
lateral (as shown in 




bodymapping talk when 
locating abnormal ovary 
(Op. 3, section 8.7)
Use of pictures (in 




(Op. 4, section 9.1; Op. 
5, section 9.2; Op.8, 
section 9.3.3 )
Use of pictures (in 
surgical textbooks and 
atlases, plus 
radiographs) by 
surgeons peripheral to 
procedures - 
participating in 'virtual 
surgery' (Op. 4, section 
9.1; Op. 5 section 9.2)
Social interaction 
-collaborative operating 
(Op 4, section 9.1, Op 
5, section 9.2)
Verbal bodymapping by 
IM when lots of 
interruptions (Op. 6, 
section 9.3.1)
Fig 13: Table to show primary enhancement, reduction and further 
enhancement procedures, with examples.
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I argue for this purpose of pre-operative procedures on the basis of their observed 
differential usage by surgeons who had accrued differing amounts of experience 
in respect of the operation in question. For routine operations, experienced 
surgeons took less trouble over these procedures than did novices. Since risk of 
infection (for the same operation, carried out in the same conditions upon the 
same species of animals) is hardly likely to vary to any great extent, it seems 
therefore that these procedures play quite another role apart from that of infection 
prevention. They are also used as visual aids to bodymapping. As is customary in 
talking about perceptual information, I have emphasised the visual. However, 
visual data is invariably complemented by that from other sensory modalities. 
Surgeons referred for example to the ‘feel’ of certain bodily tissues, and also on 
occasion to specific ‘sounds’ that they listen for. My use of the term ‘visual aids’ 
(which was ‘borrowed’ from a respondent) must therefore be seen in the light of 
this.
Once the surgery is underway, what I have called ‘further enhancement’ 
procedures may also be applied. These may be visual, or verbal in nature. ‘Visual’ 
ones can in addition be direct (that is, applied directly to the patient’s body, as 
with James’ use of the swab in operation 1 to conceal ‘unwanted’ organs), or 
indirect, involving pictures, which may be anatomical pictures or images derived 
from visualisation technologies such as radiography. Verbal bodymapping also, 
may be resorted to. In this instance, the surgeon may actually ‘talk his or her way’ 
through identifying the various bodily organs and tissues that s/he encounters. On 
the whole, further enhancement procedures are similar to the enhancement and 
reduction procedures described formerly, in that they also tend to be used more 
frequently and more comprehensively by the inexperienced. However, it was 
observed that experienced surgeons also engaged in these behaviours in situations 
of uncertainty. Like the outsides of bodies, their insides also frequently differ, and 
this can lead to uncertainty where a surgeon encounters a variant that s/he has not 
come across before. S/he will often in such instances engage in verbal 
bodymapping.
Further enhancement procedures are interesting also in that they may be ‘used’ by 
surgeons who are peripheral to the operation in question, as well as those who are 
actually participating in its performance. I have presented evidence which 
indicates that surgeons become able over time to map the body through their
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experiences of participating in actual and virtual operations. On several occasions 
where an unfamiliar operation was being performed, or one acknowledged for 
some or other reason to be ‘harder’ than average, groups of surgeons congregated 
around the actual surgery, and (particularly) visual representations of it, verbally 
rehearsing alternative strategies for carrying it out. Initial anatomical knowledge 
learned by rote from pictures and textbook accounts is thus applied via 
participation and collaboration in virtual and actual operations. The form of these 
‘virtual’ operations may be simple initially, for example, the comparison of 
anatomical textbook pictures with the anatomy of actual animals, as reported by 
student surgeon Richard could be seen in this light. Later, complex social 
interactions around visual representations at the scene of actual operations may 
take place. Veterinary surgical knowledge is thus constructed at least in part by 
social means.
10.4.3 In what ways do surgeons mediate uncertainty in relation to the 
body?
Some aspects of this question have already been answered. Surgeons use the 
further enhancement processes discussed earlier, in situations of uncertainty. 
However, how exactly can we define a ‘situation of uncertainty’? Experienced 
surgeons spoke of ways in which their experience had been built up over time in 
relation to mental ‘libraries of cases’ which they had accrued. Uncertainty 
therefore, it would seem, results when a surgeon encounters a case which for 
some reason is unlike any other case which s/he has come across before. Most of 
these problem situations can be related to variations that occur in anatomy, or to 
difficulties in relating actual bodies to textbook representations of them. This 
latter point was raised in the previous section, but it might prove useful to reflect 
a little more upon surgeons’ strategies for dealing with anatomical variations. 
Further enhancement procedures can be Used as physical aids as we have seen. 
Since we have already looked at visual (or more properly, perhaps, perceptual) 
variants of these at some length, it might prove instructive here to reflect a little 
more upon verbal strategies. We will also consider the relevance of evidence from 
Schunn and Klahr (2000) who showed how, when confronted with a confusing 
situations, participants in a series of experiments relating to solving computer 
programming problems temporarily switched their attention to less confusing
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aspects. Finally, I will argue for the usefulness of the abductive mode of inference 
in accounting for surgeons’ mediation of uncertain situations.
Fieldwork data has provided us with evidence of verbal bodymapping during 
operations, and this is complemented also by evidence from the literature 
(Hirschauer 1991; Pinch et al 1996). OfF-task and on-task talk during operations 
is a useful evidential form because o f the insights that it can provide into skill. 
Skill thus becomes visible and invisible to the observer via on-task and off-task 
talk On-task talk, that is, talk about the procedure itself, or about the anatomy 
encountered, renders surgeons’ skills visible. This skill does not disappear 
however on those occasions when ofif-task talk (which is talk about topics other 
than the procedure in hand, often casual chat) takes place. The skill is still there, 
and still being exercised. It is however rendered tacit. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
experienced surgeons tended to engage in off-task talk more than novices, who 
needed to concentrate far more upon the task in hand. Recordings of talk by 
surgeons during operations revealed that a significant proportion of on-task talk is 
related to bodymapping. Other topics ranged from surgical techniques to more 
general discussion o f  the types o f injuries encountered, and surmising possible 
causes for these.
Bodymapping talk is particularly interesting, in that it does not necessarily appear 
to be directed at anyone else present. Surgeons were observed to talk their way 
through the identification of organs and tissues, in unfamiliar or uncertain 
situations. Interviews with veterinary nurses too, confirmed that ‘their’ surgeons 
customarily engaged in this behaviour when uncertainty arose. At certain stages 
of operations, such as the initial incision (to make sure that it was made in the 
optimum place), and in the location o f tissues that were particularly salient to the 
procedure in question, particular concentration was needed. Thus bodymapping 
talk was more likely to occur, and off-task talk to be absent, at these stages. This 
accords with verbal evidence from surgeons JH and BMc who spoke o f ‘crucial 
stages’ during operations when it is necessary for a surgeon to concentrate all of 
his or her resources upon the task in hand.
Although fairly speculative in the case of surgery (since evidence from fieldwork 
data is thin in this respect), I would like to mention metaphor before concluding 
this short discussion of language-related strategies for mediating uncertainty. In
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chapter 5, we explored ways in which this term can be applied, as a ‘figure of 
speech’ for example, or more fundamentally, as a tool for thinking whereby 
aspects of something are thought about as some other thing. Thus abstract or 
unfamiliar concepts can be thought about in terms of more concrete or familiar 
concepts. I have already discussed my disquiet with this ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ 
terminology. However, I resort to their use due to the lack of any alternative; (in a 
‘metaphorical’ sense perhaps?) Metaphor is thus seen to be a potentially more 
useful linguistic device for communicating complexity, or ambiguity than others 
that we have encountered, such as narrative or prepositional language. Sculptor 
respondents referred several times to the difficulties involved in trying to express 
some issues related to their work in words. Metaphor was sometimes able to 
mediate this difficulty. The metaphor of evolution for instance, was employed to 
explain how their work developed and progressed over time. This usefulness of 
metaphor in communicating topics that are difficult to put into words, may be 
compared to the uses that we make of pictures for similar purposes.
Moving on from communicating uncertainty, to the more mechanical topic o f 
acting in the face of it, the work of David Klahr and his associates (2000) is 
useful in that it highlights the similarities that exist between everyday activities 
and scientific discovery. This work consists of a series of studies in which 
participants were asked to conduct experiments by using computer ‘microworlds’ 
in which they controlled the actions of animated devices. Their aim was to 
discover the effects of specific unknown functions. In one particular study, 
Schunn and Klahr (2000 ppl61-199) presented a complex discovery microworld 
called ‘Milk Truck’ to a group of 22 undergraduate students, in an attempt to 
reveal heuristics and strategies that people use to deal with task complexity. 50% 
of these participants went on to successfully complete the task, and the other 50% 
either gave up or reached an incorrect solution. Schunn and Klahr characterised 
their activities in terms of ‘searches’ of two ‘spaces’, a ‘hypothesis space’ and an 
‘experiment space’. They showed how, in searches of the experiment space, 
when confronted with a confusing aspect of a problem, several successful 
participants used what they termed the PUSH (put up on stack) heuristic, 
temporarily switching to another aspect that was less confusing. This strategy was 
apparently useful in three ways. Firstly, by allowing participants to work on a 
different aspect of the problem, PUSH enabled new ideas to be activated in the 
hypothesis space search, ie, it allowed the formation of new hypotheses.
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Secondly, the investigation of a different problem can suggest new operations that 
can be applied to the old situation thereby improving the experiment space search. 
Thirdly, in inducing a complex concept involving interactions (such as those 
underlying the mystery command), ‘discoveries about one part o f  the concept 
aids discoveries about another part o f the concept' (ibid p. 174).
PUSH aids then, in the production of novel solutions (or solutions to novel 
problems perhaps), and a version of this was observed in operation 3, where RH 
was confronted with an abnormal variant of canine reproductive anatomy that he 
had not before encountered. This strategy would therefore also seem to be one 
that is o f use when thinking about the ways in which surgeons deal with 
uncertainty or ambiguity. It would also seem to suggest that there are many 
similarities between surgical practice and other skills.
Thus we link the physical dimensions of mediating uncertainty, taken to be those 
aspects that are directly available to the observer for example through visual or 
verbal means, with the cognitive ones, about which we can only surmise, and 
make suppositions based upon the perceptual evidence available to us. I would 
argue that many surgical problems (particularly those that relate to anatomical 
ambiguities) are not amenable to solution by logical means alone, since 
insufficient evidence is available to effectively apply logic. This discounts then, 
the sole use of deductive or inductive modes of inference as sufficient 
explanation. I argue therefore for the abductive model o f inference which allows 
for creative ‘leaps’ to be made, from what is known (for example, from one’s 
previous experience, or information that can be found in a textbook or obtained 
from a colleague), to what is not yet known. As Gooding (1990, ch.l) pointed out 
however, practical procedures such as those that I have been investigating, are 
often later reconstructed so that they appear logical in retrospect.
Abduction can be characterised as a scheme which incorporates both intuitive and 
logical moves, and verbal, symbolic or image based representation, and can thus 
‘fill the gap’ of knowledge that can exist between the present case and a slightly 
different one experienced previously, explaining the ‘working hypotheses’ formed 
by my respondents to account for ambiguous perceptual data during surgical 
operations, and for alterations that were seemingly automatically made to 
previously-stated plans. Although the unfamiliar anatomical or physiological
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variant is not the same as any previously encountered, some aspects of it will be 
the same. Practitioners therefore identify these familiar aspects, and abduce novel 
solutions from this basis. As Josephson and Josephson (1996) pointed out, 
abductions are fallible and doubt cannot be completely eliminated. However, they 
enable action to be taken ‘on the run’ in situations of uncertainty which require 
immediate attention.
This strategy of course requires that the practitioner in question has some degree 
of personal experience in relation to the problem in question. As we have already 
seen however, such experience can be virtual (ie acquired by vicarious 
participation in surgery that is being performed by others), as well as actual It 
can be argued that all surgeons, even students like Richard, will thus have some 
small amount of experience upon which to base solutions, and even he would 
have the ability to make small abductions on the basis o f this. However, the scope 
of these would be very limited, since presumably, insufficient aspects o f the 
situation in hand would be recognisable to him to enable him to solve any but the 
simplest problems without help. Also, vicarious participation in operations alone 
(though important), does not provide the opportunity for the acquisition of 
embodied experience (which may relate for example to the feel o f the tissues, or 
the manipulation o f instruments), in the same way as actual participation. Thus 
the importance of both types of experiences needs to be taken into consideration.
10.4 4 In what ways do all o f these things change in nature as surgeons gain 
in experience?
Clear differences exist in the performance of surgeons with less experience in 
comparison to those with greater experience. For example, we have seen that 
primary enhancement and reduction processes may be less stringently applied by 
experienced surgeons, and further enhancement procedures may also be used less, 
or differently. Self-preparation o f the surgeon may also be performed less 
stringently, although beginners and acknowledged experts may ‘use’ this for 
different purposes. These preparations can also be seen (in addition to the usual 
explanation given, which is that they are indispensable for the purposes of 
infection prevention), in relation to surgeons’ presentation of self (Goffman 
1961). The scrupulous preparations that were undertaken by newly qualified 
surgeon James and by consultant orthopaedic surgeon IM for example, were
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interesting in that these two practitioners would seem to be almost at either end of 
the spectrum of experience, and the bulk of surgeons who were situated 
experientially in the middle of this spectrum took considerably less trouble over 
these preparations. It could be surmised that, while James might have seen these 
procedures as a defining characteristic of the fonn-of-life of surgeons into which 
he had recently been admitted, IM may in contrast have used them to detach 
himself in some respects from this ‘ordinary’ veterinary form-of-life. Use of 
humour too, can play an important part in presentation of self. IM referred to 
jokes that exist in ‘veterinary orthopaedic circles’; circles which are by definition 
separate from ‘ordinary’ veterinary circles.
Inexperience renders a practitioner liable to need to concentrate more o f his /  her 
resources on mapping the body, and this may detract from their ability to notice 
and / or prioritise other (important) things. This was observed in relation to 
James, who had to be reminded about the vulnerability of the spleen to damage 
during certain stages of the spay operation. In addition, (perhaps understandably), 
experts were observed to take less time to perform a given procedure, and tended 
to use fewer instruments and smaller incisions. Somewhat more surprisingly 
however, not only did they seem to possess an ability to cut comers, and simplify 
complex procedures to some extent, but they were also observed to choose less 
complex (and hence more straightforward) methods in the first place, where these 
were available, and in some cases to invent new ones of their own if not. This was 
shown for example in relation to cruciate repair operations carried out by IM as 
compared to that performed by BMc.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) and Benner (1984) stressed the importance to 
novices of context-free rules which can be applied in every situation. They stated 
that, as actual experience is gained, it is necessaiy that these rules are put aside to 
allow progression to higher skill levels. These algorithmic rules are replaced by 
heuristics, or ‘rules of thumb’. This could be turned on its head thus: what if it is 
not the rules themselves that change (for example, in their content, or the way in 
which they are worded or otherwise encoded), but rather people’s use of them? 
Measurements for instance, may be more or less accurate, or sampled by means of 
more or less precise techniques or apparatus; but they are still measurements. 
What is most important, seems to be the circumstances in which they are used, 
rather then the actual measurements themselves. Whether gauging the
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circumference of an object with the aid of a piece of string, or measuring minute 
fractions in the blood by means of complex assay techniques, measurements can 
be used either in the sense of ‘rules’ or ‘rules of thumb’. Experts tend towards the 
latter use, while novices cannot conceive of any other than the former. However, 
when the same experts are forced for some reason to use them algorithmically, 
they experience the same sort o f uncertainties as novices. This indicates that 
novices do not put aside ‘the rules’ as they become more experienced. The rules 
are still there, essentially the same. They merely change the way in which they use 
them. I have discussed algorithmic and heuristic rules in terms of categories, and 
in terms of measurements. This contrasts somewhat with accounts of ‘the rules’ 
as sets of propositions or instructions (Benner 1984; Collins 1986; Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus 1986). I see no reason however why they cannot be encoded in other 
formats. Artist respondents reported difficulty in using pictures either as 
‘blueprints’ or plans for their work (ie, as a draughtsman would make them), or as 
models to copy directly, and observations of surgeons indicated similar 
difficulties. Pictures too, it would seem, can be used either algorithmically or 
heuristically.
10.5 Graphic renderings?
Alongside the necessity to address the research question itself, I have set myself 
another, altogether different task; to render my exposition graphically. That is, in 
diagrammatic form, alongside text, in the tradition o f the ‘visual languages’ that 
have emerged for burgeoning scientific disciplines, including geology, and 
anatomy. I thus employ some of the techniques of anatomy for myself. I have 
provided several diagrams which are intended to help focus on changing aspects 
of some of the processes that I have described, providing further explication 
beyond that of the textual account itself. It remains for me to ‘complete the 









Less complex operation, or more 
experienced surgeon
More complex operation, or 
less experienced surgeon
Mental model of situation; dynamic, subject to change
Fig. 14 Completing the picture: a generalised model of surgical operations.
In this diagram, I have tried to show how primary enhancement, reduction and 
further enhancement procedures may be differentially used by more and less 
experienced surgeons, or in more or less complex surgery. It is important to note 
that by ‘experienced’, I mean possessing experience in relation to that specific 
surgical procedure. Surgery, and for that matter sculpture also, have much to 
commend them as contexts in which to investigate further aspects of skill. They 
have provided me not only with opportunities to ‘research’ the activities of 
proponents of these disciplines, but also with opportunities to reflect upon the 
nature of research, and research methods themselves. I would personally like to 
cany out further research with student and newly qualified surgeons, to tiy to 
discover in more detail the ways in which (and the point at which) they change in 
their approach to ‘the rules’. Also, I have speculated that ‘rules’ can take other
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forms than sets of instructions or propositions, as categories or other means of 
classification, or measurements for example, or possibly even of certain kinds of 
pictures. This too, is a topic which would be very interesting to take further.
To conclude, thinking back to my very first sentence for a moment, I have 
attempted to provide insights into what is entailed in ‘Knowing, seeing and how 
we come to know and see’. The quote which heads this chapter represents one 
way of thinking about surgeons’ skills. Hirschauer has broken down the complex 
bundle of skills necessary for performing a surgical operation into smaller (and 
hence less complex) units. He has then related or compared these to (parts of) 
other occupational skills. As the quote indicates, surgery thus has many aspects in 
common with other skills. This type of investigation could therefore in theory 
have been carried out in the context of almost any other skilled practice. The pilot 
study described in chapter 7 which features evidence from sculptors, provides 
contrast which serves to demonstrate that many o f these things are more widely 
applicable beyond any one practice, and hence that similarities exist between 
practices that are often thought about as belonging to entirely different spheres. A 
key link is that of skill. Skill, and its development thus encapsulate, and 
demonstrate similarities across different disciplines and different practices.
Finally, my experiment with ‘graphic renderings’, though to some extent 
unsatisfactory (since it did not after all enable me to escape the limitations of the 
narrative form), has however, by combining verbal /  narrative and graphical /  
non-linear modes o f representation, enabled me to convey something more than 
either alone could have done. Any mode of representation offers opportunities, as 
well as limitations, and it is therefore an experiment that is worth repeating, 
perhaps by trying out different diagrammatic forms for different activities. 
‘Research methods’, rather than being inscribed in tablets of stone, as tends to 
come across in the teaching of them (and I have been equally as guilty as anyone 
in this respect, in my own teaching), should, I feel, be thought about in a more 
‘experimental’ sense. Researchers should not be afraid to challenge accepted 
methodologies, to adapt them, and to use them in unorthodox ways. What they 
must do of course, is to be quite explicit about this, if  the integrity of research to 
be maintained. I hope that if  nothing else, this work reopens debates about 
methodologies. Researchers must be reflective about the methods they use, rather 
than adopt them merely through habit or conventional usage. If  by challenging to
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some extent methodological conventions (which is probably a somewhat unwise 
thing to do in a doctoral thesis), I have encouraged this reflectiveness, then I feel 
that I have in some small way succeeded in contributing to current and future 
debates, and that the hard work has been worthwhile.
I have come to the end of this present work, yet in many ways the real work is 
only just beginning. Northrop Fiye (1947) an eminent practitioner in a discipline 
quite apart from any o f those in which I have dabbled here, described how a 
doctoral thesis is useful for encouraging intensive reading (or in this case perhaps, 
extensive reading), but of relatively little use for gaining ‘literary perspective’, 
which takes years to develop and cannot be hurried. I consider this a fitting way 
in which to think about my efforts here. This is but a small contribution to the 
study of the vast topic of human knowledge and skills (or for that matter, that of 
researching them also). Much is left to do, and to discover, by whatever methods 
are available to us. On this note, I finish.
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NOTES
* I have adopted David Gooding’s terminology to describe these processes. In 
doing so, I am making an analogy only. As he suggested I point out, his term 
denoted something veiy specific; the adding and removing of dimensions of a 
representation. I have used it in a more ‘literal’ or ‘physical’ sense, in respect of 
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